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ABSTRACT
This project studies how ethnic American literature of the long nineteenth century
represents the relationship between the dispossession of lands and lives—the histories of
settler colonialism and slavery—and the making of democracy and capitalism in the
United States. We often think of this relationship in terms of temporally distinct stages in
which the formal equality of democracy and the marketplace overcome and thus leave
behind the direct domination of colonization and enslavement. However, I focus on how
the early novels of Indigenous, African, and Mexican American writers from the period
of manifest destiny to the New Deal era represent the ways colonial and racial
dispossession are not overcome by but in fact underpin and cohere liberal democracy and
its market economy. I argue that the formal dissonance of these early novels—the way
the narrative and aesthetic structures of these works contain irresolvable tensions and
oppositions that foreclose harmony or unity in their formal visions or experiences—
embodies how the social cohesion, cooperation, and consent required for liberal
democracy and the wage labor relation are produced through and continue to depend on
Native dispossession and anti-Black subjection. In doing so, they serve as a key literary
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history or archive of narrative forms mapping a formative period in the history of racial
capitalism. These early novels reveal how whiteness and settler sovereignty serve as the
linchpins of capitalism. That is, they demonstrate how the violence of anti-Indianness
and anti-Blackness generates the forms of unity among settlers that help overcome the
contradictions of US capitalism in ways that enable its meteoric expansion in the long
nineteenth century when the United States transforms from a settler colony into a settler
empire at the center of the world system in the twentieth century. In this way, my project
contributes to how we understand race and capitalism. It shows not only how capitalism
depends on producing racial, colonial, gender, and sexual difference, but also how the
ability for capitalism to expand in the face of its internal conflict between labor and
capital is made possible through this unity among settlers generated by colonization and
enslavement.
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Introduction
In a work mostly ignored or when acknowledged often dismissed, sometimes
even derided by academics, yet well-read in study groups of community organizers since
its publication in 1983, J. Sakai’s Settlers writes a history of the United States as a
capitalist society based on slavery and genocide in which settlers from the poorest to the
richest collaborate to share power and wealth through the dispossession of Native lands
and Black lives. For Sakai, capitalism arrives and develops differently in the North
American European settler colonies than how Marx theorizes capitalism’s history in
England. Marx’s map of capital focuses on wage labor and the value form, a social
relation between owners of the means of production and a class of proletarians divorced
from the land and forced to sell their labor in exchange for subsistence wages. For Sakai,
the United States context is defined by a social relation between settlers and the colonized
and enslaved. There is an unbridgeable gulf between settlers and those whom settlers
genocide and hold captive in their pursuit of capital accumulation. That is, for Sakai,
settlers are a class of parasites living off the stolen land, enslaved bodies, and labor of
Native, African, and Chicanx peoples, and later imported colonial laborers from around
the world. Sakai writes that
in Amerika intra-oppressor class distinctions have always been muted on the mass
level by the fact that the main distinction was whether you were a settler or a
subject, whether you were in the slave patrols or enslaved in the fields, whether
you were in the frontier garrison community or imprisoned in the reservation.
This was the all-important identity, to which everything else was subordinate.
Only someone with no contact with reality can fail to see this. (352)
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While within the settler ranks there are conflicts of class, there is only irreconcilable
antagonism between colonized people and settlers. It is from this antagonism, Sakai
contends, that springs democracy and the growth of US capitalism.
It is easy to why Settlers finds itself in the spaces of community organizing and
the undercommons of the (neoliberal) university rather than in the works cited pages of
liberal humanist academics.1 It suggests that settlers will not, on their own, dismantle the
structures of violence they constructed, continue to uphold, and benefit from. Instead,
Sakai argues only liberation movements of the colonized and enslaved will do this.
However, narratives of liberal progress represent this antagonism Sakai identifies in
terms of distinct stages in which expanded forms of citizenship and the formal equality of
wage labor overcome the direct domination of colonization and enslavement. We are told
that whatever happened in the past can stay there for we are all Americans now, or for
class-first thinkers, we are all workers now, the 99%, and should not divide ourselves
worrying about issues of “identity” like race or gender.
In this climate, Dissonances of Dispossession returns to Sakai’s history of the
United States and studies how narrative form can help bring into view what Sakai
maintains are relations of violence constitutive of a settler society that nonetheless
celebrates itself as a democracy not only worth saving and defending but one marching
toward further progress. It asks the questions: what is the relationship between the
dispossession of lands and lives—the histories of settler colonialism and slavery—and
the making of democracy and capitalism in the United States? How can literary narrative
map the terrain of this relationship between dispossession and US settler society?
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In pursuing these questions, Dissonances of Dispossession examines how the
early literary narratives of Native, African, and Mexican American writers from the midnineteenth century to 1945 offer ways of mapping how settler colonialism and slavery
create the conditions in which the wage labor system emerges and expands. This period
precedes the arrival of global anticolonial rebellions of the mid-twentieth-century and
their corresponding literary and cultural nationalisms. Which is to say, these early
narratives had much different aims than those of literary and cultural nationalisms.
Writers and artists of literary and cultural nationalisms represented and cohered the
identity of national liberation struggles. Such representations affirmed the humanity of
dispossessed peoples in the face of a colonial system that treated them as Franz Fanon put
it, “the wretched of the earth,” or as Sylvia Wynter termed, “the irrational/subrational
Human Other” (266). Artists of the cultural nationalism period used narrative form to
construct the affirmable identities of Black, Red, and Chicanx power. However, during
this earlier period of my study from manifest destiny to the New Deal Era, writers of the
colonized and racialized classes use the genres of the novel to demand recognition of
their sovereignty and humanity. Writers from John Rollin Ridge and Martin Delany at
mid-century to Alice Callahan, Simon Pokagon, and Nat Love at the turn-of-the-century,
to D’Arcy McNickle, Américo Paredes, and Ann Petry in the years when the welfare
state emerges, use the novel to craft images of their communities’ sovereignty and
humanity in an effort to challenge the ways colonization and racialization positioned
them as the unsovereign and nonhuman.
Yet the visions or formal experiences these early novels offer to do this work are
uneven, fractured, and irregular. The images of sovereignty or humanity they seek to
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produce do not turn out coherently like they do in major works of the novel of the time.
However, it is this literary history of dissonance in the early ethnic American novel I
focus on. I argue that the dissonant forms of early literary narratives of Indigenous,
African, and Mexican American writers embody and thus make visible the way settler
colonialism and slavery are asymmetrical power relations—antagonisms—through which
the forms of unity, reciprocity, and equivalence among settlers are forged that then
become central to the consolidation of democracy and expansion of capitalism in the
United States. The antagonism between settlers and the colonized and enslaved inscribes
itself in the forms of these early novels as narrative and aesthetic dissonance. I am
suggesting, then, that these early novels map this contradictory history in which the social
cohesion, stability, and consent required for liberal democracy and the wage labor
relation are produced through and depend on these structures of anti-Indian and antiBlack violence. They serve as a literary history periodizing the way colonial and racial
dispossession produce the unity and cooperation among white settlers that allow the wage
labor relation to emerge and expand without facing catastrophic worker refusals or
rebellions.
Dissonances of Dispossession thus demonstrates how capitalism emerges within
and through these relations of violence of Native elimination and anti-Blackness and
continues to be reproduced through them. It highlights how the overlooked or
understudied formal features of the early ethnic American novel help us see how forms of
direct domination of dispossession are co-present with, and not prior stages to, the
indirect domination of labor exploitation.2 They also help historicize how settler
sovereignty and whiteness are key formations through which the conflict between labor
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and capital, the conflict of exploitation, is resolved in ways allowing for US capitalism
not only to emerge and expand in the nineteenth century but rise to the center of the
world-system in the twentieth century to come.
This project is also a study of how nineteenth-century narrative form develops and
functions at the locations that serve as the constitutive exterior to liberal modernity. Here
is where marginalized authors use the novel not so much to respond to the contradictions
of nation-building, or the alienation of market society, but rather to help their
communities simply survive the nineteenth century. The same genres of the novel at the
locations of possession and freedom—the sites of white settler power—which are used to
cohere the nation, consolidate liberal subjectivity, or the bourgeois nuclear family, are
used by Native, African, and Mexican American writers in ways that reveal the limits or
contradictions of these categories. In this way, I locate a much earlier and overlooked
history of form that does the work of expressing the contradictions of liberal modernity in
the way the modernist aesthetic is valued for doing so later. However, the dissonances I
read in these early novels that embody these contradictions result not from attempts at
formal experimentation, but from what these authors sought to imagine from the
structural locations where they are positioned using the available narrative forms of the
nineteenth century literary marketplace. Writers of colonized and enslaved groups of this
period seek to imagine justice, redemption, or inclusion within the same sites of equality,
possession, freedom, and rights that are premised, however, on their peoples’ oppression.
As such, they try to envision demands that if fulfilled would destabilize these very
categories, demands that if satisfied would make US settler society impossible. By using
the very narrative forms legitimizing this society to write such demands, these authors
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cause such forms to buckle and break—they cannot bear the load of this task—and it is in
these binds and tensions where these early novels map for us the terrain of contradictions
of a settler society like the United States built on and through stolen land and lives.
This earlier period my project focuses on spans the time from when the wage
labor relation formally emerged in the US national economy to the moment when this
economy reached its zenith or center of the world-system as the twentieth century
hegemon. This is a period when important developments between dispossession and
capitalism crystalized in ways that prepared the way for United States to become the
center of capitalism in the twentieth century, as well as, the later arrival of late capitalism
and its failure we are living through right now. It begins with the absorption of labor in
the mid-nineteenth century and ends when labor is perhaps most fully absorbed by the
capitalist relation during the welfare-state/Fordist model of accumulation. It ends, then,
right before US capital enters its “golden era” (1945-1973) and then subsequent descent
into secular crisis or our current era of deindustrialization and structural unemployment
of late capitalism (1973-present). This earlier period of my project also begins when the
dream of realizing a white settler republic appeared the most attainable, when colonialism
and slavery not only enclosed a continent through genocidal wars against Indigenous
nations and Mexico but also accumulated millions of African people as slaves to make
this dream possible. It ends, as I will show, when this dream is later recuperated but at a
higher level of mediation in the welfare-state model that promises to strike a permanent
balance between labor and capital.
Racial Capitalism
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The argument, then, of Dissonances of Dispossession builds on and responds to a
body of work interested in both questioning the assumed teleology of liberal democracy
and broadening our understanding of capitalist modernity beyond the realm of the wage
labor relation to the sites of colonial and racial dispossession. Recent work from scholars
in Indigenous studies, Black studies, critical ethnic studies as well as scholars using
decolonial and Black abolitionist frameworks have offered critiques of colonialism and
slavery in response to post-racial imaginaries and to the lack of attention theories of
neoliberalism give to questions of race and coloniality.3 This work highlights the ongoing
role of dispossession in the contemporary, challenging the view that liberal inclusion
resolves the violence of colonization and racialization or that neoliberalism is only a
matter of finance (or fictitious) capital and/or immaterial labor. In doing so, this work
points up how critiques of settler colonialism and slavery better explain the United States
as a white settler colony and slave estate than either postcolonial critiques or orthodox
(white) Marxisms. The former tends to ignore that the colonizer never left North America
and the latter focuses on wage labor and finance capitalism without a view of
colonization or racialization. I want to reflect, then, on some key perspectives from this
body of work in order to show how my project both rests and seeks to expand on the
critical maps this work offers for understanding the way histories of dispossession relate
to capitalism.
To do this, we must begin with Marx and his theory of capitalism not only
because it offers a foundational understanding of the capitalist relation, but also because
it prompts responses that stretch it to account for colonialism and slavery. While Marx
maps the movements of capitalism’s law of accumulation between labor and capital, he
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doesn’t attend to the co-presences of colonialism and slavery.4 Instead, they are stages of
capitalism’s past rather than ongoing structures of dispossession on which capitalism
depends. In Capital, Marx uses the term primitive accumulation (borrowed from Adam
Smith) to describe not only the origins of capitalism as the stage of colonialism and
slavery that gives birth to capitalism, but also the history of land enclosures and
expulsion of peasants that creates masses of propertyless populations or “wageless life”
from which capital culls (absorbs) wage laborers.5
Much of this account serves to dispel bourgeois economic theories that teach that
capitalism emerged from the thrift and work-ethic of merchants or entrepreneurs. Against
this, Marx emphasizes that capitalism arrives, “dripping from head to toe, from every
pore, with blood and dirt” (926). While Marx in the sections on primitive accumulation
demonstrates that capitalism is not universal but historical—its origins remind us that if it
was created by human hands, it can be ended by them as well—he nonetheless suggests
that the capitalist relation temporally supplants prior forms of primary or direct
accumulation like colonial and racial dispossession. In Marx’s account, capitalism
overtakes colonialism and slavery and other “precapitalist formations” by homogenizing
space and time and creating its own presuppositions.6 Primitive accumulation doesn’t
continue, according to Marx, because once the capitalist relation arrives, its relations of
production of surplus value become its relations of reproduction. It becomes a closed
loop until its own internal contradictions result in a terminal crisis out of which emerges,
it is imagined, the negation of capital’s negation of the proletariat, namely a democratized
worker-controlled mode of production, or communism as synthesis.

9
Yet theories produced by decolonial struggles and the Black radical tradition have
offered crucial updates and expansions to Marx’s map of capitalism. They have done
what Fanon had said was necessary when understanding capitalism in a colonial context
which was to stretch Marxism, or Marx’s map of capitalism, to be accountable to the
liberation struggles of the colonized and enslaved. Theorists of racial capitalism, building
on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, and Cedric Robinson, argue that
capitalism is a racial capitalism insofar as racialization is central to the wage labor
relation and the management of capitalism’s surplus populations (those excluded from
waged labor, or the unwaged). Racialization produces hierarchies of social value through
which capital exploits and sheds labor. Devalued bodies are made to be cheaper and more
disposable. This allows capital to more easily exploit labor power for profit and to shed
labor from the production process in the attempt to increase profitability through
innovations in productivity that reduce the need for labor. Such exclusions from the wage
form not only have been made along the lines of race but racial differentiation also
legitimates the use of state-sponsored direct violence in managing those made
superfluous to wage labor. Critiques of capitalism as racial capitalism thus help us
understand how dispossession generates hierarchies of social value as categories of racial
difference that help justify the distribution of populations among the waged, the
underwaged, and the unwaged.
Recent work in Indigenous and Black studies consider the colonial relation and
slave relation as paradigmatic sites of dispossession rather than the exploitation of wage
labor as Marxism suggests. Critiques of settler colonialism show how the colonial
relation in the United States is one of European settlers eliminating Indigenous people in
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order to replace them, turning the land into a literal and figurative base for the capitalist
relation.7 The aim in settler colonialism is transform land not only into wealth but the
means itself of producing wealth, and Indigenous peoples stand in the way of this. As
such, Indigenous people relate to capital as already surplus or impediments to
capitalism’s arrival and expansion. In this way, Indigenous peoples are not positioned as
wage laborers, even though they must work as wage laborers to live. They are positioned
as “savages” to be eliminated because their sovereignty over or autonomy through the
lands that capitalism seeks to enclose opposes its aim of turning all land into means for
producing more capital.8 As Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang explain:
Within settler colonialism. . . Land is what is most valuable, contested, required.
This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source
of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land
represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This
violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted
each day of occupation. . . In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade
into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of
the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological
relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made
savage. (5)
To capital, then, the “Savage,” neither owns land as property nor labors on the land to
produce value. The “Savage” is one without productive capacity. In this way, then, the
“Savage” is surplus to capital and thus marked for elimination rather than absorption into
the production process as wage laborers.9
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From this violence of colonial dispossession as the attempt to eliminate
Indigenous peoples emerges the asymmetry of the colonial relation in which the power or
sovereignty of settlers as both a subject position and a nation-state form derive from what
is simultaneously the recognition and disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty. The process
of dispossessing Indigenous peoples, in other words, creates settler sovereignty as a form
of what Manu Vimalassery calls a “countersovereignty”: “US sovereignty is in perpetual
reaction to the prior and primary claims of Native peoples on the territories that the
United States claims as its own. Seen in this light, US sovereignty will always be an
unfinished project in perpetual crisis of unraveling.” (142). The settler state recognizes
Indigenous sovereignty only insofar as doing so legitimates its claims to lands in relation
to other competing empires. Yet the settler state cannot recognize the sovereignty of
Indigenous people on lands it has enclosed through violent dispossession or it risks
demonstrating the illegitimacy of its own sovereignty. My project thus considers settler
sovereignty not only in terms of state power and territoriality but more broadly as a site
or position of power derivative of the processes of colonization and elimination. The
colonial relation engenders settler sovereignty as a shared power among settlers through
their mutual support, participation, and benefits received from, colonization.
Building on these insights, my project studies more closely the relationship
between this asymmetry of the colonial relation and the wage labor relation. It asks what
is the role of settler sovereignty in the relationship between labor and capital? Settler
sovereignty, or the structural position of the settler, becomes a site of shared power
among settlers over the colonized. It is the site of expectation of autonomy through a
claim to productive capacity, which is the claim of immunity to being made surplus, or
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being positioned as the “Savage.” My project seeks to show, then, how settler sovereignty
serves as one of the sites power in which the wage labor relation emerges and expands. It
is the settler wage worker’s shared status with the settler owner that allows for the
reproduction of the wage labor relation. The worker fights on behalf of the colonial
relation to gain more power within the capitalist relation. The owner depends on the
worker to do the work of expanding empire by enclosing land. In this site of shared
power of settler sovereignty, worker or owner alike, are offered the expectation of
property or autonomy through colonialism. It is through these shared benefits and power
that labor consents to capital despite the conflict and crisis of the wage labor relation.
My project also examines the relationship between slavery and the capitalist
relation, or the slave relation and the wage labor relation. Theorists of slavery and/or
whiteness studies demonstrate how the slave relation was the primary economic engine of
capitalist production. Du Bois, Walter Johnson, and others show that all capitalist
production rested on exploited slave labor and the economic value of slave bodies as
fixed capital. Johnson argues in his historical study of slavery in the Mississippi Valley
that in 1860 New Orleans was the center of capital not London. Innovation of machinery
like the steam boat occurred at faster rates on the Mississippi river than it did in the
textile mills of Lowell, MA, or Manchester.10 For David Roediger and Joel Olson (both
of whom build on Du Bois’ critique of whiteness), slavery constitutes the formal wage
worker as the white worker and white citizen. Wages of whiteness and the privileges of
white citizenship depend on anti-Black subjection. The wage worker becomes white,
then, insofar as the wage worker is “free” through the selling of his or her labor to capital.
Which is to say, selling one’s labor came to index one’s unenslaveability or claim to be
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free from being positioned as a slave. Such critiques of whiteness show how it serves as a
form of social control. The wages of whiteness and white citizenship make the white
worker loyal to capital against his or her interests as a proletarian. In this account,
whiteness is an ideology. For my project, I am less concerned with how whiteness works
as an ideology than I am with the way the slave relation generates whiteness as position
of cross-class shared power. The working class of US capitalism is not divided by the
ideology of whiteness. Rather, the asymmetry of the slave relation has positioned white
labor on the side of capital in their mutual opposition/shared power over enslaved
Africans.
It is for this reason that I also draw on critiques of whiteness or anti-Blackness
from Afropessimist theory. For Afropessimists, slavery is neither a stage nor a relation of
labor. It is a structure of anti-Black violence that positions the Slave in social death in
order to provide coherence to the social world (symbolic order) of the master-class. In
this way, the Slave is not a laborer, but, as Frank Wilderson puts it, “a being for the
captor” (2). From within this position the Slave might be forced to labor, but he or she is
not enslaved in order to enrich economically the master. Economic profit is secondary to
or a product of the primary role of anti-Blackness or the making of the Slave position
which is to cohere and stabilize the libidinal economy of the master-class.11 The
enslavement of African people creates the racialized the status of slaveness, the site of
social death, as Blackness where slaves are accumulated and made fungible as objects to
be owned and traded before they are exploited as laborers. In this same process, the site
in which one claims immunity from this violence of enslavement or position of social
death is racialized as whiteness.
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For Wilderson, the wage laborer, then, exists within this site of whiteness as
Humanity itself. The wage laborer relates to the Slave in the same way the capitalist
relates to the Slave: as a potential buyer of slaves. As Wilderson puts it, “If workers can
buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave. It seems to me that, the psychic dimension
of a proletariat, who stand in precisely the same relationship to other members of civil
society due to their intramural exchange in mutual possessive possibilities, the ability to
own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both, is where we must begin
to understand the founding antagonism between [whiteness and blackness]” (13). The
wage labor relation is thus a conflict in relation to the antagonism of Blackness.12
Workers and owners share power through their support of the enslavement of African
people. Owners might exploit workers, but owners nonetheless relate to workers as
fellow masters or potential buyers of enslaved Africans. The antagonism of antiBlackness thus enables workers and owners to reconcile their conflict in ways that the
relationship between the Slave and the master, whether he or she be an owner or worker,
is without a resolution. This is why the slave relation never ended but was carried
forward through different technologies and methods. Anti-Black violence must be
repeated to cohere meanings of whiteness as Humanity in which the conflict between
labor and capital can be resolved. Not only is hegemony not a constituent element of the
Slave position like it is for the wage laborer, but hegemony, as the gaining of the consent
of workers to be ruled, is enabled or made possible through anti-Black violence.
While Wilderson addresses the relationship between anti-Blackness and the
capitalist relation, he tends to focus on either the role of accumulation of slaves as
resolution to capital’s profitability crisis or on the way wage labor exploitation should be
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seen as one among many sites of oppression that are equivalent as non-Black or “intraHuman” conflicts in relationship to the antagonism of Blackness. To this latter point,
Afropessimism argues that Marxism explains only the experience of white or human
workers and does not apply to those racialized as Black. My project seeks to use these
insights of Afropessimism to sharpen or focus Marxism’s understanding of wage labor as
a relation structurally dependent on the asymmetry of the slave relation. If Wilderson
argues that anti-Blackness makes waged labor white labor or places the wage laborer on
the side of capital in relationship to the Slave, my project continues to follow the
movement of this relationship by looking at the ways the alienation of labor produces a
need for psychic or libidinal coherence in the first place. In other words, the wage labor
relation and its commodity fetish produce alienated life and atomization, which for the
reproduction of wage labor to occur, demands forms of symbolic value that anti-Black
violence offers to members of the master-class. If Afropessimism appears totalizing or
universalizing at times, even anti-dialectical to many, my project focuses on the specific
historical conditions of alienated labor and the ways these conditions produce a need for
symbolic value that the slave relation as social death offers. That is, my project contends
that dialectically capitalism depends on Black social death. While this point supports the
Afropessimist thesis that slavery was less about exploiting labor and more about
subjugating people in order to cohere the life of European colonizers engaged in capitalist
social relations, it also suggests that capitalism’s law of accumulation, and the life of
alienation it creates, plays a recursive material role in reproducing the slave relation. That
is, anti-Black subjection produces the symbolic compensation helping settlers overcome
the alienation they experience in a society they have created based on wage labor
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exploitation. In this way, through the help of Afropessimism, my project hopes to offer a
way of completing rather than breaking Marxism’s theory of wage labor.
If the above studies offer contributions to understanding the role of colonialism
and slavery in capitalism, stretching Marx’s map in important ways, an area in need of
more attention is grasping how colonialism and slavery create the conditions of
possibility for capitalism to overcome its conflict with labor and crisis of its own
reproduction. My project offers a close look at this relationship between dispossession
and the expansion of capitalism by demonstrating how the early narratives of the
colonized and enslaved represent colonialism and slavery’s role in creating sites of shared
power among settlers in which the conflict of exploitation and the crisis of reproduction,
housed within these sites, do not turn into catastrophic worker refusals or rebellions.
What is the conflict and crisis of the capitalist relation and how do they stand in
the way of capitalism’s expansion? Marx theorizes that the wage labor relation emerges
when workers are divorced from the means to production and must sell their labor-power
to capital in exchange for wages they use to buy the commodities necessary for life.
Capital in turn must reproduce workers in order to accumulate surplus value from their
labor. When this relation emerges, it can be said that capitalism produces its own
presuppositions. That is, it produces its own conditions of possibility. Without wages, the
worker cannot live. Without labor power, capital has no source from which to accumulate
surplus value. Labor and capital must reproduce each other for each to live, so to speak.
However, the conflict at the heart of this relationship is exploitation. The value
workers produce for capital is not returned to them. Through the compulsion to labor for
wages, because workers are divorced from the means to produce their lives outside of the
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market, capital exploits the capacity of workers to produce value. It alienates the product
of their labor. They work not for themselves but to produce surplus value. Furthermore,
the crisis of this relation is that for capital to accumulate surplus value it must also shed
the commodity that produces surplus value, namely labor power. Inter-capitalist
competition requires reducing the cost of labor. Capital organizes the production process
such that productivity increases while using less labor. With less labor, not only are
workers shed or excluded from receiving wages necessary for life but aggregate surplus
value decreases. The capitalist relation enters a crisis of reproduction. It cannot produce
surplus value and workers cannot reproduce their lives without laboring for wages. In
other words, the crisis of the reproduction of capitalism is not only a crisis of
accumulating surplus value but a crisis of the reproducing the lives of workers. Together
the conflict of exploitation and this crisis of reproduction create conditions of catastrophe
for capital.13 That is, if we understand that the capitalist relation requires proletarianized
laborers and produces its own limits or crisis of reproduction, the problem of how it
expands without catastrophe emerges. If producing capitalism is also producing its own
impossibility, how does it continue to be reproduced? Why hasn’t labor in North America
turned this conflict and crisis into catastrophe for capital?
For Marx, this crisis becomes the occasion for labor’s negation of capital.14 For
others, this crisis produces imperial seizures of land and cheaper labor where the process
starts all over again on an expanded scale. For economist Giovanni Arrighi, the crisis of
capitalism’s reproduction means the changing of hands of the center of capitalism, the
move from one hegemon to another. My project, however, suggests that the early
narratives of colonized and racialized writers offer an important view of how capitalism
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avoids conflict and crisis turning into catastrophe through the ways the colonial and slave
relation produce and maintain sites of white settler power. They represent how the
colonial relation produces settler sovereignty as site of shared power counterposed to
Indigenous dispossession, how the slave relation produces whiteness as site of shared
power counterposed to the social death of the Slave, and how it is from within these two
sites of white settler power that the wage labor relation can emerge and become
reproducible despite conflict and crisis.15
In this way, my project reveals how settler sovereignty and whiteness together
serve as the linchpin to the wage labor relation. If ideology or producing consent is
integral to the wage labor relation as a form of indirect domination, it is through these
categories that this process takes place. Studies on whiteness from Du Bois to Baldwin to
Roediger maintain that whiteness is an institution of social control. I expand on this
social control thesis by showing how settler sovereignty intersects with whiteness in
creating these conditions of gaining consent. I also try to flesh out a better understanding
of the material role of the symbolic value these categories produce for white settlers in
the capitalist relation. The symbolic value of being in the master class and being
protected by sovereignty of empire matters in a situation of alienated labor and the crisis
of labor’s reproduction. Symbolic value provides the coherence that capitalism prevents
in the first place. In this way, my project traces the way the colonial and slave relation
must be reproduced recursively to ensure the conditions of capitalism’s reproduction.
My argument that the early narratives of Indigenous, African, and Mexican
American writers map the way colonialism and slavery create sites of shared power,
symmetries of white settler power, that enable the resolution to capitalism’s conflict of
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exploitation and crisis of reproduction helps answer the question of why colonization and
racialization persist in capitalism. Why do colonialism and anti-Blackness remain copresent structures of dispossession with the capitalist relation? Recent work by scholars
studying this very question have demonstrated how late capitalism works through the
long histories of dispossession. These studies work against the idea that capitalism has
outgrown its colonial and racial origins, revealing instead how capitalism’s latest stage
depends on the technologies and institutions of colonialism and slavery.16 My argument
suggests that they persist because the capitalist relation depends on colonialism and antiBlackness reproducing the asymmetrical power relations between settlers and the
colonized and enslaved through which the reproduction of capitalism can continue on an
expanding scale without falling victim to catastrophic labor refusals or colonial and racial
rebellions. The asymmetries of colonialism and slavery, or the ontological hierarchies
between white settlers and the dispossessed, justify the use of (state) violence to
subjugate the dispossessed, while at the same time gaining from settler workers not only
the consent to be exploited but the commitment to defend capital against colonial or
racial rebellion.
Understanding how reproducing settler sovereignty and whiteness is integral to
the wage labor relation also helps explain why colonialism and anti-Blackness and their
technologies of managing populations “return” so strongly to resolve capitalism’s
protracted crisis in our contemporary period of deindustrialization and state policies of
neoliberalism. While my project focuses on an earlier period, its findings offer answers to
questions about late capitalism and the contemporary. If these early narratives show us
how dispossession constituted the conditions in which the wage labor relation could
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emerge and expand despite the crisis of its reproduction, they already offer then a view of
how colonialism and anti-Blackness would remain pivotal in later stages of capitalism
when the wage labor relation sheds labor leaving the once waged increasingly wageless
or surplus to capital. While technologies of colonialism and slavery serve to manage
surplus humanity in late capitalism, capital’s shedding of labor increases the pressure to
strengthen the positions of power of settler sovereignty and whiteness, which is done
through reinforcing the antagonism of anti-Indianness and anti-Blackness. The maps
these early narratives offer of the intersections between colonialism, slavery, and
capitalism predict in many ways how capital will attempt to resolve the problem of
structural unemployment, and its crisis of reproduction, by fortifying asymmetries created
through colonialism and slavery.
Form at the Sites of Coloniality
As Fanon had advised, Dissonances of Dispossession stretches the method of
historical materialism to focus on sites beyond wage labor and the commodity form to
write a new literary history of the rise of capitalism in the US settler colonial context. It
offers a way of understanding the development of the novel form moving along a
different trajectory at the sites of coloniality than the line it follows at the sites of
modernity. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson studies how the novel “plays a
significant role in what can be called a properly bourgeois cultural revolution—that
immense process of transformation whereby populations whose life habits were formed
by other, now archaic, modes of production are effectively reprogrammed for life and
work in the new world of market capitalism” (153). The novel’s task in this cultural
revolution, Jameson continues, is to produce
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for the first time that very life world, that very ‘referent’—the newly quantifiable
space of extension and market equivalence, the new rhythms of measurable time,
the new secular and ‘disenchanted’ object world of the commodity system, with
its post-traditional daily life and its bewilderingly empirical, ‘meaningless,’ and
contingent Unwelt—of which this new narrative discourse will then claim to be
the ‘realistic’ reflection. (153)
Understood through this lens, we can see how the novel aids in the construction of the
bourgeois subject, the nation, the family, and other categories cohering of commodity
society, generating the experience of aesthetic and narrative unity as compensation for
the increasing atomization and alienation of life under capitalism. The novel carries
forward a bourgeois aesthetic tradition offering formal experiences of unity, harmony,
and balance that serve as resolutions to how reification or commodification destroys a
social unity or capacity to map one’s place in his or her larger social world.
Terry Eagleton explains how the rise of capitalism atomizes social relations in a
way that hails the need for the bourgeois aesthetic:
in economic life, individuals are structurally isolated and antagonistic; at the
political level there would seem nothing but abstract rights to link one subject to
the other. This is one reason why the ‘aesthetic’ realm of sentiments, affections
and spontaneous bodily habits comes to assume the significance it does. Custom
piety, intuition and opinion must now cohere an otherwise abstract, atomized
social order. (23)
Eagleton argues that the most “important cultural instrument of this hegemony in the
nineteenth century . . . uniting within itself an economy of abstract form with the effect of
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lived experience [is] the realist novel” (44). If this is the case at the sites of modernity, I
demonstrate that Native, African, and Mexican American authors of this period, writing
from the standpoint of coloniality, use the very forms of the novel doing this work of
cohering bourgeois modernity in ways that disrupt this trajectory, which is to say, their
use of the novel moves in a direction that reveals the impossibility of the aesthetic and the
colonial modern world it emerges to resolve and legitimize.
To see how this is the case, we have to first understand how my project defines
form. I understand form in the way the Frankfurt school and Jameson’s contributions to
that school theorize it, which is to say, form is ideology. Forms are representations
(mediations) of the subject’s relationship to his or her, in the language of Althusser,
conditions of existence. Forms as ideologies mediate the subject’s experience of his or
her objective conditions, the social system or mode of production in which one is situated
historically. What is, then, the form that is the novel? Jameson contends that “the novel is
then not so much an organic unity as a symbolic act that must reunite or harmonize
heterogeneous narrative paradigms which have their own specific and contradictory
ideological meaning” (144). That is, the novel takes already existing forms and puts them
into relationship with one another in the structure of its text, creating out of this
arrangement a new form itself, with the chance to do something ideologically different or
not. As mentioned, the novel as a form develops in the nineteenth century as a mode of
legitimizing the social life of capitalist modernity. Key to this is the way the novel unifies
and harmonizes its formal elements in ways that ideologically legitimize bourgeois
experience. This study, however, suggests that the forms of the early novels of Native,
African, and Mexican authors do not arrange within themselves pre-existing generic
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codes in ways creating unity or harmony, but rather these preexisting forms and genres
are arranged in ways that they relate through tension, incommensurability, collision, and
conflict, the result of which are narrative structures that produce dissonant experiences or
uneven visions of the categories of modernity, like sovereignty or humanity. Genres are
combined in these early works in ways that create dissonance and tension rather than
ideological closure and unity of experience, the result of which are forms that destabilize
the categories that the novel at the location of modernity is cohering.
The reason these early novels contain dissonance has to do with how their authors
take genres developed at one structural location and put them into new arrangements for
much different uses at the locations of coloniality. Jameson explains how “a genre is
essentially a socio-symbolic message, or in other terms, that form is immanently and
intrinsically an ideology in its own right. When such forms are reappropriated and
refashioned in quite different social and cultural contexts, this message persists and must
be functionally reckoned into the new form” (141). These writers seek to show their
humanity and sovereignty through the genres developed at and used to cohere the social
and political worlds of the structural locations premised on their own communities’
elimination and death. By transferring these genres from one location to another where
they are placed into new arrangements within their novels—for reasons of demonstrating
the sovereignty and humanity of the colonized and enslaved—these writers break or
cause these genres to fail, or not perform the same ideological function. It is this failure
due to the dissonance in these new arrangements of genres in the formal structures of the
early ethnic American novel that embodies the asymmetrical relationship between
modernity and coloniality, how the violence done in the latter constitutes the stability and
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progress of the former. This asymmetry is what limits or prevents these early novels from
replicating and reproducing the same formal structures and ideological visions that the
novel in the hands of settlers at the locations of modernity offer and produce. Put
differently, it is in causing genres of the nineteenth century to fail to envision sovereignty
and humanity of the colonized and enslaved that these novels make explicit the ways in
which the categories of settler modernity cannot include the very people whose
destruction produces such categories in the first place.
Another way of saying this is if Jameson looks at texts for their diachronic
sequence, how genres from prior stages of production are put to use in later stages,
forming generic discontinuities which are signs of historical change, I am using a similar
approach only I am looking at how genres, as mentioned above, move across political
ontologies, how they move from sites of power to sites of elimination and death.17 When
genres in the hands of settler writers cannot do the same ideological work once in the
hands of the colonized and enslaved, it points up how the genre has travelled across the
asymmetries of the colonial and slave relation—where if before it helped to construct
categories of modernity, now it forms tensions with other genres in ways that produce
visions destabilizing these categories. The historical ground that appears in this difference
is precisely the colonial and slave relations as antagonisms, as asymmetrical power
relations. The categories of modernity cannot hold their line if they include or redeem the
very people whose exclusion has produced them in the first place. Native, African, and
Mexican American writers of this study take the narrative forms writing modernity and
create from them new forms that imagine how the categories of modernity can save
colonized people. In doing so, they show that where these forms succeed in writing the
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cultural revolution of bourgeois modernity, they fail to write a place for colonized people
in this modernity precisely because it is premised on their death and elimination. Making
these forms fail to write a place for colonized people in modernity is the way these
authors register the antagonism at the heart of modernity, how there is no modernity
without genocide and enslavement, how there is no progress without this violence, no
democratic inclusion or market freedom without racial and colonial exclusions.
In this way, the dissonant forms of these early narratives exemplify, I suggest,
negative dialectical representations that Theodore Adorno theorized as formal acts of
making visible irreconcilable antagonisms of capitalist society in the hope that such an
understanding could help map their overcoming.18 A negative dialectics derives from the
material reality it attempts to model. That is, as Jameson also explains, “you have to be
grappling with a dialectical reality already in order to be able to show what the dialectic
is” (50). Negative dialectics brings into view the irreconcilable and incommensurable. As
Jameson describes it, a negative dialectic is “where the antinomy has taken the place of
the contradiction, expressing intractability rather than energy and construction (or indeed
incommensurability rather than relationship)” (50). My project illustrates how the
asymmetrical relations of the colonialism and slavery are a negative dialectic reality that
these early narratives encode through their dissonance.
This reality is what Fanon described as a manichean world of colonialism and
anti-Blackness. The settler world has nothing in common with the colonized; they are
incommensurable because the life of one is premised on the death of the other: “the zone
where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two
zones are opposed, but not in service of a higher unity. . . they both follow the principle
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of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for the two terms, one is
superfluous” (38). The reformulation of prior genres in these early novels in ways
creating irresolvable binds is a product and mediation of this manichean reality. These
works and their formal dissonance model their worlds in ways that demonstrate how the
settler colonial and anti-Black structure of the United States cannot be synthesized or
resolved in ways that leave behind or overcome the colonial and slave relation. Yet by
seeing intractability and impossibility for resolution, these early novels, I maintain, see a
new future precisely in the destruction of what cannot be synthesized. They see a new
future in the refusal to accept synthesis, a refusal to see justice in carrying forward at
higher levels of development relations of violence.
In other words, these early narratives indicate how the requisite for freedom of the
colonized and enslaved, as well as all workers whose exploitation rests on such
oppressions, is not synthesis in reforms or linear stagism, but the destruction of the
asymmetrical power relations that are colonialism and slavery and how they uphold the
capitalist relation. This is a destruction, of course, not only of the violence of these
relations but also of the power, benefits, and cohesion of settler life derived from such
violence in the first place. While biographically some of the authors of these early
narratives may have supported this kind of synthesis, the forms of their narratives do not.
This reading of these early narratives is important, then, because it brings attention to
how their uneven forms prefigure what becomes manifest at the level of content of later
cultural nationalisms that represented identities of national liberation struggles whose
goal was the overcoming of the colonial and slave relation not their synthesis at higher
levels. In short, these early narratives map the antagonisms of colonialism and anti-
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Blackness that mid-twentieth-century national liberation struggles were actively
attempting to overcome.19
It is in this way that Dissonances of Dispossession also shows how these early
narratives make legible forms of resistance not legible to dominant narratives of liberal
progress, freedom, and redemption. Their dissonant forms, which are a negative
dialectics, a refusing to affirm the world premised on colonial and racial violence,
embody the position (and politics) of those who have always tried to refuse or escape
capitalism and its colonial and slave relations. In other words, the logic of Indigenous and
Chicanx autonomy and defense against the arrival and expansion of capitalism, or the
fugitivity and building of Black autonomy found in slave insurrections and maroon
societies, are found in the dissonant forms of these early narratives. For those who
wanted America never to be or who wanted it to always go away, there was never any
debate whether it should be synthesized, resolved, realized, or redeemed. The goal of
these forms of resistance and struggle was always to destroy the destroyer, to dismantle
the structures targeting one for elimination or captivity. These early narratives inscribe
this logic by making explicit how reforming or synthesizing capitalism and its settler
democracy has and will always rest on maintaining the colonial and slave relations.20
Those who struggle from this point of view, of course, have always been rendered
invisible. Such a position is illegible to the United States and its literary and cultural
imaginaries, yet it is given form in the dissonances of these early novels.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 studies how the uneven narrative forms of Cherokee writer John Rollin
Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta (1854) and Mexican American author María Ampáro Ruiz de
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Burton’s Squatter and the Don (1885) represent the role of settler colonialism in creating
an asymmetrical relationship between Indigenous sovereignty and settler sovereignty and
how this asymmetry creates the conditions in which capital and labor overcome the
conflict of exploitation through their shared support and benefit from colonization.
Ridge’s novel uses historical romance and frontier sensationalism to represent Indigenous
sovereignty as commensurable to US sovereignty. While Ridge turns to frontier
sensationalism for the same reasons he uses the historical romance—both call for the
United States to recognize Indigenous sovereignty—each mode of representation,
however, serves as a necessary supplement to the other, forming an irresolvable bind. The
bind in the narrative strategy rehearses and thus brings to light this asymmetry of
indigenous dispossession and how it underpins the ways settler sovereignty is a site of
symmetry among settlers who share power through dispossession.
It is this symmetry of settler sovereignty that allows for capital to absorb labor
and form the wage labor relation without catastrophic refusal. The chapter makes this
point through a reading of Melville’s “Bartleby,” as a counterpoint to Ridge and Ruiz de
Burton’s attempts to use narrative fiction to resolve the problem of colonial violence.
“Bartleby” demonstrates how the wage laborer’s conflict with capital is overcome
through appeals to settler sovereignty as a position of power premised on colonial
dispossession. While Melville’s story portrays the conflict between labor and capital and
the revolutionary potential of the worker’s refusal of labor, the story’s narrative and
aesthetic structure resolves this conflict in a way that no such resolution is found in
Ridge’s novel for the colonial subject. “Bartleby” offers a coherent experience of the
grievability of the wage laborer’s exploitation. This aesthetic resolution to capital’s
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treatment of the wage laborer indexes the way colonialism—the enclosure of land
through genocide—resolves the conflict between wage labor and capital ensuring the
reproduction of their relationship. Colonialism creates settler sovereignty as a position of
shared power among settlers in which workers and owners meet as fellow settlers.
Ruiz de Burton further makes explicit this asymmetry of the colonial relation
when she attempts to write, as Melville does for the white workers, the grievability of the
dispossession of Mexican land owners in California in the years following the USMexico War of 1848. The novel tries to point up a structural equivalence between white
settlers and Californios in order to suggest that US capitalism is not recognizing the
settler sovereignty of Californios as land owning small capitalists. The tension, however,
between the novel’s use of romance and populist realism to write this grievability brings
to light the asymmetry of the colonial relation that Ruiz de Burton’s demand to be
recognized as equivalent to white settlers cannot overcome as a member of a community
targeted for dispossession. The dispossession and proletarianization of the Californios
place them in the category of the colonized, even as Ruiz de Burton writes from the point
of view of the settler with expectations of sovereignty and immunity from disposability
and proletarian life. The novel’s narrative tension offers an important representation,
then, of colonization as the process that generates asymmetries of power, the ontological
hierarchies in which settlers overcome conflicts through their support and benefits from
colonization.
The chapter shows how the dispossession of Indigenous peoples creates settler
sovereignty as one site of shared power where wage labor is formed as consenting to
capital from its inception precisely because labor expects to benefit from empire. Literary
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form grieves the worker’s exploitation, but renders victims of colonial dispossession
ungrievability. Yet, the chapter also argues that by encoding this asymmetry in their
narrative tensions, the novels of Ridge and Ruiz de Burton not only demonstrate how
colonialism generates the conditions for the emergence of the wage labor relation, but
also make legible the history of indigenous autonomy as the refusal of and struggle to
prevent the arrival of the capitalist relation.
Chapter 2 explores the way Martin Delany’s Blake (1859) represents slavery as a
structure of anti-Black violence that constitutes whiteness as a site of power in which
wage labor emerges from its inception as white labor. That is, this chapter argues that
Delany maps slavery less as a relation of labor than as a relation of violence producing
the positions of the Slave as a “being for the captor” and whiteness or the Human as
immunity from enslavement. From within this site of whiteness, the novel shows how
wage labor is made white in two ways. The first is how exchanging labor power for
wages indexes the way the wage laborer meets the owner within the same position of
“freedom” or unenslaveability. This is the argument Du Bois, Roediger and others make
and that Delany’s novel already knows in 1859. The second way is how wage labor as
free labor “earns” its unslaveability by defending capital against colonial and/or racial
rebellion. It polices for capital to prove its whiteness or unenslaveability. In this way,
Delany’s representation of slavery points up how wage labor as white labor emerges
precisely as a consenting and thus more easily reproducible class.
The tensions in the novel’s view of slavery brings this to light. The novel
represents two national visions of insurrection, one in the United States and the other in
Cuba. The vision of insurrection in Cuba, however, functions as a supplement to the
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vision of insurrection in the United States. When read together in this way, we see that
what cannot be expressed in the United States comes to light in Cuba but in a displaced
form. Non-enslaved or free workers in Cuba join with the enslaved to make the
insurrection a possibility, whereas Delany doesn’t address the problem of the whiteness
of free workers in the United States and how they relate to the enslaved. The role of the
free laboring class to police black insurrection cannot be expressed in the novel’s vision
of the United States, yet in Cuba the novel envisions free workers and slaves working
together for insurrection precisely because they are both racialized as nonwhite. Delany
takes his insurrection to Cuba, in other words, because it is where the problem of a large
free laboring policing force does not exist like it does in the United States. In Cuba, this
problem can be narratively resolved in order to envision the emergence of insurrection.
This gap in the novel’s vision of insurrection reveals how one of the constituent elements
of wage labor in the United States is to defend capital against Black rebellion in order to
maintain solidarity between itself and capital to overcome the conflict of exploitation.
The chapter also argues that the novel’s incomplete mapping of insurrection, its
refusal to totalize or offer the ideological closure necessary to complete its transnational
or global view of slavery, points to how the event of insurrection that dismantles the slave
relation or negates anti-Black violence would also abolish the very conditions upholding
liberal capitalism and thus the world the novel tries to imagine Black nationalism
emerging within. In other words, the incomplete map of insurrection encodes at the level
of form what Afropessimists theorize as the place of anti-Black violence in the modern
world of liberal capitalism, namely this world’s constitutive foundation. Blake is not so
much an incomplete representation of insurrection and Black nationalism as it is a view
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of Black insurrectionist actions as the undoing or abolition of a world held together by
anti-Black violence.
Chapter 3 examines the role of colonialism and slavery (ongoing as antiBlackness) in liberal capitalism’s transition to industrialized forms of accumulation. The
chapter looks at how Native and African American writers represent the way the rise of
industrial capitalism and its increasing absorption and disciplining of wage labor at the
turn of the century depended on reproducing the colonial and slave relation. This is a
stage of capitalism when the reproduction of wage labor becomes much more central to
the accumulation of surplus value. That is, this is a period that begins the transition from
what Marx called formal subsumption of labor to the real subsumption of labor, or in
other terms, the maturing of capital’s organization of the production process in which the
production of relative surplus value (real subsumption) begins to overtake the production
of absolute surplus value (formal subsumption). From 1873 and on, this transformation of
labor process increasingly consolidated the wage labor relation which intensified the
conflict between labor and capital. The narratives of Alice Callahan (Muscogee) writer,
Simon Pokagon (Potawatomie), and African American writer Nat love represent how the
colonial and slave relation were integral in this transformation of the labor process. The
asymmetries of the colonial and slave relation enabled settler workers and owners to
manage the conflict of labor’s increased subordination to capital.
Callahan’s Wynema responds to state-sponsored forms of indirect colonization
and elimination, namely policies of assimilation, like allotment. The tension between its
sentimentalism endorsing assimilation and reform realism exposing the violence of
colonization dramatizes the way indirect forms of elimination were pursued to generate
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greater social stability for settler society in a moment when not only military campaigns
of direct elimination had created costly instability for capital, but also conflicts between
labor and capital that challenged capitalism’s industrialization and expansion. It is this
tension between the two modes that reveals how the internal stability at the site of settler
sovereignty allowing for the resolution of conflicts is fiction, since it is premised, in part,
on elimination. That is, the means for resolving conflicts to ensure capitalism’s success
depended on elimination that was and would always be met with the contingency of
indigenous resistance, or the defense of Indigenous sovereignty.
Similarly, Pokagon’s sentimental temperance novel, Queen of the Woods,
responds to assimilation as a strategy of elimination. The novel uses sentimentalism and
realism in contradictory ways that show how elimination produces ideologies of romantic
anticapitalism that become so central to reconsolidating the site of settler sovereignty in
the face of capital’s increased absorption of labor (called at the time the “closing of the
frontier”) without the chance for escape through stolen land. In other words, Pokagon’s
novel illustrates how the ideologies by which white labor accommodates itself to new
realities of full proletarian life rest on continuing the project of elimination.
Nat Love’s autobiography represents how the slave relation continues to be
reproduced after formal abolition in part because it animated the whiteness of the wage at
a time when labor became not only increasingly absorbed and disciplined but also was
shed or made surplus to capital. His narrative maps this through the way its dime-novel
sensationalism interrupts the realism of his slave narrative. Love writes a slave narrative
demonstrating the freedom he achieves through wage labor. Yet within this slave
narrative Love uses dime-novel sensationalism to commodify these same life experiences

34
for the pleasure of the audience. The slave narrative demands readers recognize his
humanity. The sensationalism offers his life experiences to readers as consumptive
pleasure. This tension embodies the way the slave relation continues to position people of
African descent after formal abolition as objects whose suffering and abjection coheres
lives of the master-class, particularly in this period when these lives were increasingly
brought into conflictive relationship with the rapid expansion of capitalism. When
capitalism expanded and wage labor became increasingly absorbed and disciplined,
capitalism required recursively that the slave relation be remade and maintained through
new means after emancipation. All three novels thus reveal how the expansion of capital
recursively depended on reproducing the colonial and slave relation in order maintain the
sites of white settler power in which capital could accumulate greater surplus value by
further subsuming the labor process without the catastrophe of labor’s refusal or
rebellion, or without turning the crisis of capitalism’s reproduction into catastrophe.
In Chapter 4, I close my study focusing on the way the long nineteenth century
ends, in my view, with the rise of the welfare state as the attempt to redeem the
nineteenth-century dream of settler democracy. Here I examine how Salish writer D’arcy
McNickle, African American writer Ann Petry, and Mexican American writer Américo
Paredes use naturalist social protest fiction to demonstrate how the demand for the settler
state to recognize and redress the conditions of colonization and anti-Blackness will
always be ignored or disavowed—for the role of settler state, as they reveal in their
works, is to ensure settler unity for successful capitalist expansion. In other words, these
writers use the very genre of the 1930s that most powerfully produced visions demanding
recognition and redress from the state for the plight of white workers and small farmers
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to show how this genre and the political work it promises to do cannot secure the same
recognition and redress for colonized and racialized groups. These novels suggest that
New Deal reforms and the creation of the welfare state are forms of state recognition
designed to rescue white workers and small farmers from the economic crisis of 1929 as
a means of mending settler democracy as a necessary condition for creating the kind of
harmony that enables Fordist production.
McNickle’s The Surrounded uses naturalist strategies for eliciting the recognition
of the conditions of containment and imprisonment that is the reservation model. Yet
McNickle comes to point up how these very strategies parallel the logic of liberal
recognition found in the “Indian New Deal” or the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 in
which the settler state appears to move away from allotment policy toward a new policy
of federal recognition of tribal sovereignty when, in fact, the opposite was true: the IRA
was policy that extended the project of Native elimination by only granting recognition of
sovereignty if tribes agreed to structure their political forms and economies in ways
favorable to US capital accumulation. The Surrounded reveals how naturalist protest
fiction, like IRA policy, is not only a narrative strategy legitimizing the colonial relation,
but it also conceals the presence of generative Indigenous refusals of the settler state and
the colonial relation.
Similarly, Ann Petry’s The Street also contains naturalist techniques that seek to
elicit empathy for the destruction and suffering of the Black family. I contend, however,
that Petry stages naturalism in ways showing how the empathy it seeks to gain is empathy
for the white nuclear family and not about the suffering of Black subjects in the novel. In
this way, Petry’s novel makes visible how naturalist protest fiction continues the tradition
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of documenting Black suffering as something for a master-class to own rather than
confront. That is, Petry reveals how the consolidation of the nuclear family so central to
Fordist production depends on the abjection of Black subjects.
I finish the chapter by discussing Américo Paredes’ novel, studying the ways he
uses the proletarian novel form to narrate a potential recuperation of revolutionary
consciousness among Mexican Americans of South Texas after years of facing violent
counterinsurgency. I show how Paredes’ uses this form—that at the time emerged to
cohere the identity of the worker movement and its universal or “collective worker”—to
reveal how such an identity is entangled with US colonialism and thus cannot include
Mexican American laborers and their demand not only for the end of exploitation but also
decolonization. Paredes uses the proletarian novel to highlight how its politics advocates
for a white worker-first class politics. In this way, the novel suggests that the welfare
state that accommodates such politics depends on border violence in the policing not only
of forms of resistance and survival among colonial populations, but also in securing the
cross-class settler unity between white workers and capital.
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Chapter 1
Settler Colonialism, Wage Labor, and Indigenous Sovereignty in the Nineteenth
Century
In the latter chapters of Capital on the origins of capitalism, Marx discusses the
role of state violence in removing, policing and controlling the wageless and landless
masses out of which the formal working class was created in England. Through policies
of what Marx calls “Bloody Legislation,” the state officially made it a crime to be poor
by branding, torturing, imprisoning, and even killing those categorized as vagrants and
idlers—the wageless and landless—whose mere presence in public places, rather than at
work, posed a threat to the social peace of the new social order of capitalism.1 This was
the process of primitive accumulation of capitalism—the expulsion of peasants from the
land and the use of state violence to manage this new class of the propertyless. For those
in Europe wishing to escape state violence, or, those hoping never to become its victims
in the first place, the United States offered the chance to escape from or avoid falling into
this proletarian status. It was chance, however, premised on the other face of primitive
accumulation, that is, settler colonialism and slavery that targeted Indigenous people for
removal and elimination, and accumulated African peoples as slaves. If in Europe the
state aided in the enclosures of the peasant commons, in North America the settler state
enclosed the Indigenous commons and stole bodies from Africa to create a democracy for
people of European descent arriving as settlers.
By the 1840s, the US settler state had greatly expanded and centralized its use of
violence, from the federally-sponsored removal of Indigenous people of the Southeast, to
the genocidal campaigns against Native tribes in the Old and New Northwest, to the
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imperialist war with a competing settler state of Mexico in the Southwest. It was also
during the 1840s that the settler state increasingly took on the role of managing the
emerging class conflict between capital and labor. For instance, the creation of the New
York Police department in 1845, and modern police departments to follow in other major
cities of the North, formalized the settler state’s use of violence to control and contain the
potential rebellion of wageless or unemployed workers.2 This class conflict in turn was a
motor for increased and expanded forms of state violence against colonized and enslaved
populations. As land speculation and monopoly increased the cost of land, limiting its
access, while driving down wages, a process which intensified beginning in the 1830s,
the demand from workers became louder, in the South and North, for the settler state to
expropriate more Native land and/or African people to relieve this tension.3 Within this
conflict between owner and worker, the state had to balance its role of managing class
conflict by controlling rebellious workers, while ensuring capitalism’s expansion. In
short, the inception of the wage labor relation in the United States already contained a
conflict that could prove catastrophic to its reproduction.
How did nineteenth-century US fiction represent this relationship between
colonial dispossession and the emergence of the wage labor relationship? While
separated by geography and genre, the novels of Cherokee writer John Rollin Ridge,
Mexican American writer María Amparo Ruiz de Burton, and Herman Melville’s story of
class conflict, “Bartleby,” address this question in their attempts to use fiction to demand
the state resolve the problem of dispossession. Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta (1854) and Ruiz
de Burton’s The Squatter and the Don (1885) narrate the violent state-sponsored
dispossession and removal of Indigenous people and Mexican settlers in a post-1848
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California. Melville’s “Bartleby,” while widely recognized as a tale about worker
alienation, is also concerned with the role of state violence in dispossessing settlers of
their assumed right to be sovereign through ownership of land. If Melville’s “Bartleby”
expresses a feeling of lament and melancholy over Bartleby’s alienation and
incarceration, a rich and complete image of loss and exclusion that invokes sympathy for
the forlorn (white) worker, the novels of Ridge and Ruiz de Burton offer uneven and
dissonant representations of dispossession and exclusion. I argue that this difference in
the form of representing dispossession embodies the way colonial dispossession
generates settler sovereignty as a site of shared power between capital and labor in which
the conflict of exploitation could be managed to ensure capital’s emergence and
consolidation. Melville’s narrative vision lamenting Bartleby’s dispossession appeals to
and is enabled by the promises of settler sovereignty as a site of shared power
overcoming intra-settler conflicts like that between labor and capital. Ridge and Ruiz de
Burton’s discordant and irregular representations of Indigenous and Mexican American
dispossession bring to light this asymmetry of colonial relation—the way it produces
cohesion for settlers precisely through the violent removal and/or removal of the
colonized. In other words, if Melville represents the conflict of the capital/labor relation,
his story also contains this conflict’s formal resolution found in its vision of Bartleby’s
grievability.4 But for Ridge and Ruiz de Burton, their attempts to imagine a reconciliation
between US sovereignty and the colonized results in narrative forms without resolutions.
The unresolved narrative form of Ridge and Ruiz de Burton’s novels thus make explicit
this irreducible antagonism of the colonial relation in which its violence constitutes a
shared power among settlers—settler sovereignty—that allows for the wage labor relation
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to emerge without catastrophic refusals from workers. Despite, then, their manifest
themes endorsing capitalist values, the uneven forms of Murieta and The Squatter and the
Don make legible the erased position of those in the nineteenth century who refused and
rejected the United States as an illegitimate colonial capitalist project.
Bartleby the Vagrant
Melville’s “Bartleby” is widely recognized as one of the most lucid literary
representations of what Marx had conceptualized in the same years as alienated labor.5
The story not only allegorizes class conflict emerging in the North. It also demonstrates
how this conflict is concealed by the ideology of liberal humanism. The nameless
narrator, a lawyer and owner of the law firm on Wall-Street that employs Bartleby,
becomes the target of the story’s critique. The narrator is shown repeatedly emphasizing a
shared humanity with Bartleby that mystifies the inequality of the owner/worker relation.
The narrator tries to reconcile this inequality and his role in benefiting from it by
befriending Bartleby, even as he exploits and profits from his labor:
He is useful to me. I can get along with him. If I turn him away, the chances are
he will fall in with some less-indulgent employer, and then he will be rudely
treated, and perhaps driven forth miserably to starve. Yes. Here I can cheaply
purchase a delicious self-approval. To befriend Bartleby; to humor him in his
strange willfulness, will cost me little or nothing, while I lay up in my soul what
will eventually prove a sweet morsel for my conscience. (56)
Bartleby’s “passive resistance” to the alienation of his labor and his choice to “prefer not
to” do anything but occupy the property of his employer is read by many as a refusal to
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participate in a relationship that exploits him, regardless of whether or not he is treated
kindly or harshly within it.6
Yet “Bartleby” is also concerned with state violence and its role in upholding the
process of separating landless workers from accessing the means necessary to satisfy
their needs, or what Marx had theorized as one aspect of primitive accumulation. If
Bartleby resists capital by refusing to perform alienated labor, he also resists the state by
refusing to be treated as a vagrant. Barbara Foley reads this refusal and occupation as an
allegory of mid-century working class struggles in the North where workers, particularly
after the panic of 1837, fought against exploitation by demanding land reform. As Foley
argues:
For Bartleby both withholds his labor power and asserts his right to terrain. . .
Invoking a symbolic discourse current in the 1840s, [Bartleby] engage[s] in an
occupation of space that is, simultaneously, an assertion of humanity. As a ‘Story
of Wall Street,’ then, ‘Bartleby’ addresses not only the market in labor but also
that in land, not only exploitation but also homelessness. Its portrait of alienation
is devastatingly complete. (96)
While Bartleby’s occupation of privatized space works hand in hand with his refusal to
work, it is not for reasons, I suggest, of challenging capital on Wall Street so much as it is
the demand that the state and capital honor the sovereignty of his white settler status.
Labor parties that emerged from the 1830s and on demanded that land be made
available to workers and that it be more equally distributed. This would result in
increased worker mobility or escape from proletarian labor, and greater power to limit the
work-day to 10 hours and increase wages. One such party, the National Reformers, which
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held an Industrial Congress of workers in 1845, called for, in a popular circular printed in
1846 aptly titled, “Vote Yourself a Farm,” the following reforms: “1. To limit the
quantity of land that any one man may henceforth monopolize or inherit; and 2. To make
the public lands free to actual settlers only,” the result of which, “would then consist of
the accumulated products of human labor” going to the worker-turned-farmer, “and the
antagonism of capital and labor would forever cease” (306). If in Europe state violence
helped enclose the peasant commons creating a landless class of proletarians, in North
America, these proletarians could become settlers where it was expected that the state
would ensure access to land as property precisely through the dispossession of the
Indigenous commons. The demand for land reform was thus also support for statesanctioned dispossession and destruction of Indigenous nations.7
If the question, then, is what is wrong with Bartleby, one answer could be that he
is a settler being targeted rather than served by the settler state. The logic of the profitmotive embodied in the narrator has come to violate the promises of settler democracy.
Bartleby is a fallen figure, one who holds a job of a gentlemen, but who is treated no
better than a lowly hireling or wage slave whose refusal to labor has reduced him further
to the station of a vagrant, that is, a failed settler. After Bartleby refuses to vacate the
office, the narrator reminds Bartleby of this status as one dispossessed of property: “What
earthly right have you to stay here? Do you pay any rent? Do you pay my taxes? Or is
this property yours?” (84). The narrator’s questions reflect worker desires at the time to
secure (stolen) land as a means not necessarily to escape poverty but to avoid a
diminished status. For example, the “Vote Yourself a Farm” circular suggests that “If a
man has a house and a home of his own, though it be a thousand miles off, he is well
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received in other people’s houses; while the homeless wretch is turned away. The bare
right to a farm, though you should never go near it, would save you from many an insult.
Therefore, Vote yourself a farm” (306). With the increased consolidation of class
inequality necessary for the expansion of the capitalist relation, a growing number of
workers, like Bartleby, had become “homeless wretches,” or surplus, both a nuisance and
a threat to capital:
In plain fact, he had now become a millstone to me. . . not only useless as a
necklace, but afflictive to bear. Yet I was sorry for him. I speak less than truth
when I say that, on his own account, he occasioned me uneasiness. If he would
but have named a single relative or friend, I would instantly have written, and
urged their taking the poor fellow away to some convenient retreat. But he
seemed alone, absolutely alone in the universe. A bit of a wreck in the midAtlantic. (76)
The solution to this hindrance becomes the use of state violence against rather than in
favor of the settler worker.
Bartleby is removed and incarcerated for vagrancy, a victim of bloody legislation
come full-circle: the office’s new property-owner “had sent to the police, and had
Bartleby removed to the Tombs as a vagrant” (99). Here the story represents an anxiety
that class conflict among settlers could not be squared with settler democracy, or
egalitarian republicanism, precisely because the settler state had come to formalize its
role in containing the rebellion of settler workers like Bartleby.
It is the narrator’s emphasis in not calling on the state to remove Bartleby that
accentuates the scandal of state violence targeting a white settler: “What! surely you will
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not have him collared by a constable, and commit his innocent pallor to the common jail?
And upon what ground could you procure such a thing to be done? — a vagrant, is he?
What! he a vagrant, a wanderer, who refuses to budge? It is because he will not be a
vagrant, then, that you seek to count him as a vagrant. That is too absurd” (91). What is
absurd is that capitalism appears to violate the political categories of the colonial relation.
Settlers do not invade to become vagrants. They invade to become sovereign property
owners. Bartleby’s occupation is about claiming space in order to refuse landlessness in a
landed (settler) republic. After the narrator proposes Bartleby try his hand in other trades,
all of which show the scrivener’s interchangeability, he refuses, saying, “It does not strike
me that there is anything definite about that. I like to be stationary. But I am not
particular” (97). The state should be ensuring, as working struggles of this time
demanded, that land be made available to offer opportunities to escape proletarian labor.
When the state, however, begins to formally target settler workers, it fails to uphold and
secure settler sovereignty by treating settler workers as removable and thus disposable,
that is, like the colonized and enslaved.
For instance, Bartleby who once had worked for the state in the destruction of
dead letters, has by the end of the story been turned into one by the state and its support
of capital: “Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men? Conceive a man by nature and
misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness, can any business seem more fitted to heighten
it than that of continually handling these dead letters, and assorting them for the flames?
For by the cart-load they are annually burned. . . On errands of life, these letters speed to
death. Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!” (107). While the image of dead letters being burned
by the cart-load indicates how the life of the alienated worker is disposable to capital,
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cart-loads of burning dead letters also invokes, if dead letters are dead men, images of
state-sponsored genocide. And those at the time facing an actual holocaust were
Indigenous people not settler workers denied sovereignty by land monopoly and state
violence. Yet the story invokes this image of disposable life to suggest that Bartleby’s
dispossession and removal is the same as the settler state’s genocidal treatment of
colonized and enslaved populations.
The story likens Bartleby to a colonized and enslaved subject through the imagery
of containment and exclusion. The most widely recognized example of this is Bartleby’s
workplace location in the office. Relegated to a corner of the office and cordoned off by a
partition, Bartleby is forced to stare, it is imagined, through a set of office windows
which, as the lawyer-narrator describes, “commanded an unobstructed view of a lofty
brick wall, black by age and everlasting shade; which wall required no spy-glass to bring
out its lurking beauties, but, for the benefit of all near-sighted spectators, was pushed up
to within ten feet of my window panes” (34). The blackness of the wall and darkness of
corner highlight not so much the “wages of slavery,” as it was called at the time, of
Bartleby’s position as a hired copyist, but his fallen and forlorn status because of it. Wage
slavery appears to place him on the same footing as a Black slave, a fear the labor reform
movement used to garner votes. “Are you tired of slavery,” reads the same circular, “of
drudging for others—of poverty and its attendant miseries? Then, Vote yourself a farm”
(306). To be denied land or the means of securing autonomy in the marketplace and
respectable citizenship in a settler democracy, is felt by the white settler worker in
Melville’s story as the same as to be treated like a Black slave or Native “savage.”
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The full extent of Bartleby’s forlorn status of a failed settler is made clear when
the plot of land the settler state does provide Bartleby is a prison-courtyard rather than
160 acres of farmland in western New York, or perhaps the Northwest territories. While
visiting Bartleby in jail, the narrator reminds Bartleby, with the ostensible intention of
raising his spirits, that incarceration and containment might offer the space that Bartleby
was looking for all along in his demand for sovereignty: “‘Nothing reproachful attaches
to you by being here,” the narrator tells Bartleby, “And, see, it is not so sad a place as one
might think. Look, there is the sky, and here is the grass.’ ‘I know where I am,’ he
replied, but would say nothing more, and so I left him” (102). If Bartleby embodies
worker struggles of the 1840s that fought against exploitation by fighting for a more
equal distribution of enclosed Indigenous lands, his despondent awareness of the state’s
role in containing his protest by removing and incarcerating him laments the fact that
Bartleby’s occupation has been handled like the settler state handles Indigenous peoples’
claim to land: removal, incarceration, and death.8
When read this way, the story’s critique of the narrator is not so much an
indictment of capital as it is an expression of disapproval of settler owners whose pursuit
of profit threatens to undermine the aspiration for intra-settler equality and unity.9 For
instance, the narrator appeals to a common humanity yet debases his workers by treating
them as (white) chattel:
Turkey would appreciate the favor, and abate his rashness and obstreperousness
of afternoons. But no; I verily believe that buttoning himself up in so downy and
blanket like a coat had a pernicious effect upon him — upon the same principle
that too much oats are bad for horses. In fact, precisely as a rash, restive horse is
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said to feel his oats, so Turkey felt his coat. It made him insolent. He was a man
whom prosperity harmed. (42)
Here the wage labor relation has made the narrator believe that some white settler
workers cannot be gentlemen, that is, be white enough to hold property.10 The profitmotive, it appears, causes the narrator to naturalize and thus support a racial hierarchy
among whites. The more the narrator emphasizes his recognition of the humanity of
Bartleby, the greater the story condemns the narrator’s undermining of this category in
his drive to secure profits: “The bond of a common humanity now drew me irresistibly to
gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For both I and Bartleby were sons of Adam” (65). Here,
as elsewhere, the narrator’s reverence for the category of the human is ironized—for his
support of class inequality and the use of state violence to manage it threatens the very
meaning of this category premised on colonial dispossession in the first place.
Bartleby frustrates the narrator, then, because Bartleby refuses to participate in
and threatens to disrupt the wage labor relation that undermines Bartleby’s assumed
settler sovereignty, or expectation of accessing stolen land as a way to achieve autonomy
and freedom. Bartleby’s passive resistance comes to appear as a violence against the
order of things. Bartleby embodies the specter of a potential white settler riot, several of
which had taken place in New York from the 1820s to up when Melville writes the story
in late 1840s: “he now persists in haunting the building generally, sitting upon the
banisters of the stairs by day, and sleeping in the entry by night. Everybody is concerned;
clients are leaving the offices; some fears are entertained of a mob” (95).11 This fear of
Bartleby’s haunting, a fear of mobilizing a riot, is not just a fear that workers will rise up,
destroy property, and demand better working conditions. From the perspective of the
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owning-class, if workers demanded land reform, their rebellion was about reducing
conflict by opening up access to land to the point at which profits could not be made. The
riot for land was about depleting the pool of the wageless that served as a lever for
reducing wages and increasing surplus value. The settler state had always been tasked
with managing this tension between making lands available in the interests of
accumulating value through direct expropriation, while also not making lands available
by setting a price on it in the interests of accumulation by the exploitation of labor
power.12 Commodifying land, raised the cost of escaping wage labor, giving capital more
leverage to extract surplus value from the worker’s labor. Bartleby’s occupation and
refusal to leave invokes this conflict of a capitalist settler democracy. It calls on the
wageless to become settlers when it requires their help in the costly and bloody
colonization of lands. In other times, it needs them to stay wageless to drive down wages
and the cost of production that takes place on top of those stolen lands, (a point to which I
will return when discussing The Squatter and the Don).
Yet if “Bartleby” reveals the conflict of labor and capital and its threat to settler
sovereignty, the story’s formal experience nonetheless resolves this conflict. The statesponsored dispossession and removal of Bartleby registers in the story as a grievable act,
an image which elicits sympathy for the scrivener’s plight and a demand for redress and
redemption. Consider how Melville narrates the moment when state violence befalls
Bartleby. He is like the lamb being taken to slaughter: “the poor scrivener, when told that
he must be conducted to the Tombs, offered not the slightest obstacle, but, in his pale,
unmoving way, silently acquiesced. Some of the compassionate and curious by standers
joined the party; and headed by one of the constable’s arm in arm with Bartleby, the
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silent procession filed its way through all the noise, and heat, and joy of the roaring
thoroughfares at noon” (100). The image of the imprisoned Bartleby becomes even more
lamentable: “Strangely huddled at the base of the wall, his knees drawn up, and lying on
his side, his head touching the cold stones, I saw the wasted Bartleby” (105). This image
of the wasted Bartleby emphasizes how as a settler he possesses a capacity for freedom
and sovereignty that has been destroyed by the very state whose legitimacy is premised
on ensuring that this capacity is respected and protected. Bartleby is the subject with the
capacity to possess but is denied by the state and capital from doing so, a capacity that is
the product in the first place of the colonial and racial processes of constituting the
colonized and enslaved as subjects who lack the capacity to possess or be sovereign. In
other words, Bartleby’s dispossession and removal registers as grievable precisely
because he is the settler who has been treated or targeted in the same way the settler state
treats the colonial and enslaved subject against whom the meaning of Bartleby’s status of
settler sovereignty and freedom has come to be defined. Bartleby is the figure of the crisis
of settler whiteness, democracy, and humanity, the lament of which becomes the call for
its resolution—the settler worker’s redemption, as was the message of labor reform
movements at the time. The image of grievability becomes the demand for the settler
state to redeem and restore settler workers, to create the conditions in which the
owner/worker relation does not break the bonds of settler sovereignty. The grievability of
Bartleby is the aesthetic that encodes the resolution to the conflicts of capital’s form in
the United States, namely the expansion of empire—the intensification of colonial
dispossession—as a way to offset intra-settler conflicts.13
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Joaquín Murieta and Indigenous Sovereignty
In 1850, John Rollin Ridge fled the Cherokee nation for the gold fields of
California because he had killed a man in retaliation for the murders of his father, John
Ridge, grandfather Major Ridge, and cousin, Elias Boudinot. As members of the
Cherokee nation’s slave-holding minority-faction, Ridge’s family had been targeted
because of their role in signing the New Echota Treaty of 1835, which had ceded
Cherokee lands in the Southeast in exchange for lands west of the Mississippi, an act that
the majority of the Cherokee nation refused to acknowledge. The treaty sanctioned what
had already been underway: the genocidal removal and displacement of the Cherokee,
culminating in the Trail of Tears, a state-directed forced evacuation of the dissenting
Cherokee where the rate of genocide by some estimates was a staggering 40-50%.14 A
treaty that ostensibly was signed to broker peace between the Cherokee and the United
States, had only sown violence, destruction, and death. Yet if Ridge had fled from the
violence stemming from treaty-making with the United States, he would come to witness
this violence again in California where the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 did not
so much bring peace as it authorized and endorsed a white settler invasion of the region
that sought to eliminate Indigenous people and dispossess the newly conquered Mexican
citizenry.
It is in this context that Ridge, after failing as a miner and struggling as a
journalist, writes a novel dramatizing the local rebellion, or, to Anglo-settlers, the
terrorist uprising, of the Mexican social bandit Joaquín Murieta.15 Stories of Murieta had
filled California newspapers in the early 1850s. In Ridge’s version of Murieta’s life and
actions, Murieta aspires to pursue an honest living in post-1848 California, but comes to
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be violently dispossessed and displaced by white settlers whose belief in racial hierarchy
prevents them from honoring the sovereignty of the individual, a law that if kept,
promises to protect both Mexican citizens and US settlers alike:
The country was then full of lawless and desperate men, who bore the name of
Americans but failed to support the honor and dignity of that title. A feeling was
prevalent among this class of contempt for any and all Mexicans, whom they
looked upon as no better than conquered subjects of the United States, having no
rights which could stand before a haughtier and superior race. They made no
exceptions. If the proud blood of the Castilians mounted to the cheek of a partial
descendant of the Mexiques, showing that he had inherited the old chivalrous
spirit of his Spanish ancestry, they looked upon it as a saucy presumption in one
so inferior to them. (9,10)
After white settlers violently remove Murieta from his mining claim and rape his
mistress, he settles a plot of land that he turns into a successful farm. This is short-lived
as white settlers once again arrive and violently steal his land and lynch his brother:
“They listened to no explanation, but bound him to a tree, and publicly disgraced him
with the lash. They then proceeded to the house of his half-brother and hung him without
judge or jury” (12). From such acts of violent dispossession, terror, and displacement,
Murieta pledges to become a bandit, vowing to avenge the wrongs committed against him
by stealing away the wealth and lives of invading white settlers: “It was then that the
character of Joaquín changed, suddenly and irrevocably,” for “he had contracted a hatred
to the whole American race, and was determined to shed their blood, whenever and
wherever an opportunity occurred” (12, 14). After narrating the rise and fall of Murieta’s
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rebellion that ends in his death and beheading, Ridge instructs readers on the importance
of respecting individual sovereignty: “He also leaves behind him the important lesson
that there is nothing so dangerous in its consequences as injustices to individuals—
whether it arise from prejudice of color or from any other source; that a wrong done to
one man is a wrong to society and the world” (158). If US settlers had respected the
individual sovereignty of Murieta, his life and the lives of those he destroys could have
been saved.
While many read Joaquín Murieta as a novel of ethnic American assimilation
and/or its discontents in which Ridge ostensible supports US liberal democratic values of
inclusion and universal emancipation precisely by calling on white settlers to uphold
them for the benefit of all, I suggest it be considered a national allegory of the
relationship between Indigenous sovereignty and US state sovereignty, or the way the
colonial relation constitutes Indigenous sovereignty as the supplement of US settler
sovereignty.16 The story of Murieta and his movement’s sovereignty is the story not only
of Cherokee sovereignty but of the relationship between Indigenous sovereignty and the
United States. Like the Cherokee, Murieta is a foreign nation(al) whose sovereignty is
recognized but not honored by the United States. Also like the Cherokee, Murieta is
dispossessed precisely because he is a competing sovereign. It must be remembered that
it was because the Cherokee were recognized as a successful foreign nation that the
United States sought to dispossess them through treaty-making and military force. As
Patrick Wolfe explains:
the factor that most antagonized the Georgia state government. . . was not actually
the recalcitrant savagery of which Indians were routinely accused, but the
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Cherokee’s unmistakable aptitude for civilization. . . They had become successful
agriculturalists on the White model, with a number of them owning substantial
holdings of black slaves, and they had introduced a written national constitution
that bore more than a passing resemblance to the US one. Why should genteel
Georgians wish to rid themselves of such cultivated neighbours? The reason why
the Cherokee’s constitution and their agricultural prowess stood out as such
singular provocations to the officials and legislators of the state of Georgia. . . is
that the Cherokee’s farms, plantations, slaves and written constitution all signified
permanence. The first thing the rabble did, let us remember, was burn their
houses. (396)
This problem of the United States recognizing Indigenous sovereignty while
simultaneously rejecting it is what Ridge explores and attempts to resolve in his novel.
The treaty-form, which the Supremacy clause (Article 6, section 2) of the constitution
stipulates is the supreme law of the land, and the modern liberal meaning of sovereignty
that the treaty-form represents, are under crisis for Ridge.
How can the United States be considered a sovereign nation if it doesn’t respect
the sovereignty of other foreign nations? How can the United States propose and sign
treaties in which Indigenous sovereignty is formally acknowledged, if it is for reasons of
facilitating the removal and genocide of Indigenous people? As Kevin Bruyneel notes:
From 1789 to 1871, the U.S. Senate ratified over 370 of the 800 treaties
negotiated by the executive branch of the government. The purpose of many of
these treaties was to facilitate the removal of Indigenous tribes from their
territories, especially tribes that resided east of the Mississippi River, which
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generally coincided with the western boundary of the United States at the time.
Therefore, these treaties inherently recognized the sovereignty of Indigenous
tribes—at least to the extent that they could agree to a treaty—while also serving
as the vehicle for placing many of these tribes beyond the extant political
boundaries of the United States. (15)
A descendent of the slaveholding minority-faction who signed the New Echota Treaty,
and a witness to the violence it engendered, Ridge is concerned not only with proving the
legitimacy of Indigenous sovereignty, but also with demanding that the United States
uphold it.
If we consider this the premise of the novel, which builds on Louis Owen’s early
reading of it, Ridge’s Murieta becomes an important nineteenth-century narrative through
which to apprehend the meanings of Indigenous and settler sovereignty and their
interlocking relationship.17 Instead of resolving the problem of Indigenous sovereignty by
imagining a balance or reconciliation between the US settler state and Indigenous
sovereignty, Ridge’s novel represents Indigenous sovereignty as an irreconcilable aporia
or antagonism of US sovereignty. The novel represents this antagonism through its
uneven narrative structure that is often cited as a sign of Ridge’s immaturity as a writer or
the result of his attempt to write a novel with mass appeal, but not as a symptomatic
aesthetic structure of the eliminatory, exclusionist, and genocidal logics of settler
colonialism.
The novel’s uneven form can be found in the relationship between Ridge’s use of
the historical romance and frontier populism. Most readers of the novel often pay more
attention to the novel’s low-brow mass appeal than to its aspirations for literary
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respectability as a historical novel. For instance, John Carlos Rowe argues that “Ridge’s
Joaquín Murieta fits most definitions of the category of ‘mass culture’ in its resolution of
social and political problems by recourse to established cultural conventions,” and that
because of this, it “belongs with the countless popular adventure stories of frontier life
that exploit citizens’ fears of lawless anarchy, barbarism, and other threats to civilized
life resulting from westward expansion” (150, 154). Or as Parins claims, “There is no
doubt that Joaquín was meant to be sensational. That Ridge wanted a best-seller, the
equivalent of a box office smash. . . he expected to make money from his book. . . Money
was his prime motivation, and his quest for literary fame was a close second” (110).
Ridge, however, considered his novel an important literary project precisely because, in
the tradition of the historical novel, it represented a formative event in the US nation’s
history. Ridge indicates this in the preface:
The author, in presenting this book to the public, is aware that its chief merit
consists in the reliability of the ground-work upon which it stands and not in the
beauty of its composition. He has aimed to do a service—in his humble way—to
those who shall hereafter inquire into the early history of California, by
preserving, in however rude shape, a record of at least a portion of those events
which have made the early settlement of this State a living romance through all
time. (4)
Ridge emphasizes how his novel both offers an accurate history of early California and
that the events depicted are important enough to be considered a universal “living
romance.” Although he acknowledges the “rude shape” of the novel, the reminder that his
novel represents a foundational moment in history of the nation elevates the cultural
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value of the novel from cheap to respectable literary fiction. “By shifting its subject to the
serious matter of history,” Winfried Fluck writes, “the [historical] novel gained cultural
respectability and successfully countered charges of frivolous irrelevancy” (117). As
Shelby Streeby puts it, Ridge “wants to make it clear to readers that his novel transcends
wild romance and cheap sensationalism, that it is not meant to imbue ‘enthusiastic spirits’
with the same sentiments. . . Ridge aspires to a sort of literary respectability even as he
tries to appeal to popular tastes” (263). This tension between the cultural meanings of
historical romance and the melodramatic modes of frontier sensation and sentiment
results from a clashing narrative strategy at play in the novel that attempts to envision a
reconciliation between Indigenous sovereignty and US state sovereignty.
In other words, the historical romance becomes the mode through which Ridge
demonstrates how Indigenous sovereignty is equivalent to US sovereignty in order to
demand Indigenous sovereignty be recognized and respected. Frontier populism serves to
warn white settlers of the threat of Indigenous retribution which poses a danger to the
security and stability of the nation if Indigenous sovereignty is not recognized and
respected. Honor treaties and respect Indigenous sovereignty because it is equivalent to
US sovereignty, or do it because Indigenous people are not sovereign but violent
“savages,” whose retribution will be costly, enough so to threaten the stability of the
nation. While Ridge turns to frontier populism for the same reasons he uses the historical
romance—both are used to offer a vision calling for the United States to recognize and
respect Indigenous sovereignty—each mode of representation serves as a necessary
supplement to the other, forming an aporetic bind in which, as a supplement, the vision
produced by one mode fills in the lack in the vision of the other. In doing so, however,
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the legitimacy of each representational strategy is called into question by the presence of
other. As the following discussion of the novel will show, it is this irresolvable negative
dialectical movement in the novel’s representation of Indigenous sovereignty that makes
explicit how Indigenous sovereignty simultaneously enables and makes impossible US
sovereignty.
Unsettling the Settler Nation
In calling his novel a “living romance,” Ridge places before his readers the
expectation that his account of Murieta’s rebellion will follow in the tradition of the
historical romance of envisioning a national identity as the solution to the nation’s
conflicts. The historical romance or historical novel had emerged in the first-half of the
nineteenth century as a formidable cultural tool for constructing and legitimating a
national identity.18 As Fluck explains, “by focusing on grand topics such as revolutionary
wars or key conflicts in a nation’s history, the novel could be elevated to the rank of a
modern epic that depicted the formation of a nation and captured the soul of its people”
(117).19 Yet if Ridge announces his novel as a “living romance,” the national identity it
writes is not so much of the United States as it of the organization or autonomous
collective behind Murieta’s rebellion.
The describes the presence of this collective and its autonomy in post-48
California in several locations. Its most pronounced description can be found when
Murieta announces the rebellion’s goals:
I am at the head of an organization. . . of two thousand men whose ramifications
are in Sonora, Lower California, and in this State. I have money in abundance
deposited in a safe place. I intend to arm and equip fifteen hundred or two
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thousand men and make a clean sweep of the southern counties. I intend to kill the
Americans by ‘wholesale’ burn their ranchos, and run off their property at one
single swoop so rapidly that they will not have to collect an opposing force before
I will have finished the work and found safety in the mountains of Sonora. When I
do this, I shall wind up my career. My brothers, we will then be revenged for our
wrongs, and some little, too, for the wrongs of our poor bleeding country. We will
divide our substance and spend the rest of our days in peace. (74, 75)
When Murieta refers to his country in this passage, it is easy to see how he ostensibly
means Mexico, supporting the view of Mark Rifkin who argues that the novel is
concerned with how the US imperialist war with Mexico never ended because the foreign
publics it conquered and enclosed continue to resist and remain unmanageable. Yet if
Murieta’s rebellion is an allegory for Cherokee or Indigenous rebellion, the country to
which Murieta refers, and as the passage suggests, could also describe Murieta’s
organization in terms of an unrecognized stateless nation cohered through its opposition
to settler colonialism.20
This stateless autonomy can be seen in the organization’s many informal
networks and institutions:
they invariably left those ranches and houses unharmed whose owners and
inmates had afforded them shelter or assistance. Many persons, who were
otherwise honestly inclined, bought the safety of their lives and property by
remaining scrupulously silent in regard to Joaquín and neutral in every attempt to
do him an injury. Further than this, there were many large rancheros who were
secretly connected with the banditti, and stood ready to harbor them in times of
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danger and to furnish them with the best of animals that fed on their extensive
pastures. (19)
Murieta’ collective, what Alemán calls the region’s “racial body politic,” fights against
the US state but not necessarily in the name of the Mexican state. Instead, it fights for its
own autonomy by defending against settler invasion in order to secure its territory and
capacity for self-determination. In this way, the form of Murieta’s organization embodies
Indigenous sovereignty as the collective struggle to gain autonomy and achieve selfdetermination in the face of settler colonial violence.21 If the failure of treaty-making, for
Ridge, lies in how the United States doesn’t recognize Indigenous sovereignty, his novel
attempts to envision a resolution to this problem by dramatizing the sovereign status of
Murieta’s organization, the recognition of which could prevent conflict and violence
between the colonized and the United States. If recognized as sovereign, and given back
what has been stolen from its members, Murieta’s collective, it is imagined, will live
autonomously and peacefully on the lands the United States has claimed to enclose. This
imagined arrangement echoes the proposed solution of the treaty-form in which US state
sovereignty co-exists peacefully alongside the sovereignty of Indigenous nations. To
represent, then, Murieta’s organization as sovereign, Ridge uses the historical romance to
produce a coherent and unified image of the rebellion as it unfolds across space and time.
In other words, it must offer an image of the totality of the rebellion in order to
elicit/demand recognition of the sovereignty of Murieta’s organization, which in doing
so, could (imaginatively) fulfill the treaty-form ideal of creating harmony between the
United States and Indigenous America.
To represent the totality of the Murieta’s organization, the novel attempts to map,
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both synchronically and diachronically, the multitude of events that constitute its
anticolonial rebellion. Synchronically, the novel maps the space of the rebellion by
locating for the reader the group’s many actions across the landscape of California. Great
attention is given to the places and locales that mark the group’s action. As the actions
accumulate, a view emerges tracking the expansion of the group’s many expropriations.
In this way, the novel spatializes or gives an image of the group’s territory, the center of
which is the valley at Arroyo Cantoova, a location described as an autonomous space
where the expropriated goods and wealth of the banditti are distributed and enjoyed: “it
was a beautiful sight that met his eye, as he gazed over the extensive valley and saw a
thousand fine horse feeding on the rich grass,” where “busy cooks hurried up the fires,
and the fresh venison and bear meat was soon smoking” and where “everything was
spread forth in superabundance, scattered over a large white cloth that covered a few
yards square of green grass” (70, 71). Diachronically, the novel takes great care to plot
the group’s actions in a linear trajectory. Taking on a journalistic style, Ridge narrates
incident after incident of violence either perpetuated by the banditti or against it, many of
which have no bearing on the plot but are accounted for nonetheless to ensure that
nothing it left out of the novel’s depiction of the rebellion.
The novel also pauses frequently to include several detailed scenes of violence,
sentiment, descriptions of landscape, and attempts at characterization. They are muted
and controlled, even if sometimes they are tangential to story. Their purpose is to prove
the novel’s ability to accurately narrate history. As the narrator reminds readers of the
purpose of the novel: “I do this, not for the purpose of ministering to any depraved taste
for the dark and horrible in human action, but rather to contribute my mite to those
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materials out of which the early history of California shall one day be composed” (7). In
this way, the novel fulfills the expectations of the historical novel in which writing
national identity required synthesizing disparate local conditions and competing identities
that together formed the nation. As Fluck notes: “In order to do its work of national selfdefinition successfully, the historical novel had to be accepted as a truthful representation
of history and of national conditions. Historical novels thus aim at a reality-effect
produced by claims of accuracy in historical reference and verisimilitude in the
description of customs and locales.” (122). Taken together, the geographic mapping, the
linear-temporal plotting, and the inclusion of detailed scenes of the local conditions of the
rebellion, are all attempts to produce an accurate, unified, and completed portrayal, as the
historical novel called for, of the rebellion in order to write the national identity not of the
United States but of the autonomous collective fighting to carve out and hold a territory
within it. In doing so, the novel demonstrates and thus demands recognition that
Murieta’s organization holds sovereignty over people, space, and time and that as such it
is a competing foreign (stateless) nation.
The novel reflects on its own aspiration to represent the totality of the rebellion
and the sovereign status of Murieta’s group in a poetic apostrophe Ridge includes to
California’s Mt. Shasta. “Mount Shasta, a conspicuous land-mark in the northern portion
of the State, which rears its white shaft at all seasons of the year high above every other
peak, and serves at a distance of two hundred miles to direct the course of the mountaintraveler, being to him as the polar star to the mariner” (23). In writing a poem on Mt.
Shasta’s sublimity, Ridge describes the ideal form to which his novel aspires. Just as Mt.
Shasta serves as the figure that orients and directs, the novel has also tried to offer a
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spatial and temporal map of the rebellion in order to bring a resolution to the conflict that
engendered it. Conflict can be avoided and social peace achieved if a view of the absolute
that Mt. Shasta embodies can be approached. As the poem, “Mount Shasta, Seen From a
Distance” suggests, “To gaze upon its honored form; aye, standing/ There, the guarantee
of health and happiness!/ Well might it win communities so blest/ To loftier feelings, and
to nobler thoughts—/ The great material symbol of eternal/ Things!” (25). By aspiring to
this form, the novel intimates that its absolute representation of the rebellion can, like Mt.
Shasta, inspire resolution between the groups at war. “And well this Golden State shall
thrive, if, like/ Its own Mount Shasta, sovereign law shall lift/ Itself in purer
atmosphere—so high/ That human feeling, human passion, at its base/ Shall lie subdued”
(25). When Murieta’s rebellion, as Indigenous rebellion, is seen as the event of a
sovereign nation fighting for its autonomy, which is a view that has arrived through the
novel’s image of its totality, the violent antagonism between US settlers and Indigenous
America can be avoided and reconciled. To see that nations are equivalent through the
law of sovereignty, is to see how peace can be broken between them. The problem to
overcome, for Ridge, is for US settlers to see this mutual sovereignty and respect it as
their treaties promise they will.
Yet the novel also announces in several places how Murieta’s rebellion is
unrepresentable, an event much too chaotic for its language to capture and synthesize into
a coherent identity. It makes these announcements in order to sensationalize the
rebellion’s threat to settler security and stability. In the opening moments of the rebellion,
the narrator admits: “The scenes of murder and robbery shifted with the rapidity of
lightning. At one time, the northern countries would be suffering slaughters and
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depredations, at another the southern, and, before one would have imagined it possible,
the east and the west, and every point of the compass would be in trouble” (15). If Ridge
highlights the rebellion’s chaos to warn of the instability that ensues from white settlers
not respecting Indigenous sovereignty, this admission that the novel cannot offer a
guiding map—an absolute view—of the rebellion’s totality, invalidates the novel’s
aspiration to demonstrate how Indigenous sovereignty is equivalent to US state
sovereignty.
This incongruence between chaos and the absolute intensifies as Murieta and his
men accelerate their actions of robbery and murder. When Murieta’s movements
transform from one of revenge with goal of “accumulate[ing] an equivalent for the
fortune of which he had been robbed by the Americans,” to a movement that seeks to
“kill the Americans by ‘wholesale,’” it is met by an equally intense and pervasive white
settler vigilantism (29, 74). Tracking these movements, the novel concedes, becomes
impossible: “Thus was the whole country alive with armed parties, whose separate
movements it would be impossible, without much unnecessary labor, to trace. Arrests
were continually being made, popular tribunals established in the woods, Judge Lynch
installed upon the bench; criminals arraigned, tried, and executed upon the limb of a tree;
pursuits, flights, skirmishes, and a topsy-turvy, hurly-burly mass of events that set
narration at defiance” (135). The novel that has promised to totalize the rebellion and
reveal its sovereign form, foregrounds the limit or impossibility of doing so.
This tension in the form of representing the space and time of the rebellion is
crystallized in a latter scene where the narrator prepares to map what becomes the
group’s last organized campaign of expropriation in which “the bloodiest scenes that ever
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were enacted in the same space of time in any age or country” are promised to be
depicted (109). The narrator tries to balance the chaos that is unrepresentable with the
absolute:
though many villainous deeds which transpired in the short period which I am
about to make a sketch of were mysterious and unaccountable, many murders
committed in parts remote from each other, robberies here, thefts there, and
destruction, lightening-footed, treading everywhere, invisible in its approach and
revealed only in the death-trail which it left behind, yet all this mighty and
seemingly chaotic scene had its birth in the dramatic brain of Joaquín—an author
who acted out his own tragedies! Divergent as were the innumerable lines of
action, yet they were all concentrated upon one point and directed to one
purpose—that which existed in the breast of Joaquín. (109)
Here the two strategies for eliciting/demanding recognition of Indigenous sovereignty
come to an impasse. The instability and violence of the rebellion cannot be contained and
subdued precisely because the rebellion defies representation. Yet the rebellion is also an
organized, planned event engineered and managed by the (sovereign) individual Joaquín.
The rebellion is both out of control and in control at the same time. It’s decentralized but
also hierarchal. It’s mappable and thus visible, yet it also exceeds narration and is
unrepresentable—its only presence lies the traces of destruction it leaves behind. An
image of the rebellion’s coherence thus cannot be reconciled with its image of instability.
It is through this representational bind that Ridge contradictorily intimates that the
US state should both respect and reject Indigenous sovereignty for the same reason of
recognizing the aporetic presence of Indigenous autonomy. Affirmatively, the novel
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suggests, through the language of historical romance, Indigenous autonomy should be
acknowledged because Indigenous nations are sovereign in the same way the US nationstate is sovereign. Negatively, through the language of sensation, Indigenous autonomy
should be respected out of a fear of provoking unrestrained and chaotic rebellion and
retribution which threatens settler security and safety. Its statelessness must be respected
not as a sign of sovereignty but as a danger and threat to US settler sovereignty. These
discordant representations of Murieta’s rebellion represents Indigenous sovereignty as
both noble and savage, sovereign and unsovereign. Indigenous sovereignty must be
recognized to ensure social peace between US state and Indigenous nations but also
disavowed in order to prevent the violence of uncontrolled rebellion. Demonstrating how
Indigenous sovereignty is equivalent to US state sovereignty cannot be reconciled, then,
with the sensationalized fear-mongering view of the rebellion’s chaotic threat to settler
security. The former assumes Indigenous nations are sovereign foreign nations, while the
latter assumes Indigenous people are unsovereign stateless “savages” whose presence
threatens civilization.
This irresolvable tension thus comes to foreclose Ridge’s proposed vision of
reconciliation between Indigenous sovereignty and US state sovereignty. Yet it is this
irresolvable tension, I want to suggest, that also makes explicit what theorist Jodi Byrd
calls “impossible sovereign statelessness—desired and abjected precisely because it is
required for all other claims to be made within and across the structuring
(de)consolidations of the new world event,” of Indigenous people, or how Indigenous
sovereignty is the supplement that makes possible and impossible US settler sovereignty
(“Consolidation and Sovereignty” 435). Indigenous sovereignty is recognized by the US
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settler state in order to define and legitimize its own claims to sovereignty in relation to
other European nation-states over Indigenous lands. In the same moment, then, that the
US settler state recognizes Indigenous sovereignty it must also deny it. Byrd describes
this as follows:
Rather than producing a perfect state sovereignty that achieves territoriality and
jurisdiction through the total annihilation of the Indian, however, the taxonomy of
settler sovereignty requires Indigenous sovereignty as its necessary condition. In
other words, within the recursive logics of a twisted reciprocity, settler
sovereignty necessitates and hails the existence of Indigenous sovereignty, at the
exact moment that settler sovereignty abjects Indigenous sovereignty beyond the
internal of its own logical reach. (128)
If Ridge’s attempt to resolve the problem of treaty-making and international sovereignty
between the United States and Indigenous America produces an aesthetic and narrative
break-down, it does so because settler sovereignty is a fiction, or false synthesis of an
irreconcilable asymmetry in which settler sovereignty is premised on the violent
dispossession and exclusion of Indigenous people, not a co-equal balanced relationship
between them.
It shows, in other words, how settler sovereignty is a counter-sovereignty: settler
sovereignty depends on the very thing that also makes it impossible. “As countersovereignty,” writes Manu Vimalassery, “US sovereignty is in perpetual reaction to the
prior and primary claims of Native peoples on the territories that the United States claims
as its own. Seen in this light, US sovereignty will always be an unfinished project in
perpetual crisis of unraveling” (142). As a counter-sovereignty and false synthesis, the
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US nation-state form doesn’t so much signal sovereign control over people, space, and
time as it is the identity of a perpetual counter-revolution seeking to manage the rebellion
and resistance of the groups it has conquered and must continue to re-conquer. As
Alyosha Goldstein explains, “against the numerical weight and majority rule of settler
popular sovereignty, Indigenous sovereignty exposes the US nation-state as perpetually
fragmented and incomplete, if nonetheless preponderant and lethal” (152). The tension
between representing the rebellion as the event of a sovereign and unsovereign people
aesthetically encodes, then, how Indigenous sovereignty both constitutes and destabilizes
settler sovereignty. In this way, Murieta demonstrates how the settler nation is stable
when Indigenous nations are destabilized, just as the assertion of Indigenous
sovereignty—as the struggle for autonomy and self-determination of Indigenous
people—threatens the coherence of US nation-state and its liberal democracy.
The Ungrievable Murieta
If Ridge attempts to reconcile the disparity between settler sovereignty and
Indigenous sovereignty at the level of the nation-form, he also seeks to highlight and
resolve the asymmetry between the positions of the settler and Native, a problem of
sovereignty at the level of political ontology. Ridge wishes for a harmony between the
positions of the settler and the Native—both should be considered sovereign individuals.
White settlers have denied Murieta’s claim to this status, the result of which has produced
violent rebellion and social instability. To achieve social peace, as Ridge sees it, white
settlers must come to recognize the (liberal) humanity—the individual sovereignty—of
Murieta.
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The novel represents this category of individual sovereignty as a shared honor
exceeding national boundaries. For instance, in one scene, there is an exchange between
Murieta and a “young man from Arkansas” that emphasizes the role of honor in
maintaining social peace. While out hunting, a group of white settlers accidentally
discover the whereabouts of the banditti’s hideout and center of operations, Arroyo
Cantoova. Fearing the hunters will report the banditti’s location to state authorities,
Murieta decides to kill them all. But before doing so, the man from Arkansas steps
forward bravely declaring that as a fellow “man” of honor he will not betray Murieta’s
location: “I promise you faithfully for myself, and in behalf of my companions, that if
you spare our lives, which are completely in your power, not a word shall be breathed of
your whereabouts. . . I stake my honor, not as an American citizen, but as a man, who is
simply bound by justice to himself, under circumstances in which no other considerations
can prevail, that you shall not be betrayed” (78). After Murieta’s wife Rosita urges him to
save the men, Murieta acquiesces: “I will spare you. Your countrymen have injured me,
they have made me what I am, but I scorn to take the advantage of so brave a man.” (79).
Here, Ridge stages how the mutual recognition of honor prevents conflict and creates
harmony. If such an exchange had happened in the first place, Murieta would not have
become a dark criminal. If, in other words, his status as a sovereign individual had been
recognized—his humanity recognized—his rebellion could have been avoided.
To demonstrate, then, how Murieta is deserving of such recognition, Ridge again
turns to the language of the historical romance. Murieta is the “Rinaldo Rinaldini of
California,” or the sublime-hero of Ridge’s “living romance” (7). In one scene Murieta
flees a group of armed miners by navigating a dangerous and narrow mountain-trail.
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Running on the ledge, “his long hair streaming behind him” brandishing his “keenly
polished bowie-knife,” the narrator remarks that “It was perfectly sublime to see such
super-human daring and recklessness. At each report, which came fast and thick, he
kissed the flashing blade and waved it at his foes. He passed the ordeal, as awful and
harrowing to a man’s nerves as can be conceived. . . [and after his escape] a loud whoop
rang out in the woods a quarter of a mile distant. . . the bold rider was safe” (87). In the
closing moments of the rebellion, the narrator emphasizes the elevated status of Murieta,
a point which is repeated in several locations throughout the tale: “It was the year which
would close his short and tragical career with a crowning glory—a deed of daring and of
power which would redeem with its refulgent light the darkness of his previous history
and show him to oftentimes, not as a mere outlaw, committing petty depredations and
robberies, but as a hero who has revenged his country’s wrongs and washed out her
disgrace in the blood of her enemies” (80). Marking this difference between social bandit
and common criminal, codes Murieta as a national hero, which is to say, a sovereign
individual of a sovereign (Indigenous) nation, deserving to be recognized as such.
If recognized as a sovereign individual, then, it follows, as Ridge attempts to
suggest, that Murieta’s mistreatment should be felt as grievable. That is, the wrongs
committed against him are grievable because Murieta, as the sovereign individual, a
subject of a nation, of a political community, protected by the law, or the social contract,
expects to be immune from dispossession. This is why Ridge emphasizes how the
dispossession of Murieta transforms his very being: “Those who knew him in his schoolboy days speak affectionately of his generous and noble nature at that period of his life
and can scarcely credit the fact that the renowned and bloody bandit of California was
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one and the same being” (8). The change wrought by dispossession from noble to ignoble
implies Murieta began as the self-possessive subject, something he retains but is sadly
denied recognition for: “I was once as noble a man as ever breathed, and if I am not so
now, it is because men would not allow me to be as I wished” (emphasis added 106). A
sign of Murieta’s sovereign status, then, is that he possessed, like Bartleby, something to
lose in the first place, the loss of which should be a grievable act, the solution for which,
like we saw in the case of Bartleby’s dispossession, is recuperation and restoration.
This is also why Murieta is shown to allow his group to rob and kill Chinese
miners in the novel. Numerous scenes depict such violence: “The miserable Chinamen
were mostly the sufferers, and they lay along the highways like so many sheep with their
throats cut by the wolves. It was a politic stroke. . . to kill Chinamen in preference to
Americans, for no one cared for so alien a class, and they were left to shift for
themselves” (97). At one point Garcia proclaims: “I love the smell the blood of a
Chinaman. . . it’s such easy work to kill them. It’s a kind of a luxury to cut their throats”
(64). The presence of the Chinese offers an image of a political category of pure
exclusion and dispossession—they are shown not to have the right or capacity for
possession in the first place. The Chinese are thus a disposable class, the surplus to be
removed and exterminated, a figure in the novel, as Cheryl Walker argues, that
allegorizes Indigenous people in the United States.22 As the narrator notes, “The Chinese,
beginning to believe that they were singled out for destruction, were seized with a general
panic, and, by the fifth of March, might have been seen flocking from the mining districts
in hundreds and thousands to the towns and cities” (139).23 It is against this position that
Ridge’s Murieta of the historical romance defines his status of white possession, his
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individual (liberal) sovereignty. In the language of Abamben, Murieta is the sovereign
because he, like the sovereign power of the United States, decides the state of
exception.24
Yet the novel also represents Murieta, through the language of sensation, as a
frontier terrorist “savage” whose violent dispossession has provoked a feared retribution
that cannot be contained. The characterization of Murieta as the terrorist savage can be
found in several places. For instance, if Murieta demands recognition of a mutual honor,
he is also described as the unrecognizable person in the novel: “he had worn different
disguises, and was actually disguised the most when he showed his real features. . . He
frequently stood very unconcernedly in a crowd, and listened to long and earnest
conversations in relation to himself” (30-31). In fact, it becomes clear that Murieta is the
most powerful when disguised. At one point, he escapes imprisonment by killing a
deputy who fails to recognize his criminal identity and frees a member of his banditti
when he impersonates an Anglo-American businessman, “Mr. Harrington” (20, 95).
Furthermore, Murieta appears vulnerable when he seeks recognition—the successful
identification of Murieta is what ultimately leads to his death. Yet Murieta cannot help
but divulge his identity, repeating the refrain “I am Joaquín Murieta” in several places in
the novel, despite the danger he incurs in revealing his identity and whereabouts. The
function of these scenes of disguise and misrecognition is to suggest that Murieta is
dangerously un-policable or excessive to forms of settler surveillance and state
repression. He is everywhere and nowhere all at once, the subject who dangerously defies
state violence.
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He is also shown to give up his attempts to restrain his comrade Garcia’s
genocidal violence against the Chinese and “Digger” Indians. Murieta, in other words,
stops caring about proving his honor. At one point toward the end of the tale, Murieta’s
group come upon a group of Chinese miners who beg for their lives to be spared.
“Joaquín was disposed to spare them, but, not wishing to leave his portrait impressed
upon too many memories which might prove some day quite too tenacious for his good,
he concluded to kill as well as rob them” (133). No longer the sublime hero, Murieta the
sensationalized criminal seeks not to elicit recognition from settlers but to terrorize them:
“Around San Andreas, Calaveritas, and Yackee Camp, numerous thefts and robberies had
been committed for several weeks past. Property was missed, but no one knew whither it
was gone. Men were murdered, and the bloody hand remained unseen. Yet every one
knew that thieves and murderers walked unknown in the midst of the community. A
strange dread hung over every face and gave vigilance to every eye. The fearful shrunk
back from a danger which they could feel but not see” (110). This image of Murieta as
the terrorist rebel serves the purpose of cautioning settlers and the settler state to respect
the autonomy of the conquered unsovereign savage.
The cost is much too high not to, and settler vigilance will not be enough, it is
suggested. Expanded forms of state violence hailed by proper settler democratic
processes would be required to get the job done:
So burdensome were the tributes levied upon the citizens of the whole State by
the robbers, and so ceaselessly did they commit their depredations that it became
a fit subject for legislative action. A petition! Numerously signed, was presented
to the Legislature, praying that body to authorize Captain Harry Love to organize
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a company of Mounted Rangers in order to capture, drive out of the country, or
exterminate the desperate bands of highwayman, who placed in continual
jeopardy both life and property. (145)
Alemán points this out when he writes, “it is not lawlessness that causes social anarchy in
Murieta or California; in fact, it is just the opposite. The Anglo- Americans in the novel
follow the letter and spirit of American laws that systematically worked to dispossess
California’s Mexican and Native Americans” (80). If Murieta was the sovereign
individual deserving of recognition, he is now the enemy combatant, a stateless terrorist
savage, to be contained and eliminated. If he was the sovereign deciding the state of
exception, he is now shown to be the subject it targets.
If Ridge’s point, then, is to demonstrate how Murieta is a sovereign subject, the
simultaneous image of Murieta as the US nation’s unsovereign stateless enemy
combatant, creates a second formal paradox in the novel. The suggestion made through
the mode of sensation that Murieta be respected out of fear of his rebellion, implies that
Ridge acknowledges that the demand made through historical romance for Murieta to be
recognized as human is already always foreclosed in settler society. In the eyes of settler
society, Murieta should be respected not because he is human, but because he is
dangerously inhuman all along. It is thus his presumed savagery, highlighted through
sensational language, that must be respected less settler security be jeopardized. Yet not
to demand recognition of Murieta’s humanity, leaving only this image of terrorist savage,
would endorse the position of total annihilation of Indigenous sovereignty, fully exposing
US sovereignty as an illegitimate form premised on genocide. That Ridge must use both
strategies rather than one, despite the antagonism they form, points up the political
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ontology of the Indian as one whose existence, which is tied to land-bases that settler
colonialism seeks to enclose, constitutes a threat to the US nation, a threat that makes the
Indian a surplus or disposable subject the only solution to which is elimination.
This formal paradox and the view of Indianness it reveals can be best approached
when the novel depicts Murieta’s beheading. Here, the novel asks readers to both identify
with (grieve) and take pleasure in the dismemberment of Murieta as the sovereign
individual/terrorist savage. Such a dissonance the novel itself acknowledges when the
narrator voices reservations over its use in describing Murieta and Garcia’s deaths: “I
must shock the nerves of the fastidious, much against my will, by stating that he [Captain
Harry Love] caused the head of the renowned Murieta to be cut off” (156). Despite this
misgiving, however, the narrator quickly indulges the reader describing the sensational
details of the dismemberment:
His hand, however, was offensive, and was preserved—that terrible, threefingered hand—which had dyed itself in many a quivering heart—had torn with
its ruthless talons the throats of many an agonized victim, and had shadowed itself
forth upon the horrified imaginations of thousands who only knew that it existed. .
. [Murieta’s] head was also exhibited in a glass case, not to prove its identity
(though even that was done) but to give the public the actual sight of an object
which had flung a strange, haunting dread over the mind, as if it had been a
conscious, voluntary agent of evil. (156)
This tension between Murieta’s death as grievable and pleasurable, between Murieta as
the sovereign individual and the killable terrorist, embodies how the category of the
sovereign individual in which Ridge wishes Indigenous people would be counted is
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premised on the dispossession of Indigenous people in the first place. To be the settler is
to dispossess the Native, a relationship for which there is no structural resolution despite
Ridge’s best efforts to imagine one, or as Moreton-Robinson describes the settler/Native
asymmetry, “You cannot dominate without seeking to possess the dominated. You cannot
exclude unless you assume you already own” (xxiv). Murieta cannot call for his
dispossession to be grieved from within the very category produced by the erasure of
Indigenous people. It’s in this way that Murieta is the ungrievable subject, or as Byrd
explains: “Indians are lamentable, but not grievable. . . The lamentable is pitiable, but not
remediable. It is past and regrettable. Grieving, on the other hand, calls people to
acknowledge, to see, and to grapple with lived lives and the commensurable suffering”
(38). Sensationalizing Murieta, which negates the image of the sovereign Murieta, thus
serves to acknowledge how Native dispossession engenders the meanings of white settler
possession, which is to say, the right not to be dispossessed and excluded, or treated like
Murieta. If Melville’s “Bartleby” could express grief over the mistreatment of the white
worker by appealing to and depending on settler sovereignty, the irresolvable
representation of Murieta’s identity in the Ridge’s novel proves the existence and
irreconcilable nature of it.
Refusing Settler Democracy
By offering, then, a view of Indigenous sovereignty as the aporia of settler
sovereignty, Ridge’s novel comes to narrate the position of those who refused to
recognize the legitimacy of the US nation. That is, the novel’s uneven form negatively
calls for a defense of Indigenous autonomy that rejects US expansion or incorporation
into its democracy. It is the excessive use of sensation that embodies this refusal of the
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United States. For instance, the over-sensationalized image of Manual Garcia, or ThreeFingered Jack becomes important for the role it plays in unsettling the politics of novel’s
historical romance plot to legitimize US sovereignty:
He was a man of unflinching bravery, but cruel and sanguinary. . . He was
different from his more youthful leader, in possessing nothing of his generous,
frank, and cordial disposition, and in being utterly destitute of one merciful trait
of humanity. His delight was in murder for its own diabolical sake, and he gloated
over the agonies of his unoffending victims. He would sacrifice policy, the safety
and interests of the band for the mere gratification of this murderous propensity,
and it required all Joaquín’s firmness and determination to hold him in check. (16)
Garcia’s sensationalized image, a scandalous image of murdering for the pleasure of it,
becomes irreconcilable with the novel’s literary aspirations on which had rested Ridge’s
attempt to imagine a reconciliation between Indigenous sovereignty and US state
sovereignty.25
What makes Garcia so frightening is not the manifest content of his desire to kill
everyone, “so much so that scarcely a man whom he ever met, rich or poor, escaped with
his life,” but the disrupting form of Garcia’s sensationalized image of uncontained
violence in the novel’s aesthetic structure (84). The excess of sensation, a pleasure in
describing Garcia’s actions, can be said to express the novel’s acknowledgment of
Indigenous sovereignty as the impossibility of US sovereignty, a tension the novel’s
irresolvable narrative structure has already laid bare. In this way, the excessive
sensationalism affirms the rejection of US sovereignty as an illegitimate colonial project.
By intensifying its own narrative dissonance through overly sensationalized images of
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violence, Murieta points up how US sovereignty is constituted and cohered through
colonial violence, not its prevention or reconciliation, and that the demand for treaties to
be honored is the demand the US nation cannot satisfy less it confronts its own
illegitimacy.26
By way of comparison, if “Bartleby” calls for the redemption of the settler worker
through Native dispossession, Murieta’s unresolved formal structure calls for the
rejection of a nation premised on such genocide, an aesthetics that encodes what Audra
Simpson calls Indigenous refusal, or what Glen Coulthard theorizes as an Indigenous
politics of rejecting liberal recognition. Its uneven form encodes the demand for Native
liberation as the refusal of settler sovereignty manifested by the fight for Indigenous
autonomy.27 If Bartleby’s restored settler sovereignty is Murieta’s dispossession,
Murieta’s liberation would free Bartleby for it would destabilize a structure in which
settler owners exploit settler workers through the illusion of a shared “humanity” or
settler sovereignty as shared power creating intra-settler equality
Ruiz de Burton and Settler Popular Sovereignty
If in Melville’s “Bartleby” we learn how settler democracy manages the conflict
among settlers, and in Ridge’s Murieta we learn how settler sovereignty is constituted by
the recognition and erasure of Indigenous sovereignty, I want to end by looking at Ruiz
de Burton’s novel The Squatter and the Don that holds together in its vision of Californio
dispossession this relationship between intra-settler conflicts and colonial dispossession.
Ruiz de Burton’s novel attempts to envision what Bartleby’s grief and occupation had
implicitly called for, namely a settler popular sovereignty that could resolve the problem
of settlers being targeted for dispossession, whether they were white workers like
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Bartleby in New York, or, as Ruiz de Burton sees it, white settlers and Mexican property
owners alike in California. Ruiz de Burton ends the story that “Bartleby” began and that
Ridge’s Murieta rejected: the story of setter sovereignty promising to resolve the conflicts
of the capitalism to ensure its expansion.
Published in 1885, The Squatter and the Don depicts the last stages of
dispossession and proletarianization of the class of Mexican property-owners in the
decades following the US-Mexico war. The same imagined ranchero property holders
who had aided, abetted, and financed Murieta, are facing, in Ruiz de Burton’s novel, not
only a state-sponsored squatter invasion, but a new “invader,” monopoly capitalism.
White squatters are illegally occupying Californio’s lands, former Spanish titles of
ownership are being challenged and ruled invalid in US courts, and monopoly railroads
and big banks are breaking up and supplanting older pastoral forms of production. As a
member of this class of property-holders, Ruiz de Burton writes The Squatter and Don in
order to highlight the plight of Californios, hoping, in the tradition of the protest novel, to
arouse support and sympathy from the public.
While Sánchez and Pita’s introduction to novel’s re-publication emphasizes Ruiz
de Burton’s powerful critique of monopoly capitalism and imperialism, they, along with
scholars to follow, are quick to point out how the novel’s politics fully endorse free
markets and liberal democracy. In fact, as several scholars note, Ruiz de Burton seeks to
defend against dispossession by appealing to whiteness and supporting the exclusion of
Indigenous people and the enslaved. As Alemán explains:
the novel ultimately argues for a new Californio coloniality, one that consolidates
Californio whiteness with the whiteness of refined Northerners, victimized
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squatters, and displaced Southerners while conveniently forgetting the racialist
politics that underlie such an imagined community. The novel levels a scathing
critique of U.S. imperialism-not because it excludes Californios, dispossessing
them of their land and livelihood, but because it does not include them in the
privileged category of white class mobility in the first place. (67)
Or, as David Luis-Brown puts it, the novel’s imagined shared “class status of Californios
and Anglos depends on the exploitation of mestizos, Indians, and blacks” (819). And Jose
Aranda claims that “For Ruiz de Burton, what is often wrong with the U.S. is not its
ideals but those who fail to practice them. Such leaders need only to be reformed to set
the nation back on a moral path. Despite good reasons to see the United States negatively,
Ruiz de Burton wants her readers to understand that she has a stake in reforming U.S.
democracy” (574). Building on these insights, I want to look at how the novel appeals to
a form of settler popular sovereignty as a solution to monopoly capitalism. While it is
clear that the novel hopes to expand whiteness and settler sovereignty to include
Californios in ways that could unite squatter/settlers with Californios in opposition to
monopoly, I suggest that this vision is left unresolved or incomplete, and that through this
unresolved image of Californios allying with white settlers to fight the state and
monopoly capital, we can see how these intra-settler conflicts between the wealth of
monopolists and the threat of proletarianization of settler land owners are resolved not by
fighting capital but by supporting increased colonial expropriations and exclusions. Ruiz
de Burton’s novel offers an important view of what we saw in “Bartleby” but from the
other side of the nation and the colonial relation, namely that of settler sovereignty and

Baker 80
class in terms of how intra-settler economic conflicts are resolved through expanded
forms of colonial violence of which Ruiz de Burton, and the Californios, were a target.
As Sanchez and Pita have argued, Ruiz de Burton uses romance to imagine a
reconciliation between white squatters and Californios. It is the marriage between
Mercedes and Clarence that allegorizes the union of the two classes pitted against each
other in the fight for land. For the marriage to work and the two groups to co-exist, Ruiz
de Burton goes to great lengths to prove the whiteness of Mercedes and the Californios to
demonstrate their capacity for property ownership, which white squatters invading
California it is already assumed, possess. As Luis-Brown explains, “Squatter’s romantic
racialism integrates the Californios—ostensibly white yet racially ambiguous—into
whiteness as caste through marital union, overtly expanding whiteness yet covertly
subverting concepts of racial purity” (821). The novel also makes a distinction between
squatters and settlers to emphasize the connection between whiteness, the law, and
property-ownership. Squatters who illegally occupy Mexican-owned lands are shown to
be unrefined and repugnant, while settlers who follow the law are cast as respectable and
inviting. If Mercedes must prove her whiteness, Clarence must prove he is a settler and
not a squatter, for the marriage to work, or the two groups to find reconciliation.
This shared whiteness between the Californios and the white settlers/squatters
translates into a shared claim to be the “natives” of California. Simultaneously hailing
indigeneity and erasing it, this claim to be native to the lands targeted for theft, whether
by squatters or monopoly, becomes the assertion that both white settlers and the
Californios should be protected by the state from dispossession. When Don Mariano is
asked, “Haven’t you—the cattle owners—tried to have some law enacted that will protect
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your property?,” his response is that if only the Californios were treated as native to the
land like white settlers, the Californios would be protected by the law against
dispossession: “It could be done, perhaps, if our positions were reversed, and the Spanish
people—’the natives’—were the planters of the grain fields, and the Americans were the
owners of the cattle. But as we, the Spaniards, are the owners of the Spanish—or
Mexican—land grants and also the owners of the cattle ranchos, our State legislators will
not make any law to protect cattle” (65). The aspiration for this protected status from
dispossession, the status of whiteness, leads Don Mariano’s son Victoriano to claim
facetiously, “I wish we were squatters.” (74). The Californios as landed property holders
should expect to enjoy more privileges and protections than the landless not-quite-white
squatters, but are instead being by treated worse. As Alemán explains, “the narrative
consolidates the privileges of Clarence’s racial whiteness with the cultural whiteness of
Californios as a way of arguing for their sociocultural position above Anglo squatters”
(69). Ruiz de Burton’s goal, then, is to envision how proper US white settlers (not
“illegal” squatters) and the Californios can come together to fight against the state and
monopoly capitalism that sets squatters against the Californios in the first place. As Don
Mariano says, “No, I don’t blame the squatters; they are at times like ourselves, victims
of wrong legislation, which unintentionally cuts both ways. They were set loose upon us,
but a law without equity recoils upon them more cruelly. Then we are all sufferers, all
victims of a defective legislation and subverted moral principles” (74). Shared whiteness
becomes shared nativeness becomes shared white victimization. Together, Californios
and white settlers are, as the novel decries in its last line, the “white slaves” to monopoly
capitalism (344).
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Using the romance, then, to claim white victimization for the Californios, should
allow, as Ruiz de Burton sees it, for greater sympathy and outrage from white audiences.
Expected to be protected by their whiteness, the Californios are denied this recognition.
Like Bartleby, they are not only abandoned but targeted by the state. Ruiz de Burton
wants to make the same claim, then, that is made in “Bartleby” about the settler worker:
targeting rather than serving the white settler dangerously fails to uphold the asymmetry
between settler sovereignty and the unsovereign “savage.” Don Mariano laments this
when he describes Californio dispossession through the language of the vanishing Indian:
“I am afraid there is no help for us native Californians. We must sadly pass away. The
weak and the helpless are always trampled in the throng. We must sink, go under, never
to rise” (164). John Gonzalez points out how Ruiz de Burton suggests that the evil of
monopoly capitalism lies in how it does not uphold the asymmetry of the colonial relation
that, as the novel intimates, creates categories of white possession defined against Native
and Black dispossession: “the railroad monopoly functions as an imperium in imperio
that threatens to replace the nation’s white citizenship with the corporate empire’s white
slavery. Delinking class difference from racial [and colonial] difference, corporations
transform white Californios into Indians, white workers into the structural equivalent of
black or Chinese workers, and U.S. citizens into colonial subjects” (162). Like the grief
felt over Bartleby’s removal and incarceration, or Murieta’s dispossession, Californios
dispossession is meant to register as grievable because they are a class of people, as the
novel as tried to demonstrate through the romance, not meant for a life of dispossession.
“Whiteness,” in the novel, writes Marcial Gonzalez, “correlates with an escape from
forced proletarianization” (50). As Sanchez and Pita explain, referring to Gabriel’s
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descent into proletarian labor, “it is this change in class status, from upper class to
working class, from “Don” to “hod carrier” that constitutes the central resentment at work
in the novel” (33). Like Bartleby’s wasted body in prison, Gabriel’s broken body as a
manual laborer is meant to be received as grievable and given sympathy.
Yet by the end of the novel, Ruiz de Burton turns away from the language of
romance to what Sánchez and Pita call historical discourse through which Ruiz de Burton
offers a didactic condemnation of monopoly capitalism, leading to a call to action, or
populist uprising. The narrator proclaims: “It seems now that unless the people of
California take the law into their own hands, and seize the property of those men, and
confiscate it, to reimburse the money due to the people, the arrogant corporation will
never pay.” (338). The question becomes as Aranda puts it, “How do we make sense of a
romance narrative that finds no closure in the marriage plot but instead evolves into a
didactic form that self-consciously recruits a mass collective response to the political and
economic machinations of actual, historic monopolists?” (14). For Sanchez and Pita, this
lack of closure indicates how the novel cannot imagine a resolution to monopoly
capitalism, even though it has offered a resolution to the antagonism between squatters
and Californios:
In the novel’s concluding chapter, as we have noted, the narrator becomes one
more character, a commentator of current affairs in California. Once the
Californio society of the past has been effaced, and once the romantic closure has
been secured, there remains the new ‘invader,’ the railroad monopoly, that is
dispossessing and disempowering all Californians alike. This historical conflict
lies outside the purview of romance and cannot be ‘generically’ resolved. Faced
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with this arrow of time, the narrator can only restate his/her denunciation of
corruption and immorality at the highest levels and end with a cynical,
apocalyptic view of the future, with no Clarence, no white knight, in sight to offer
resolution or restitution, or to overcome the social conflicts in the historical
present. (48)28
In other words, if the romance plot sought to express a shared white victimization
inclusive of Californios for which grief and sympathy would be given, Ruiz de Burton’s
choice to take up a different register at the novel’s end, one that calls for a populist
uprising, marks the former’s failure to arouse concern for the Californio’s plight. Tereza
Szeghi argues that the “sentimental strategy,” of the novel is, “an attempt to pull on
readers’ heartstrings and inspire them to act on behalf of a wronged minority group
before it is too late. At the same time, this tactic runs the risk of backfiring by confirming
the presuppositions of Anglo American readers and essentially excusing them from
taking action” (112). That the novel turns into a didactic call for settler popular
sovereignty in the form of an uprising of settlers (small capitalists) who would seize and
redistribute the property of monopoly capitalists, demonstrates the shortcoming of the
romance to express Californio dispossession as white victimization. In other words, Ruiz
de Burton doesn’t put her trust, in the end, in the romance as a structure of feeling
convincing readers that squatters and Californios are equivalent white slaves to monopoly
capitalism.
The novel instead calls for unison of “white slaves” taking action in a settler
vigilante uprising through the language of historical discourse or a populist realism. The
populist image of the “people” becomes the novel’s resolution to Californio
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dispossession and not the national allegory of marriage and language of romance. It is
this image of the people as settler popular sovereignty that Ruiz de Burton hopes
Californios can be counted among. The problem is that it has been this settler popular
sovereignty all along that is the cause of the Californio’s dispossession. Ruiz de Burton
calls for the law of property to be broken, even as she demands it be respected by
squatters. The very thing the novel hails as the solution to Californio dispossession is also
the cause of it. In other words, the novel imagines that Californios would be included in a
settler popular sovereignty when in fact they are already the targets of it. Popular
uprisings, as they historically took place, did not nor would not go after the property of
monopolists. They instead were white riots, seeking to terrorize and dispossess conquered
and racialized populations. What this formal paradox attests to, then, is that squatters are
not the victims of monopoly, but are in fact the shock troops paving the way for its
entrance. As Don Mariano points out: “If these railroad men will only let us have the
Texas Pacific all will be right, but if not, then the work of ruining me begun by the
squatters will be finished by the millionaires” (288). In this way, the lowliest squatter
stands on the same side of the colonial relation as the richest monopolist, and on the other
side is now the Californios who are targeted for proletarianization, colonization, and
racialization, where they join Indigenous people, mestizos, and The enslaved. As Alemán
puts it, “the novel tries to forget that Clarence is an Anglo profiting from Manifest
Destiny,” even at is suggests squatters and Californios can unite against monopoly
capitalism (69).
What The Squatter and the Don shows, then, through its abandoned romance plot,
is that settler popular sovereignty aspires to create and maintain an inclusive and
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egalitarian liberal democracy not by resisting the capitalist relation, that here has reached
the stage of monopoly, but by supporting and/or participating in colonial expropriations
and exclusions. It offers the image of settler popular sovereignty that “Bartleby”
indirectly invokes in its grievable image of the forlorn white worker. The squatter has
been driven by the value-form to steal the land of the Californios in first place, and when
the monopoly-form catches up, squatters will not so much turn against capital but will
double-down on white supremacy and settler sovereignty through colonial and racial
dispossession. In this way, we can see how The Squatter and the Don portends what
would come to pass in the years to follow in the labor politics of California. Settler
popular sovereignty would drive white workers and settler farmers to fight against
inequality by fighting for the ongoing genocide of Indigenous people, the racial exclusion
and violence against mestizos, and the removal and banning of the Chinese, actions that
were formalized in the Chinese Exclusion act of 1888. Settler popular sovereignty, in
other words, is forged through intensifying colonial violence. It seeks to reduce the
conflict between labor and capital by coming together to support colonial dispossession.
Ruiz de Burton’s attempt to appeal to this dream becomes the appeal to the same force
that targets her community for dispossession. She writes from the point of view of a
settler, while also finding herself the target of colonial violence that produces settler
sovereignty as the site of power in which she expects to find solidarity with other settlers.
This antagonism has manifested in the tension between the romance and populist realism.
The non-solution of this tension embodies the asymmetry of the colonial relation Ruiz de
Burton is caught in the middle of.
If “Bartleby” laments the emergence of the capitalist relation and its creation of
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the conflict between an owning-class and laboring-class, Ruiz de Burton shows how its
later stages—here the generalized or monopoly form—continues to be managed by the
asymmetry of the colonial relation. This makes visible us how settler colonialism creates
the condition for the emergence of the market, but also how it continues to maintain and
manage its intra-settler conflicts. As Manu Vimalassery puts it, “the vaunted equality and
republicanism of settlers arise from the maintenance of colonial relations.” (304). It has
been, then, the asymmetry of Ruiz de Burton and Ridge’s novels that lays this bare the
relationship between colonial dispossession and settler sovereignty, a relationship in
which one side there is synthesis, inclusion, recuperation, redemption, reform, and, on the
other, stale-mate, asymmetry, exclusion, violence, and destruction. As Byrd explains,
“the paradox of settler colonialism” is “where inclusion, symmetry, and equation function
as the basis for rights on the one hand and termination of Indigenous lives and nations on
the other” (152). In other words, as an example, if Bartleby was the worker who had
occupied Wall Street in the 1840s, he, if not imprisoned, might have been participating in
the New York City white riots in 1863, or, if not, heading west to homestead—occupy—
his free 160 acres, perhaps in California, and it is this structural problem of pursuing
freedom by supporting colonial and racial violence that Ridge and Ruiz de Burton help us
see through the uneven narrative forms of their novels.
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Chapter 2
Slavery, Whiteness as Policing, and Black Abolition in Martin Delany’s Blake; or
the Huts of America
Three months after Martin Delany’s Blake was serialized in The Anglo-African
Magazine (January to July of 1859), John Brown and his 21 anti-slavery fighters, inspired
by previous slave rebellions, attempted to incite what Delany’s novel had imagined and
called for, a large-scale insurrection in the South and beyond.1 While most Northern
abolitionists (with some exceptions like Brown and his supporters, one of which was
Delany himself) disavowed the support of violent slave rebellion and instead believed
moral persuasion and legislation could end slavery, Delany’s novel had envisioned mass
insurrection as the only pathway to liberating enslaved Africans from a global system of
racial slavery.2 In fact, when compared to other literary fictions of slave rebellion like
Melville’s “Benito Cereno,” Douglass’ The Heroic Slave, or Stowe’s Dread, which
represent the threat insurrection posed to the coherence of the US nation, Blake is
premised on the inverse assumption that, as scholars of the novel Adenike M. Davidson
and Eric Sundquist have noted, the stability of US nation stood in the way of the struggle
of the enslaved to assert their right to self-determination.3 Compared to the fictions of
Melville, Douglass, and Stowe in which slave rebellion is represented as an event
contained on a ship bounded by the ocean, or in the isolated swamp deep in the woods,
spaces allegorizing the nation-form and the place of slave rebellion within it, Blake
doesn’t imagine how the enslaved can find a place within a reformed, restored, or
fulfilled US liberal democracy. It imagines instead, as the first Black nation novel, how
the enslaved could take an insurrectionist path out of it.4
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A contemporary of Delany who also shared this assumption and supported slave
insurrection as a means of emancipating the enslaved was Karl Marx. In the same years
Delany was drafting Blake, Marx was living, after the failed revolutions of 1848, as a
political exile in London where by day he studied in the British Library and by night he
put together a meager living writing news correspondence for New York and German
newspapers. Although far removed from the politics of antislavery action, unlike Delaney
who was in the thick of it, Marx was nonetheless interested in the role of slavery in
capitalism—but only to the extent that it helped him better understand the structure of
(white) wage slavery. “As long as the English cotton manufactures depended on slavegrown cotton,” writes Marx in October of 1861, “it could be truthfully asserted that they
rested on a twofold slavery, the indirect slavery of the white man in England and the
direct slavery of the Black men on the other side of the Atlantic” (“British Cotton Trade”
39).5 Marx closely followed the Civil War and wrote about the role slave rebellion played
in galvanizing white worker movements in the North and in Europe. After John Brown’s
raid, Marx writes to Engels, “In my view, the most momentous thing happened in the
world today is the slave movement—on the one hand, in America, started by the death of
[John] Brown, and in Russia, on the other . . . Should the affair grow serious by and by,
what will become of Manchester?” (“Letter to Engels” 17). By the end of war, in an
address to Lincoln on behalf of the First International, Marx optimistically writes: “The
working men of Europe feel sure that, as the American War of Independence initiated a
new era of ascendancy for the middle class, so the American Anti-slavery War will do for
the working classes” (“Address to Lincoln” 154). The enslaved liberating themselves
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from formal slavery was intertwined, as Marx saw it, with wage slaves freeing
themselves from exploitation.
That both Delany and Marx could call for and support large-scale slave revolt in
a moment when the mere thought of slaves conspiring conjured up fears in the minds of
Northerners and Southerners alike of what happened in Haiti in 1793 being repeated in
the United States, derived from how they understood the modern world. In Delany’s
fiction and in Marx’s writings, modernity is approached as a global structure premised on
a violent antagonism. For Delany, the antagonism is slavery, while for Marx it is wage
labor. For Marx, if capitalism had transformed the “definite social relations between
men” into the “fantastic form of a relation between things,” the reification of human
relations, his project, particularly in Capital, is to offer a conceptual map of the structure
or immanent laws of capitalism that in the immediate experience of its subjects are
concealed by the appearances, or what Marx calls the “real abstractions,” of exchangevalue. (Capital 165).6 On the other hand, to imagine mass insurrection, Delany must map
where the enslaved as a class or group begin and end in the modern world. Narrating
mass insurrection becomes the same as drawing up a view of the Black nation—a picture
not of a future autonomous nation of former slaves, but rather the class or group identity
of the enslaved as determined by a global structure of slavery.7 The narrative attempt to
envision mass insurrection becomes the narrative problem of how to see slavery as a
structure and the Black slave as a position.8
With this as its narrative problem, I want to look at the ways Delany’s novel
represents the world of liberal capitalism from the standpoint or position of the Slave.
Because it shares a similar premise, and, in the language of Lukács, an aspiration to map
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the totality of a global system of oppression, I also want to compare Delany’s novel to
Marx’s view of wage labor, posing the question of how does Delany’s story of slavery
compare to Marx’s story of wage labor exploitation? If Marx’s theory of wage labor
totalizes what capitalism atomizes and thus mystifies, Delany’s narrative map of slavery
is one of incommensurability produced by the novel’s formal structure of unresolved
tension, dissonance, disunity, and unevenness. Readers of Blake have often
acknowledged such formal failures, explaining them as the result of Delany’s didacticism
and focus on politics rather than attention to poetics.9 Yet these formal failures are what
create a cognitive map of slavery that forecloses narrative synthesis, embraces formal
tension, and suspends ideological closure.
I argue that this incommensurable formal structure is not so much an aesthetic
shortcoming as it is the aesthetic embodiment of the negative dialectical structure of
slavery itself. A negative dialectic, as Fredric Jameson describes it, is “a movement of
negation that can never reach a synthesis, a negativity that ceaselessly undermines all the
available positivities until it has only its own destructive energy to promote” (56). This is
how the novel comes to represent the dispossession of the enslaved—as a relation or
structural position of pure negation, what Afro-pessimist theorists call social death in
which enslaved Africans, as Frank Wilderson writes, “are not recognized as a social
subject and are thus precluded from the category of ‘human’—inclusion in humanity
being predicated on social recognition, volition, subjecthood, and the valuation of life”
(8). For the problem of social death, as a negative dialectic, there is no solution or
synthesis to be found within the world based on this negation. Blake’s incommensurable
vision of slavery, I will demonstrate, formally makes explicit this negative dialectical
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relationship between anti-Blackness and US (white) democracy. That is, the forms of
dissonance in the novel’s narrative structure register the way slavery is not so much a
stage of forced labor, but rather a form of social exclusion or social death in the way that
Orlando Patterson, Saidyia Hartman, and more recently Frank Wilderson and Tiffany
King suggest slavery is less of a labor relation than a relation of terror and ontological
exclusion in which people of African descent are positioned as objects to be owned by a
master-class.
It is through such a narrative form that Blake helps to historicize the role of antiBlackness as a constitutive structure of expropriation and exclusion in liberal capitalism.
The accumulation of the Slave’s body (economic) and the exclusion of the Slave’s self
from liberal democracy (libidinal or symbolic), anti-Blackness serves as a structure of
what Marx called primitive accumulation that both creates and sustains the conditions for
the value-form.10 The novel’s incommensurable form mediates this foundational and
ongoing role of anti-Blackness in the United States insofar as anti-Blackness constitutes
and maintains whiteness as a shared status of possession and power harmonizing the
inequalities and conflicts among whites encountered in the value-form (accumulation by
exploitation) and liberal democracy. Furthermore, because Blake represents the structure
of anti-Blackness as a negative dialectic, the novel offers a radical view of modernity that
rather than envisioning its completion or synthesis, like we see in the work of Marx or in
the views of other abolitionists or labor reformers at the time, imagines, as Fanon would
call for a century later, the dissolution of what is an irreconcilable, or structurally
irresolvable, relationship between (white) liberal humanity and Black social death on
which the project of modernity rests.11 This view of dissolution, as this chapter will show,
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expresses and affirms the logic and aim of radical abolitionist and insurrectionist political
events and actions of Delany’s historical moment that fought to overcome this negative
dialectic bind of slavery by dismantling the institutions of white supremacy holding the
United States together.
The plan of this chapter, then, is to focus on three instances of formal
incommensurability in Blake, which when read together, bring into view its negative
dialectical mapping of anti-Blackness. The first instance points up how anti-Blackness
relates to settler colonialism, the second represents anti-Blackness’s role in the formation
of “free” wage labor, and the third instance demonstrates how the Black slave’s political
ontology of social death gives life to the forward-moving, linear-progressive aspirations
of modernity. In examining these formal impossibilities, the chapter will compare what
they suggest about anti-Blackness to Marx’s understanding of the relationship between
slavery and capitalism and to the competing perspectives of abolitionists at the time who
called for the end to formal slavery but not necessarily the abolition of the institutions of
white supremacy.
Entangled Dispossessions
Included in the novel’s plot of insurrection in the South is a small chapter
exploring the place of indigenous nations in the plan to liberate the enslaved. Although
brief, the chapter nonetheless contains a formal incommensurability that reveals much
about the interlocking relationship between slavery and settler colonialism. While
traveling from plantation to plantation disseminating the secret plan of insurrection,
Blake makes his way to “the Indian Nation near Fort Towson, Arkansas” where he visits
with Mr. Culver, a slaveholding “Chief of the United [Choctaw] Nation” (86). The point
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of the visit is to determine if the Choctaw will support a general insurrection of slaves, or
as Blake asks Mr. Culver, “What I now most wish to learn is, whether in case that the
Blacks should rise, they may have hope or fear from the Indian?” (87).12 Mr. Culver
answers by describing how the enslaved share a more horizontal relationship with their
Choctaw masters than slaves experience in the South: “the difference between a white
man and Indian holding slaves. Indian work side by side with Black man, eat with him,
drink with him, rest with him and both lay down in shade together. . . In our Nation
Indian and Black all marry together. Indian like Black man very much, only he don’t
fight ‘nough. Black man in Florida fight much, and Indian like ‘im heap!” [sic] (86).
While Mr. Culver claims that slaves are treated more like subordinated laborers of the
community than as racial others, his decision nonetheless to own slaves results from what
he believes is the inability of slaves to fight and win their freedom. Here, through the
voice of Mr. Culver, Delany ventriloquizes a dominant anti-Black racial ideology that
represented people of African descent as persons naturally servile or susceptible to
domination, thus making them predisposed to enslavement. In his study on the origins of
slavery and the Black radical tradition, Cedric Robinson describes the formation of this
ideology: “the ideograph of Blacks came to signify a difference of species, an exploitable
source of energy (labor power) both mindless to the organizational requirements of
production and insensitive to the subhuman conditions of work” (82). In voicing this
view, Mr. Culver, like all slaveholders, blames slaves rather himself for their
dispossession, thereby naturalizing the power disparity of the master-slave relation of the
South.
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Delany has invoked this white supremacist myth in order to dispel it by proposing
that slaves are enslaved not because of natural “servility” but because they lack the means
to defend themselves. Blake corrects Mr. Culver: “You make, sir, a slight mistake about
my people. They would fight if in their own country they were united as the Indians here,
and not scattered thousands of miles apart as they are” (86). Through the voice of Blake,
Delany suggests that if slaves were to possess a land-base and a national identity like
Native nations of the Southeast, they would be successful in resisting and freeing
themselves from slavery. In fact, Blake goes so far as to claim, by citing the example of
African nations who have defended their lands against European powers, that Native
groups have failed—despite being in possession of a land-base and national identity—to
defend against colonial conquest. Echoing dominant settler ideologies of the “vanishing
Indian,” Blake tells Mr. Culver, “you should also remember that the Africans have never
permitted a subjugation of their country by foreigners as the Indians have theirs, and
Africa today is still peopled by Africans, whilst America, the home of the Indian—who is
fast passing away—is now possessed and ruled by foreigners” (86). If Delany demystifies
a common anti-Black view which held that African peoples were predisposed for
servitude, he does by invoking an anti-Indian colonialist trope whose ideological function
was to legitimate Indigenous genocide. “This is true, sir, true!” Mr. Culver is shown to
acknowledge, “The Indian, like game before the bow, is passing away before the gun of
the white man!” (87). Delany, speaking through Blake, implies that if what he identifies
as tools of self-determination—a territorial land-base and a national identity—were in the
hands of enslaved Africans, they could do what Native nations have not been able to do
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in North America, namely defend against and win their freedom from white colonizers
and slaveholders.
In this exchange, then, Blake and Mr. Culver each blame the other’s community
for failing to defend against colonial and racial dispossession. They also suggest that this
failure is the cause of the other’s dispossession and exclusion. From Blake’s perspective,
if Native nations would have held back white settlement, there would not be the space
available for the importation and exploitation of thee enslaved, just as, from Mr. Culver’s
perspective, if the enslaved were willing to fight against their masters, there would be no
slave-based economy and thus no slaveholding planter class occupying Indigenous lands.
Why does Delany turn to an anti-Indian ideology to dispel an anti-Black ideology, and
why is it expressed that the cause of each group’s oppression lies in the actions of the
other rather than in those of white colonizers and slaveholders?
Instead of reading the conflict in this scene for what it might say about Delany’s
views on Native slaveholders, I want to focus on the way in which the conflict manifests
a formal bind in the novel’s strategy of challenging anti-Black ideologies. To use an antiIndian ideology to dispel an anti-Black ideology and to contend that one group’s
oppression is the fault of the other’s failure to defeat colonialism or enslavement, falls
short of dispelling dominant anti-Black ideologies and instead ends up offering an image
of the relationship between slavery and settler colonialism as a pure negation. That is,
there is no manifest vision or solution in this scene to either the negation of the enslaved
(anti-Blackness) or the negation of Indigenous peoples (anti-Indianness). This image of
pure negation, however, does not so much express a view of defeatism as it formally
embodies the co-constitutive and mutually reinforcing structural relationship between
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slavery and settler colonialism.13 The pure negation of Delany’s attempt to dispel antiBlack ideologies mediates how each of these structures of negation presuppose the other
in the US context: settler colonialism and slavery emerged as intertwined and
interdependent processes of colonial and racial dispossession. Slavery made possible
settler conquests, just as the enclosures of Native lands and the attempted elimination of
its peoples paved the way for and maintained slavery.
By the 1850s, this co-constitutive relationship between slavery and settler
colonialism had come to shape the South as a settler-slaveholder imperial project. As the
South’s plantation economy grew, it not only created inequality among the South’s white
population, but overtime exhibited a falling rate of profit, economic crises, financial loss,
and increased competition, all of which, as a result, drove slaveholders and landless
whites to enclose lands in the West (like Texas and the greater Southwest), and to look
Southward to do the same in the Caribbean and Central America like in the filibustering
attempts of Narciso López in Cuba in 1850 and 1851 and William Walker in Nicaragua
1855-56.14 Seizing more lands made up for losses and provided opportunities for
potentially dissatisfied poor whites to become slaveholders themselves.15 This process of
settler colonial expansion, as it had done before, further increased the demand for Black
slave labor. In fact, the enclosures of Native lands and the stealing of African bodies
served as two interlocking forms of speculation.16 When the settler state and/or settler
vigilantes (or squatters) of the South enclosed Indigenous lands, they presupposed the
availability of Black slave labor, just as when slave-catchers and slave-traders made trips
to Africa, they assumed land would be made available for the expansion of a plantation
economy dependent on slave labor. Or, put slightly differently, it was the perceived
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limitless availability of enslaved Africans that served as the precondition for further land
enclosures, just as much as new land enclosures sent ships to Africa to be filled with
human chattel. Even after the slave trade was abolished in 1807, this interlocking
speculation continued. Slaveholders of the Upper-South region began reorganizing the
model of their plantations to produce and sell slaves in addition to using them as laborers
necessary for cash-crop production. The Upper-South depended on the systematic rape of
female slaves, as historian Walter Johnson argues, to breed and export slaves to a DeepSouth economy that was constantly expanded westward and southward through colonial
enclosures (404).17 The internal trade, as it came to be known, filled the void that stealing
bodies from Africa had left behind.
If Blake and Mr. Culver’s brief exchange represents this co-constitutive
relationship between slavery and settler colonialism through a formal negativity, the same
conversation yields a view of the entanglement of the two groups’ struggles against these
intertwined structures of dispossession. Moments after using an anti-Black ideology to
justify slavery, Mr. Culver alludes to the entangled relationship of struggle for liberation
between the enslaved and Indigenous people in the Seminole wars in which communities
of marooned slaves joined Native groups to fight and defend against enclosures of land
and kidnapping of bodies: “The squaws of the great men among the Indians in Florida
were Black women, and the squaws of the Black men were Indian women. You see the
vine that winds around and holds us together. Don’t cut it, but let it grow till bimeby, it
git so stout and strong, with many, very many little branches attached, that you can’t
separate them” [sic] (87). Despite owning slaves, Mr. Culver is presented as an
accomplice in the coming insurrection, if only because, as the scene has made clear,
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Native nations share a mutual interest with the enslaved in resisting the expansion of a
settler colony that is also a slave estate. As a result, Blake shares the secret plan of
insurrection with Choctaw slaveholders and skips personally visiting their slave
communities. Blake doesn’t visit the slaves among the Choctaw because he assumes they
will be freed upon the event of insurrection which promises to dismantle the same
structure targeting Indigenous people for elimination and Black people for enslavement.
If the enslaved were to revolt and destroy the South’s slaveholding class, such an event,
as this scene implies, would also abolish the South’s settler colonial project of
eliminating Indigenous peoples to enclose the lands necessary for cash-crop production
premised on slave labor.
This vision, then, of an entangled struggle in which the future of indigenous
nations and the enslaved appears interdependent—if one succeeds in their rebellion so
does the other just as if one fails both fail—registers the way in which the co-constitutive
relationship between slavery and settler colonialism ties together the struggles of the
peoples these structures target. Mass insurrection will not only liberate the enslaved. It
will also unsettle indigenous lands precisely because slavery and settler colonialism are
of the same totality of colonial and racial dispossession. The pure negation of Delany’s
strategy to dispel anti-Black ideologies combined with the scene’s vision of entangled
struggle offer an important systematic view of how anti-Blackness, as a structure of
expropriation and exclusion, must be approached, if it is to be understood at all, in
relationship to Indigenous dispossession precisely because together they form a totality of
colonial-racial domination that both creates and maintains the conditions for exchangevalue (market society) and the institutions of (white settler) liberal democracy.
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Enslaved Africans and White Workers
If Delany defies national borders and offers an international vision of slaves
preparing and organizing for mass insurrection, he does so by splitting this vision into
two distinct sections, each of which focuses on one national context. The first section
follows Blake’s fugitive movements in the South where he works to spread the secret
plan for insurrection, agitating and recruiting co-conspirators across the land. It ends with
Blake suspending his revolutionary plans to help his family and close friends escape to
Canada. In the second section, the plot travels to Cuba where, after freeing his wife from
slavery, Blake begins to organize and prepare an insurrectionist army for impending
military action against the island’s slaveholding class. In each of the sections, Delany
explores a major barrier that must be overcome for insurrection to arrive. In the South,
the barrier identified is the pitfall of the “good master,” what historian Eugene Genovese
has described as “the paternalism in the Old South.” This governing strategy falsely
promised manumission and better treatment of the enslaved in order to elicit from them
greater accommodation to the master-slave relation, which, in doing so, as Delany
believed, abated the revolutionary anger of the enslaved. In the novel’s depiction of
Cuba, the barrier to be reckoned with is the direct force of the slaveholding class, or, put
inversely, the problem of how Blake can create, train, and deploy an army of slaves
strong enough to defeat their masters. Rather than treating these two sections as separate
representations of two distinct national contexts, I read them as coming together in the
novel to form an unresolved formal tension between the two plots of insurrection, one
that points up the role of white supremacy in forming an asymmetry of power between
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“free” white workers and enslaved Africans that constitutes and maintains capital’s
relationship to wage labor in the United States.
To see this formal tension and the asymmetry it reveals, we have to first
understand why the novel imagines paternalism in the South and direct force in Cuba as
barriers to mass insurrection. In spreading the plan of insurrection in the South, Blake
explains that the great obstacle to overcome is “this confounded ‘good treatment’ and
expectation of getting freed by their oppressors, that has been the curse of the slave. All
shrewd masters, to keep their slaves in check, promise them their freedom at their, the
master’s death, as though they were certain to die first. This contents the slave, and
makes him obedient and willing to serve and toil on, looking forward to the promised
redemption” (127). Historically, manumission and promises of better treatment were used
by US slaveholders, particularly after the abolishment of slave trade, to abate anger and
unrest among their slaves. While the image of the “good master” might reflect a historical
shift in how slaveholders managed slave populations in the South, it also stands in for, I
suggest, the belief held among many Northern abolitionists that liberal democracy and
market society offered freedom to the slave through wage labor and formal political
equality.18
This belief rested on calling for the recognition of the slave’s humanity and
affirming liberal democracy’s promise of universal humanism, an idea that abolitionists
radically asserted at the time, and that set them apart from most other nineteenth-century
Americans. Yet Delany shows how recognizing the slave’s humanity could be used as a
tool of oppression in the hands of the “good master” figure, whether of the South or the
North. As Major Armsted acknowledges, “Southerner as I am . . . I can joke with a slave
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just because he is a man” (63). His reason for doing so, he confesses, is that “good
treatment begets more labor from the slave than bad. A smile from the master is better
than cross looks, and one crack of a joke with him is worth a hundred cracks of the whip.
Only confide in him, and let him be satisfied that you respect him as a man, he’ll work
himself to death to prove his worthiness” (63, 64). By using the slaveholding figure of
Major Armsted to express a view which affirmed the slave’s humanity, the same view
held by Northern abolitionists, the novel scrutinizes the assumed freedom found in the
formal equality of liberal democracy, suggesting that the inclusion of the enslaved in
liberal democracy might instead serve to extend anti-Blackness in order to maintain white
profits rather than liberate the enslaved.
Delany had made this point a few years earlier when he sharply criticized
Harriet Beecher Stowe. In a letter to Frederick Douglass (Pittsburg April 15th 1853),
Delany asserts that Stowe and her publisher Messrs. Jewett & Co should pay a portion of
the proceeds from the sale of Uncle Tom’s Cabin to an escaped slave living in Canada
named Father Hensen on whose life, Delany had alleged, Stowe had fashioned her novel
(230). “I am of the opinion that,” Delany writes, “Mrs. Stowe has draughted largely on all
of the best fugitive slave narratives—at least on Douglass’s, Brown’s Bibb’s, and perhaps
Clark’s, as well as the living Household of old Father Henson. . . But these draughts on
your narratives, clothed in Mrs. Stowe’s own language, only make her work the more
valuable, as it is the more truthful” (italics in original 231). As a result, Delany found
little to no value in the political work of Stowe’s fiction: (March 20 1853) “in all due
respect and deference Mrs. Stowe, I beg leave to say, that she knows nothing about us,
‘the Free Colored people of the United States,’ neither does any other white person—and,
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consequently, can contrive no successful scheme for our elevation; it must be done by
ourselves” (italics in original 224). Although Stowe’s fiction might have highlighted the
humanity of the enslaved by calling on readers to empathize with the plight of those held
in bondage, it does so, as Delany sees it, only by exploiting the slaves whose stories
Stowe had plagiarized for profit. It is the shared interest in profit, whether it be economic
or symbolic, that leads white slaveholders and white abolitionist authors like Stowe to
share in the exploitation Black bodies and lives through either the production of cashcrops or literary best-sellers.
The “good master” figure also serves to call into question the view of wage
labor as a site of freedom for formerly enslaved Blacks. This view was best expressed in
Douglass’ Life and Times (1845) where he represents his entrance into the wage labor
market as a last step sanctioning his emancipation from formal slavery. The novel’s
skepticism of wage labor can be seen when Major Armsted’s voices a scandalous desire
to extend slavery to include white workers. In the same conversation in which Major
Armsted has declared his recognition of the slave’s humanity, he also announces to
fellow slaveholders Judge Ballard and Colonel Franks that, “I would just as readily hold a
white as a Black in slavery, were it the custom and policy of the country to do so. It is all
a matter of self-interest with me” (64). Armsted’s wish to enslave white workers echoes
fears held by white workers at the time that the South’s slaveocracy was willing not only
to formally enslave them alongside Black workers, but through increased competition for
available lands, and the lowering of wages, debase white workers by treating them as
interchangeable with the enslaved.19 This fear came to be expressed as “white slavery,” a
discourse that circulated in the print culture of labor reform papers from the 1830s to the
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1860s. For instance, Walt Whitman participated in these discourses, warning in an
editorial of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle (1847) of the dangers of slavery in terms of making
“white slaves” out of white workers:
We wish not at all to sneer at the South; but leaving out of view the educated and
refined gentry, and coming to the “common people” of the whites, everybody
knows what a miserable, ignorant, and shiftless set of beings they are. Slavery is a
good thing enough, (viewed partially,) to the rich — the one out of thousands; but
it is destructive to the dignity and independence of all who work, and to labor
itself. An honest poor mechanic, in a slave State, is put on a par with the negro
slave mechanic — there being many of the latter, who are hired out by their
owners. It is of no use to reason abstractly on this fact — farther than to say that
the pride of a Northern American freeman, poor though he be, will not
comfortably stand such degradation. The influence of the slavery institution is to
bring the dignity of labor down to the level of slavery, which, God knows! is low
enough. (209)
Major Armsted’s desire to enslave white workers also reflects the anxiety, often left
unsaid by those decrying white slavery, that wage labor could not be reformed and was
nothing more than an indirect form of slavery for which more radical changes would be
needed.20 In his essay, “The Laboring Classes,” (1840), Orestes Brownson had held this
view, prefiguring Marx’s critique of labor power: “one thing is certain; that of the amount
actually produced by the operative [worker], he retains a less proportion than it costs the
master to feed, clothe, and lodge his slave. Wages is a cunning device of the devil, for the
benefit of tender consciences, who would retain all the advantages of the slave system,
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without the expense, trouble, and odium of being slave-holders.” (12). From this,
Brownson calls for radical transformation and not just land reforms or better working
conditions: “But the evil we speak of is inherent in all our social arrangements, and
cannot be cured without a radical change of those arrangements” (14). Yet the novel
mentions this fear of white enslavement not to compare the plight of white workers to
that of the enslaved Africans, but to reject the notion that wage labor and formal equality
of liberal democracy offered them pathways to liberation.21
Here Delany raises the question of how could the slave hope to be freed through
wage labor and its promise of formal equality when white workers—whose humanity was
never under question in the first place—could be treated as white slaves by rich white
property holders pursuing their “self-interest”? For Major Armsted—whose profitmaking enterprise and social existence as a Southern slaveholder depends on white
supremacy—to claim that he wishes to ignore the privileges of whiteness among white
workers and instead treat them no different from the enslaved would have been received
at the time, as Whitman makes clear in his editorial, as an absurdity and affront to what
Roediger, borrowing from Du Bois, calls “the wages of whiteness.” The image of Major
Armsted’s supporting white slavery would have confirmed and raised Northern workers’
suspicions of the South’s anti-republicanism aristocracy, while also showing how the
logic of capital brings together the property-owning classes of the South and the North in
opposition to white labor. More importantly, however, it reveals how there could be no
outlet for the enslaved “freed” by wage labor to decry the wages of slavery when the
labor politics of wage laborers were already saturated with the discourse of white slavery
which was premised on anti-Blackness and exclusion in the first place.
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For instance, Armsted declares that the formal equality in the North between
white workers and capitalist unwisely does not respect what should be considered natural
class distinctions among the oppressor and the oppressed. After the Judge suggests that
the enslaved, due to a “disposition peculiar to their race,” desire recognition from their
white oppressors, Armsted argues that this same ascribed behavior of submitting to
arbitrary hierarchy can be found and should be upheld in European peasants, poor whites
of the South, and Northern white workers (63). As Armsted explains, “Not peculiar to
them, Judge, but common to mankind. The Black man desires association with the white,
because the latter is regarded his superior. In the South, it is the poor white man with the
wealthy and in Europe the common with the gentlefolks. In the North, you have not made
these distinctions among the whites, which prevents you from noticing this trait among
yourselves” (63). By raising this specter of a slaveholding capitalist threatening to ignore
whiteness by enslaving whites and Blacks without distinction, the novel expresses a
skepticism of the argument that the formal equality of waged work afforded opportunity
and mobility for emancipated slaves. If these distinctions or hierarchies between white
property owners and landless proletarian white workers conjured up images of white
slavery in the first place, then Major Armsted’s desire to preserve rather than abolish
these distinctions accentuates how the desire of white workers to do away with them is
premised on preserving racial hierarchies between whites and Blacks. That is, how could
white workers feel free, that is to say, feel white through wage labor if emancipated
slaves competed on the same footing to sell their labor power in the job market?
The answer implied in Major Armsted’s alarmist call for white slavery is that
white workers wouldn’t feel free and would thus demand to be given preferential
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treatment over Black workers. If they called themselves white slaves, it was only to
emphasize how their assumed status of “freeman”—politically free and economically
independence—was under threat of being violated or not honored. In fact, the more wage
labor became dominant in the 1850s, the less white slavery was used to voice dissent, and
the more “white free labor” by 1860 came to be a sign of one’s free status that was to be
defended, even if it was in need of reform. Delany’s critique of wage labor, then, shows
how wage slavery is a form of oppression for all workers, and, more dangerously, how
the slave entering wage labor will not result in Black workers being treated equally, but
will continue to depend on racial difference. If expansion of formal equality or the
democratization of whites after the Revolutionary war was premised on anti-Blackness,
the entrance of the enslaved, the novel suggests, into the wage labor relation might bring
an end to the formal enslavement of people of African descent, but it wouldn’t promise to
end the racialization process.22 The novel’s image of the “good master” thus serves as a
warning that the enslaved would remain excluded and dispossessed in the national wage
labor market to come as its informal, unwaged, surplus population. If whiteness as antiBlackness had shaped the wage laboring class, this division between inferior and superior
would be upheld and continued going forward.23
To overcome, then, these barriers to insurrection and liberation, the trap of
liberal democracy and false promise of wage labor, enslaved Africans must form, Delany
intimates, a revolutionary group identity that can lead them to reject any form of
accommodation to white supremacy and instead opt for mass insurrection and the
creation of a self-determining Black nation. To do this, Blake teaches slaves how to see
themselves as a class of people unified through racial exclusion and dispossession. If
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slaves do not see themselves as a class, the danger is that the desperation and anger
among slaves could be disarmed and pacified, as mentioned above, through discourses of
individual emancipation or the promises of better treatment. This is what is happens in
Kentucky, the only state where Blake is unsuccessful in spreading the plan of
insurrection. As Blake recounts, “you can’t move them toward a strike?,” precisely
because, as fellow insurrectionist Andy explains, Kentucky is where “de slaves in dat
state was de bes’ treated uv any, an’ dat bin all ‘long spectin’ to be free” (127). Blake
tells his co-conspirators that if the slave’s rebellion is understood as a battle between the
individual slaveholders and slaves, “There is no danger that a ‘good master’ or mistress
will ever be harmed by the slaves,” precisely because no slave, “could muster up courage
enough to injure a ‘good master’ or mistress” (128). Yet if slavery is seen as a relation of
power between groups, slaves will come to understand that only general insurrection can
deliver their liberation. As Blake relates to his fellow conspirators, “But mature reflection
drove me to the expedient of avenging the general wrongs of our people, by inducing the
slave, in his might, to scatter red ruin throughout the region of the South” (128). The
general insurrection is the struggle against the “general wrongs” done to slave rather than
the fight against their individual masters. In approaching this view of slavery as a relation
of power and not the attitude of the individual slaveholder, Andy, a fellow slave of
Colonel Frank’s plantation and follower of Blake, has a change of heart toward his
master. Speaking about his “benevolent” mistress, Andy exclaims, “I bleve I could chop
off Miss Mary’ head; an’ I likes hur; she mighty good to we Black folks” [sic] (127).
Notwithstanding the sensational language and flaming of white fear expressed in Andy’s
declaration, the point is that an insurrectionist consciousness teaches the enslaved to
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target the category of the master in which, whether “good” or bad, slaveholders profit and
derive their power from the violent negation of the enslaved.
Dramatizing how enslaved Africans must learn to see the “general wrongs” of
slavery in order to rise up and destroy a class of white masters reveals that what the
figure of the “good master” as the perceived primary barrier to insurrection has
represented all along, as Delany poses it, is the problem of hegemony. That is, the novel
implies that the enslaved giving their consent to be ruled serves as the major obstacle
standing in the way of liberation. This is why the proposed solution is class- or groupconsciousness raising through systematic thinking, which is seen as a remedy for what
Delany sees as a false consciousness among slaves that has led them to accept the slave
relation. Yet, while scholars of slavery and slave rebellion concede that hegemony did
play a role in abating and controlling slave rebellion, direct force and repression were
much more central to upholding slavery. It was primarily direct force that contained slave
populations not the hollow promises of freedom.24 Direct force compelled slaves to labor
and it terrorized slaves into deferring their attempts to escape or revolt. Why, then, does
Delany emphasize the problem of hegemony rather than direct force as the principal
barrier to mass insurrection in the South? What does it mean, for example, that Blake at
one point wishes that slaves be treated more harshly in order to commit them to the cause
of insurrection: “A ‘good master’ is the very worst of masters. Were they all cruel and
inhuman, or could the slave be made to see their treatment aright, they would not endure
their oppression for a single hour?” (127).
One answer is that positing hegemony as the primary barrier to mass
insurrection plays a role in Delany’s alternative vision of Black humanity outside of the
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discourses of liberal humanism.25 Compared to the slave narratives of Douglass, the
protest fiction of Stowe, and the essays and speeches of Northern abolitionists that
asserted the slave’s humanity by demonstrating how slavery violated liberal democracy’s
universal humanism, Delany maintains that slaves’ humanity lies in their capacity to be a
self-determining people who when liberated would compete with rather than be saved by
US (white) democracy. The slaves of Delany’s novel are human not because they desire
recognition from white democracy, but because they demand separation, or fullautonomy, from it. If read this way, the novel’s suggestion that false consciousness is to
blame for preventing mass insurrection has less to do with thinking that the enslaved
were unaware of the violence of their situation than it does with disproving white
supremacist racial ideologies which held that people of African descent lacked the
capacity for civilization, culture, and community. At one point, Blake surmises that US
slaves need to be enlightened as a prerequisite for liberation: “Light, of necessity, had to
be imparted to the darkened region of the obscure intellects of the slaves, to arouse them
from their benighted condition to one of moral responsibility, to make them sensible that
liberty was legitimately and essentially theirs, without which there was no distinction
between them and the brute. Following as a necessary consequence would be the
destruction of oppression and ignorance” (101). This call for group consciousness among
the enslaved contains the assumption that the presence of a community and culture—a
Black nation—already exists among them. Delany thus locates the slave’s humanity not
in the fact that they might find inclusion in liberal democracy as fellow citizen-subjects or
market actors. The slave’s humanity lies instead in the presence of slaves as an already
existing nation of people temporarily held in bondage.26
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A second answer is that imagining the enslaved overcoming hegemony serves
as the novel’s solution to the unique problem found in a settler colony like the United
States of nonenslaved workers serving as the policing force of the enslaved class, or how
white labor actively participates in upholding and maintaining the racial zoning that
presupposes wage labor relation. In striving to secure what they believed was their right
as settlers to become independent property holders, whether that meant becoming
slaveholders in the South, or small farmers in the North, “free” workers of the United
States labored as the rank and file—formally and informally—in the institutions tasked
with policing the enslaved in order to prevent or contain escape, rebellion, and
insurrection. In the North, this often took the form of white workers terrorizing through
riots the communities of free Black Americans in order to disenfranchise the Black
property holders who could vote and to discourage Black mobility which ensured white
advantage in the marketplace. In Black Reconstruction, W.E.B Du Bois points out how in
the South “the system of slavery demanded a special police force and such a force was
made possible and unusually effective by the presence of the poor whites . . . the great
planters formed proportionately quite as small a class but they had singularly enough at
their command some five million poor whites; that is, there were actually more white
people to police the slaves than there were slaves” (12). Through this policing role, white
workers of the South (and the North), came to be rewarded for supporting slavery and
settler colonialism.
These rewards were not only economic benefits in terms of sharing in the
profits of a US empire—higher wages compared to European workers and access to
stolen land and bodies that could aid white workers escape proletarian status—but also
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socio-symbolic benefits, an ontology of whiteness, what Wilderson argues is the category
of the Human itself, or what Du Bois refers to as the psychological wage of whiteness,
that free workers shared with the very same property holding class that exploited them.
Du Bois explains that for the white worker, the policing of the enslaved:
fed his vanity because it associated him with the masters. Slavery bred in the poor
white a dislike of Negro toil of all sorts. He never regarded himself as a laborer,
or as part of any labor movement. If he had any ambition at all it was to become a
planter and to own [slaves]. To these Negroes he transferred all the dislike and
hatred which he had for the whole slave system. The result was that the system
was held stable and intact by the poor white. Even with the late ruin of Haiti
before their eyes, the planters, stirred as they were, were nevertheless able to
stamp out slave revolt. . . Gradually the whole white South became an armed and
commissioned camp to keep Negroes in slavery and to kill the Black rebel. (12)
Policing of the enslaved, then, was not simply something white workers were tricked into
doing that worked against their interests as exploited wage laborers or tenant farmers.
Rather, it was a constituent feature of the white worker’s position in a US settler colonial
class structure.27 A “free” worker became white through a set of negations, one of which
was the negation of the Black slave —a negation consisting of bodily dispossession and
political exclusion—both of which were made possible first and foremost by the use of
violent direct force, not hegemony. In this way, white workers formed a relationship of
antagonism with enslaved Africans. It is this anti-Blackness, Frank Wilderson argues,
that creates a situation in which “white people are not simply ‘protected’ by the police,
they are the police” in US white democracy (82). For the novel to envision false
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consciousness among slaves rather than an army of white slave patrols as the obstacle to
insurrection is telling of the novel’s attempt to narratively suture this asymmetry between
white workers and the enslaved in which white labor works to uphold and maintain
through terror and force the racial zoning that presupposes wage labor relation.
Yet this asymmetry comes to be made explicit when the narrative travels to
Cuba where its vision of insurrection leaves behind the problem of hegemony and
focuses on direct force. Although presented as autonomous contexts separated by
geography, national boundaries, distinct obstacles, and unique class structures, Delany’s
plot of insurrection in Cuba serves as a space of speculation where what was left unsaid
in the US context can be imagined and addressed. Locating the two problems of
hegemony and direct force in spatially distinct contexts is not merely Delany’s attempt to
reflect the historical circumstances slaves faced in Cuba or the United States. The plot of
insurrection travelling to Cuba instead comes to form the other half of what is an
unresolved formal tension in the novel’s map of international mass insurrection that
marks the presence of this asymmetry of power between white workers and enslaved
Africans in the United States.
To approach how the novel’s two plots of insurrection create an unresolved
formal tension, we must very briefly understand why direct force is emphasized in the
novel’s plot of insurrection in Cuba. If in the United States, slaves are depicted as an
autonomous group in their efforts to prepare for insurrection (the exception being Native
groups as already mentioned), in Cuba the novel imagines how the enslaved and free
workers of the island come together in order to defeat the increasingly violent (rather than
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“good” like in the US South) slaveholding class. Initially, divisions among the enslaved
and nonenslaved workers beset the organizing of the insurrection:
The political relations of the colony were peculiar, and singularly mischievous
and detrimental to the best interests of this class of inhabitants [the enslaved]. The
four great divisions of society were white, Black, free and slave; and these were
again subdivided into many other classes, as rich, poor, and such like. The free
and slaves among the Blacks did not associate, nor the high and low among the
free of the same race. And there was among them even another general division—
Black and colored—which met with little favor from the intelligent. (276)
What free workers of color come to learn is that racial exclusion unites them with the
enslaved class of Cuba. Plácido, a free worker of color and the movement’s poet and coleader, tells Blake: “Ah, cousin, though you consider us here free—those I mean who are
not the slaves of white man—I do assure you that my soul as much as your pants for a
draft from the fountain of liberty! We are not free, but merely exist by sufferance—a
miserable life for intelligent people, to be sure!” (196). As the preparations for
insurrection mount and white defenses against it are consolidated, free workers of color
are increasingly policed and brutalized. Plácido, for example, is publicly beat by a
transplanted American book shop owner and Ambrosina, the daughter of one of the
wealthier families of free persons of color, is publicly whipped by an American dry
goods shop owner. Here free persons of color are being policed and repressed in public
spaces as though they share the same status as the enslaved. The novel imagines that if
one is not white, one is not free, regardless of one’s laboring position—whether free or
enslaved.28
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By encountering direct force, policing, and repression, free workers of color, the
novel shows, learn how to be accomplices to the island’s slaves in their goal of
insurrection. During the celebration of carnival, the island’s oppressed nonwhite
population come together through racial separation in what are the beginnings of the
Black nation:
Never before had the African race been so united as on that occasion, the free
Negroes and mixed free people being in unison and sympathy with each other. . .
There was a greater tendency to segregation instead of a seeming desire to mingle
as formerly among the whites, as masses of the Negroes, mulattoes and
quadroons, Indians, and even Chinamen, could be seen together, to all appearance
absorbed in conversation on matters disconnected entirely from the occasion of
the day. (245)
There is also the choice for the marriage of the slaves Gofer Gondolier and Abyssa
Soudan and the marriage of free persons of color General Juan Montego and Madame
Cordora to be held together, which serves to symbolize the political marriage between the
two classes. The choice for the marriages to take place “at the same sacred hymeneal
altar. . . was received with great favor among the high and low classes, especially the
slave portion of the Black inhabitants, and their social relation was now regarded as a
mutually fixed reality” (276). Free workers of color reject the potential rewards of allying
with white slaveholders and instead enter into a racial compact led by rebellious slaves.
This racial solidarity which overcomes class divisions serves as the staging ground, the
precondition for, the coming insurrection.
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The irresolvable formal tension between the novel’s two plots of insurrection
comes into view, then, when we see how the image of racial unity that overcomes class
divisions among Cuba’s free workers of color and slaves serves as the dialectical other to
the representation of racial unity of whiteness found in the United States between free
workers and property holders. Responding to white supremacy that targets all nonwhites
of Cuba, free workers of color and the enslaved forge solidarity through a shared group
identity of the Black nation—a group identity of Black resistance to white supremacy. In
seeking the promised rewards of future property ownership, preferential treatment in the
labor market, and a shared ontological status with their exploiters, free workers of the
United States collaborate with the property-owning class by serving as the policing force
protecting a white nation premised on slavery and genocide. The racial unity of the Black
nation in Cuba becomes the novel’s positive (displaced) image of what was left unsaid
and irresolvable in the US context, namely the problem of racial unity of white
supremacy that joins together free workers and capitalists in preventing slave rebellion
and Black liberation.29
The role of nonenslaved or free workers as the policing class of the enslaved
serves as the absent cause of both of the novel’s seemingly separate visions of
insurrection. In the US, Delany imagines that slaves face only the problem of hegemony
and not an army of white workers collaborating with capital to uphold slavery and settler
empire, whereas in Cuba, free workers do not police but are policed and because of this
join the enslaved in their shared resistance to white supremacist direct force that targets
all nonwhites. Delany takes his story of insurrection to Cuba, in other words, precisely
because the historical conditions at the time are devoid of this problem specific to a
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settler colony like the United States of the nonenslaved settler workers outnumbering and
policing the enslaved in the hopes of becoming slaveholders themselves. The image of
free workers of color successfully joining the cause of the slaves in Cuba becomes the
novel’s second attempt to resolve white supremacy’s role in the United States of creating
an asymmetrical relationship between free workers and the enslaved in which free
workers are constituted as white precisely by loyally working to contain the rebellion and
struggle for liberation of the enslaved and free Black workers. That the novel offers two
distinct images of insurrection, each of which negate the other, even as they are responses
to the same problem, shows that in the end there is only a pure tension in the novel’s
attempt to envision how free and enslaved workers relate. In representing the place of
white labor in the novel’s map of slavery, Blake offers no resolution, no way out, a
negative dialectical dead end that nonetheless points up a way of understanding the way
in which white supremacy zones populations into uneven ontological categories, a
differentiation on which depends a wage labor system in which white workers receive
social recognition in and through their relationship to capital, while the enslaved exist in
the category of nonrecognition as capital’s fungible commodities and subjects of social
death.30 In other words, it is this racial unity through policing of Black rebellion that
resolves in the US context the labor/capital contradiction, or the conflict of worker
exploitation in ways allowing for the reproduction and thus expansion of the capitalist
relation. Workers consenting to their relation to capital and the stability this consent
creates—that is necessary for the reproduction of the wage labor relation—arrives
through this white solidarity of working to keep African people positioned as slaves by
policing and containing their rebellion.
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From this, we can see that this tension in the novel’s map of insurrection shows
how a constituent element of the free worker and his wages of whiteness in the United
States is to defend his free status or claim to unenslaveability by working to police black
rebellion. For free labor to mean white labor, the white worker must defend capital by
policing the threats against it, namely slave fugitivity, insurrection, and autonomy.
Consent that creates stability as a necessary condition for the reproduction of wage labor
comes not from the fact that workers are bribed, but from forging this unity through
policing black rebellion. Counterrevolution creates consent. In this way, we can also see
that it is Black resistance, the Black radical tradition, that shapes capitalism’s form.31
While certainly the economic exploitation of slave labor produced value for capitalism, it
is the resistance against slavery, the struggle for Black liberation, that provokes a white
solidarity through policing such rebellion that is then generative of the consent and thus
stability needed for capital to effectively exploit wage labor on an expanding scale.
Slavery in Marx’s Map of Capital
Like we see in Delany’s novel, Marx’s conceptual view of capital also registers
the asymmetry between free workers and the enslaved, but unlike Delany, Marx offers a
vision of this asymmetry’s synthesis or structural resolution. Examining sections of the
Grundisse, Capital, and his writing on the Civil War, we can see how Marx’s attempt to
understand wage labor leads him to offer a view of the unfree zones of slavery in
capitalism against which he totalizes or synthesizes his map of the value-form and its
negation to come, namely communism.
In the Grundisse, unpublished notes written between 1857 and 1861 that later
would become A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and Capital, Marx
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dedicates a section exploring the prehistory of capitalism. While one goal of the section is
to demonstrate how capitalism is neither timeless nor universal but an historical social
formation. This requires that Marx explains how the conditions of capitalism, what he
calls its presuppositions, emerged from the past yet are categorially distinct from former
modes of production. One of the primary presuppositions of capitalism is the creation of
a class of propertyless workers who are “freed” or divorced not only from society’s
means of production, but also “freed” from being the means of production themselves as
slaves or bondsman. Once a pool of propertyless free workers exist, the exploitation of
labor-power, which is also the accumulation of surplus value, can take place, creating a
situation in which capital creates its own presuppositions. As the well-known formula
goes, the owners of the means of production, the capitalists, pay an up-front price for the
free worker’s labor-power. The free worker is then organized and made to labor in the
production process in a way that adds more value to commodity produced than the value
paid to worker in the form of wages. This difference, unpaid wages, is absorbed as
surplus value by the capitalist class, enriching them while further impoverishing the
working class. While the free worker and capitalist appear to relate equally in their
exchange of one commodity for another, labor-power for wages, Marx emphasizes how
structurally free workers as a class relate asymmetrically to the class of capitalist property
owners. It is this appearance of equality, what Marx calls in the Grundisse a “necessary
illusion,” and in Capital, the commodity fetish, that conceals the power disparity between
worker and capitalist, making possible accumulation by exploitation, or capital as such.
This illusion of equality is what distinguishes capital from its prehistory, or prior modes
of production.
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In emphasizing this point, Marx suggests that if workers were to see their labor
power in concrete terms, as it is actually valued in capital, the exchange relation would
not be possible: “So long as both sides exchange their labour with one another in the form
of objectified labour, the relation is impossible; it is likewise impossible if living labour
capacity itself appears as the property of the other side, hence as not engaged in [equal]
exchange” (464). It is in this moment that Marx is compelled to acknowledge an
exception to the very rule he has just defined. He must address the on-going presence of
slavery in capitalism, which unlike wage labor, doesn’t rest on “necessary illusions,” or
hegemony. It depends on naked direct force. He reconciles this conceptual dilemma in
which on the one hand Marx asserts that capitalism depends on formal equality, while on
the other he recognizes that capitalism works perfectly well using slave labor, by
claiming that slavery is merely an anomaly: “The fact that slavery is possible at
individual points within the bourgeois system of production does not contradict this.
However, slavery is then possible there only because it does not exist at other points; and
appears as an anomaly opposite the bourgeois system itself” (464). Marx considers
capital and slavery two distinct structures, both temporally and systematically, yet he also
admits that slavery continues to exist within capital insofar as forms of unfree labor exist
side by side wage labor. His quick answer of contending that slavery is an anomaly in
capitalism begs the question of why cannot Marx think of slavery and wage labor as
temporally co-present forms of accumulation in his map of capitalism?
He cannot see them as co-present forms because Marx views capitalism from
the standpoint of wage labor. Slavery appears to Marx as a stage of the past, even as it
has an ongoing presence in capital, which he recognizes, precisely because slavery exists
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as a distinct structure of domination on which rests capital’s structure of wage labor
exploitation. What Marx represents as a relationship in which slavery is understood as
temporally prior to wage labor is his way of accounting for how slavery is at the same
time external to, while also constitutive of wage labor exploitation. The illusion of formal
equality required for exchange-value depends on the on-going production of unfree,
dispossessed populations. The dissolution of slavery does not pave the way for the
emergence of “free” workers. Rather, the creation and maintenance of free workers
available for exploitation is premised, as Delany’s novel has also shown, on the ongoing
production of racial difference in which social recognition among white citizens is
determined by the nonrecognition of the excluded Black slave.
A few passages later, Marx offers a more direct view of this on-going and
foundational relationship between the maintenance of free workers necessary for
accumulation by exploitation and the production of unfree Black subjects. After repeating
that slavery must be suspended for wage labor to exist, Marx explains how the free
worker and capitalist share the same political ontology of the independent self-possessive
individual precisely through the act of exchange:
Living labour capacity belongs to itself, and has disposition over the expenditure
of its forces, through exchange. Both sides confront each other as persons.
Formally, their relation has the equality and freedom of exchange as such. As far
as it concerns the legal relation, the fact that this form is a mere semblance, and a
deceptive semblance, appears as an external matter . . . [The free worker] sells the
particular expenditure of force [labor power] to a particular capitalist, whom he
confronts as an independent individual. It is clear that this is not his relation to the
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existence of capital as capital, i.e. to the capitalist class. Nevertheless, in this way
everything touching on the individual, real person leaves him a wide field of
choice, of arbitrary will, and hence of formal freedom. (Grundisse 464)
Marx then further clarifies the meaning of the free worker’s political ontology by
defining it against the status of the slave. “In the slave relation,” writes Marx, the slave
“belongs to the individual, particular owner, and is his laboring machine. As a totality of
force-expenditure, as labour capacity, he is a thing belonging to another, and hence does
not relate as a subject to his particular expenditure of force, nor to the act of living
labour” (Grundisse 464). Unlike the free worker, the slave is not a subject in his
relationship to capital but a thing, or better put, the political ontology of the Black slave is
to exist as the object to be possessed by another. The dispossession of the slave’s body,
which is also the ownership of it by another, determines and gives meaning to the shared
status of “free” persons, whether the free worker or the capitalist, confronting each other
in the act of exchange. To be free, to be a person in the market, comes to mean
possession of one’s self, which, as Marx has revealed, is a category of social existence
defined against the status of dispossession of the Black slave who lives as object to be
possessed by another. As Marx continues, “In the slave relation the worker is nothing but
a living labour-machine, which therefore has a value for others, or rather is a value. The
totality of the free worker’s labour capacity appears to him as his property, as one of his
moments, over which he, as subject, exercises domination, and which he maintains by
expending it” (Grundisse 464-465). Defined against the dispossession of the slave, the
free worker is transformed into a recognized, self-possessive subject precisely by owning,
holding domination, over his labor power and any other commodities the free worker can
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purchase through exchange, including potentially slaves.32 What “confronting each other
as persons” means, then, is to possess the capacity to possess, a status that is the product
of the incapacity of the slave to possess, since the slave is made to live as an object to be
possessed by another.33 The (real) appearance of equality between free worker and
capitalist forged through their shared capacity of possession/ownership rests on the
dispossessed body and self, or the unfree status, of the slave.
A few years later, after the Civil War, in his chapter “The Working Day,” from
Capital, Marx acknowledges how this production of ontological difference between free
and unfree subjects serves to maintain an exploitable working class. Of the many things
the chapter addresses, Marx is primarily concerned with understanding the tension
between capital’s drive for self-valorization and the reproduction costs of the worker—
the contradiction between over-working the worker and the drive to extract the most
amount of surplus value from the worker’s labor. Once again, Marx turns to the slave’s
situation in order to understand this contradiction of wage labor. “The slave-owner buys
his worker in the same way as he buys his horse. If he loses his slave, he loses a piece of
capital, which he must replace by fresh expenditure on the slave-market” (Capital 345).
While it might appear costly to the slave-owner, Marx notes how over-working the slave
to point of death to maximize profits is not a problem when there exists a large surplus or
“preserves” of slaves available for purchase. Using US slavery as his example, Marx
explains how surplus populations are the lever for surplus value:
Hence the Negro labour in the southern states of the American Union preserved a
moderately patriarchal character as long as production was chiefly directed to the
satisfaction of immediate local requirements. But in proportion as the export of
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cotton became of vital interest to those states, the over-working of the Negro, and
sometimes the consumption of his life in seven years of labour, became a factor in
a calculated and calculating system. It was no longer a question of obtaining from
him a certain quantity of useful products, but rather of the production of surplusvalue itself. (Capital 345)
Marx asserts that the role of surplus populations elsewhere in capitalism offer the
capitalist the same opportunities for over-work, citing bakers in London and agricultural
workers from the countryside.
Yet in this same section in which Marx has talked about the law of surplus
value determining cotton-production in the South, he comes to the conclusion that there
are limits to the over-working of wage laborers in ways that there are not for slaves. Such
limits are set not by capital but by civil society, that is, the social value of the free
worker’s life overrides its economic value in capital:
Capital therefore takes no account of the health and the length of life of the
worker, unless society forces it to do so. Its answer to the outcry about the
physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, is
this: Should that pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure (profit)? But
looking at these things as a whole, it is evident that this does not depend on the
will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free competition, the
immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a
coercive force external to him. (Capital 381)
It is (civil) society here that places a limit on the political economy of working laborers to
death for profits. Yet as his previous remarks on slavery highlighted, no such limits are
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placed on the over-working of slaves precisely because slaves do not share the same
political ontology as the formal free wage laborer.
Where do such limits arise from if they violate the laws of the profit-motive? If
the immanent laws of capitalist production operate as a “coercive force external” to the
capitalist, it follows that the capitalist would have no interest in preserving the life of the
worker so long as surplus populations were available. What protects the free worker,
then, from over-work are not the laws of exploitation but the laws of white supremacy.
Over-working of free worker places him or her much too close to the disposable unfree
slave (for whom outcry against the slave’s treatment has more to do with the fear of
insurrection than with treating the slave fairly). Capitalists have obligations to respect the
“health and the length of the life of the [free] worker” if only because the illusion of
formal equality, “confronting each other as persons,” depends on the free worker being
treated like a subject and not an object like the unfree slave.
For instance, labor reformers had understood these laws of white supremacy
perfectly well when they condemned the inequality of wage labor using the language of
white slavery. In a rejoinder to the perspective of abolitionism, George Evans in 1844
claims, echoing a very common view at the time, that wage labor treats white workers
worse than enslaved Africans:
I beg you to bear in mind that thousands in the cities are continually tortured by
the same agonizing system. This is an evil of the first magnitude, about which the
Black slave knows nothing; and this can afford you but a faint idea of the miseries
of a city tenantry, which the Black has never dreamed of. This, however, may lead
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you to understand why I have contended that the landless white is in a state of
slavery quite as galling as that of the Black. (360)
In calling attention to white slavery, labor reformers hoped to curb the profit motive’s
targeting of white bodies in ways that it was left unrestrained to accumulate and enslave
Black bodies. Claiming wage labor as white slavery further emphasize the free, selfpossessive, human status of the white worker, or as Roediger explains “the comparison
could lead to sweeping critiques of wage labor, as ‘white slavery’ but it also could
reassure wage workers that they belonged to the ranks of ‘free white labor,’“ (47) and
furthermore that the “existence of slavery. . . gave working Americans both a wretched
touchstone against which to measure their fears of unfreedom and a friendly reminder
that they were by comparison not so badly off” (49). The same held true for nonslaveholding poor whites of the South. Johnson points out how in the 1850s, “The
question was whether these degenerate white men would have slaves or becomes slaves,”
which is to say, white democracy and market exchange reach a limit when capital
threatens to treat white workers and the enslaved as equally disposable populations (394).
What the discourses of white slavery and Marx’s reflection on civil society’s relationship
to the profit-motive reveal is that the free worker must be treated in the market as a
subject in possession of his or her body and self, or accumulation by exploitation does not
work, and workers retain this status only through the upholding of slavery.
In his attempt, then, to demonstrate the temporal and structural distinction
between wage labor and slavery, Marx ends up offering a very similar view of the
structural asymmetry between free workers and the enslaved that Delany had made
explicit through his novel’s irresolvable narrative map of insurrection. Like Delany, Marx

Baker 127
proves how capital, the accumulation of value by exploitation of wage labor, structurally
depends on the production of ontological difference between free and unfree subjects, or
the racialization of social categories of existence in which whiteness is a cross-class
status of possession determined by the object-status—a dispossessed state of being—of
Blackness. In this way, we see how it is through the social death of slavery that white
labor can define itself as being both victimized and saved by capital, both a target of
capital’s violence and a collaborator helping to carrying it out.
Synthesis or Abolition?
For Marx, the solution to this asymmetry between free workers and the
enslaved can be found in capitalism’s dialectical forward movement. The universalization
of wage labor, as Marx sees it, will overcome white supremacy. At the end of the
“Working Day” chapter, Marx famously offers a vision of white and Black working-class
unity: “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was
paralysed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the republic. Labour in a white skin
cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a Black skin” (Capital 414).34 While often
read as Marx calling on white workers to forge solidarity with Black workers, his point is
instead to show how slavery had held back or slowed down the dialectical movement of
capitalism in which once all workers become wage workers, the socialization of the
working class can take place in ways that workers can organize and amass the power
necessary to seize control of a modern world they have created through their labor. As
Marx continues in the lines that follow, “a new life immediately arose from the death of
slavery. The first fruit of the American Civil War was the eight hours’ agitation, which
ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New England to California, with the seven-
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league boots of the locomotive” (Capital 414). With the abolition of formal slavery,
workers would now meet each other on the same footing as equally rather than
differentially dominated proletarians. The universalization of exchange-value subsumes
and thus dissolves former modes of production, transforming prior categories of
oppression like slavery into a new singular category of the exploited wage worker. The
abolishment of formal slavery opened the door for the full realization of the next stage in
the dialectical movement of capitalism in the United States. “If the North lets the South
go,” writes Marx in a piece for the German newspaper Die Presse in 1861, “it then frees
itself from any association with slavery, from its historical original sin, and creates the
basis of a new and higher development” (“The Civil War in the United States” 55). If
Marx pays heed to the role of white supremacy in which populations are zoned into
categories of the free and unfree in capital, he treats it as a stage that the value-form
overcomes in capital’s march toward higher forms of development rather than what
Delany has shown to be an ongoing and temporally co-present form of domination in
capitalism.
Unlike Marx, then, Delany’s negative dialectical representation of the
asymmetry between free workers and enslaved Africans reveals how the production of
ontological difference is not to be resolved through the inclusion of the enslaved within
the wage labor relation (a synthesis of the working class). It is to be dismantled through
the destruction of the institutions of white supremacy on which rests capital. If the formal
tension found between the novel’s plots of insurrection suggests that white supremacy
creates an irresolvable asymmetrical relationship between white workers and enslaved
Africans in which white workers serve the interests of capital by policing the enslaved,
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this doesn’t so much indicate that slaves lacked the ability to foment insurrection and
liberate themselves as it points up what conditions would need to be met to do so. White
workers defecting from their role of policing slaves as well as the enslaved using force to
liberate themselves and building autonomy from instead of seeking inclusion within
liberal democracy and the wage labor relation are the conditions highlighted through this
formal tension that if met would dismantle slavery and its superstructure of white
supremacy. The latter condition, of course, was greatly feared by white America in the
1850s, and while less publicly feared, the former might have been just as terrifying
because without the allegiance of white workers serving as a garrison force nothing stood
in between slave insurrection and the destruction of white property and power. Johnson
notes that as the inequalities of the plantation economy intensified in the 1850s, “it was
the non-slaveholders who came to be seen as ‘a problem’ in the era of the ‘Negro Fever.’
. . . Although few slaveholders had the bad judgment to come right out and say so, there
were grave doubts circulating through the South about the loyalty of non-slaveholders to
the existing order, especially after 1857” (376).
In one brief scene, the novel conjures up this image of disloyal white workers
potentially abandoning and betraying their allegiance to white supremacy. When Blake is
leading family members and other slaves of his plantation out of the South to the freedom
of Canada, they must at one point cross the Mississippi river and require a ferry. Upon
approaching the boat, its operator, a white ferryman, asks if they are free slaves because
if not, as he says, “I be ‘sponsible for ‘em ‘cording to the new law called, I ‘bleve the
Nebrasky Complimize Fugintive Slave act, made down at Californy, last year,” which, as
the ferryman tells the slaves, he is “‘bliged to fulfill . . . by ketchin’ every fugintive that
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goes to cross this way, or I mus’ pay a thousand dollars, and go to jail till the Black folks
is got, if that be’s never” [sic] (139-140). In response to the ferryman’s voiced
commitment to policing the enslaved, Blake questions the legitimacy of a structure like
white supremacy that seems to leave the ferryman poor even as it asks him to uphold it:
“My friend, . . . are you willing to make yourself a watch dog for slaveholders, and do for
them that which they would not do for themselves, catch runaway slaves? Don’t you
know that this is the work which they boast on having the poor white men at the North do
for them? Have you not yet learned to attend to your own interests instead of theirs?”
(140). Blake then offers the ferryman “five half eagle pieces” which he calls his group’s
“free papers” that the ferryman gladly accepts, agreeing to transport the fugitives across
the river. Here the white ferryman has not so much come to aid fugitive slaves in
betraying his duty to police fugitive slaves as he been instead bribed by them, mimicking
and mocking how white supremacy bribes him not with economic benefits in his
particular case but with the political ontology of whiteness which he upholds by dutifully
policing slaves—a status that if not honored could also land him prison.
The white fear this scene invokes is that whiteness could potentially reach a
breaking point in terms of enlisting white workers to police the enslaved when the price
of doing so is shown to be far too costly than any of the benefits, whether economic or
symbolic, promised to white workers. Blake making the ferryman an offer that out bids
white supremacy registers what all white property holders, and in particular slaveholders,
feared: that white workers would come to learn how it is not in their interest as
proletarian laborers to police and support a structure of white supremacy on which rests
the very wage labor system that exploits them. In other words, if unity in policing black
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resistance forms white solidarity as the linchpin of capitalism, this scene suggests that
black resistance is also a catalyst for white workers betraying this unity and all that it
upholds. That is, if the novel’s two plots of insurrection form an irresolvable formal
tension revealing an asymmetry between white workers and the enslaved, here in this
scene the novel offers a view, to the consternation of those benefitting from white
supremacy, of this asymmetry’s potential destruction. Unlike Marx who believed that the
logic of capital itself would unite white and Black workers, Delany’s novel shows how
white workers abandoning their posts as the watch dogs for slavery, combined with the
enslaved taking insurrectionist and fugitive actions, threaten to destabilize the very
institutions of white supremacist direct force that uphold and maintain the capitalist
relation in the first place.
White Modernity and Black Abolition
If Delany represents anti-Blackness as a structure of violence for which there is
no resolution, while Marx sees the wage labor relation as a stage in which racial
asymmetries are overcome on the way to labor’s global confrontation with capital, how
does the story, so to speak, of modernity end for each writer? From the standpoint of the
wage worker who confronts the capitalist as a fellow person, emancipation from
exploitation becomes a project of recuperating and then fulfilling the promises of a
European modernity. This view can be found in a few places in Marx’s work. In his
address to Lincoln on behalf of the First International, Marx is hopeful that the
abolishment of formal slavery will turn white workers into proletarian revolutionary
actors whose unity with European workers sets the stage for working class liberation:
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While the working men, the true political power of the North, allowed slavery to
defile their own republic; while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his
concurrence, they boasted it the highest prerogative of the white-skinned labourer
to sell himself and choose his own master; they were unable to attain the true
freedom of labour or to support their European brethren in their struggle for
emancipation, but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of
civil war. (“Address to Lincoln” 154)
Marx recognizes how white supremacy maintains the illusion of formal equality
necessary for exploitation, yet this sense of “pride” in paradoxically being able to choose
one’s master is considered by Marx a false consciousness rather than a structural
antagonism. Since wage workers hold the “true political power,” Marx implies that Black
freedman become revolutionary actors once they enter the wage relation where they are
unified with other workers through a shared material opposition to capital (exploitation).
Viewing the wage labor relation as the site in which the production of
difference is overcome allows Marx to complete or totalize his map of capitalism as a
stage paving the way for the future emancipation of Humanity. In the latter chapters of
Capital, Marx envisions the completion of capitalism in order to imagine its synthesized
negation, a future mode of production based on cooperative labor:
The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labour
reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument.
This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.
The expropriators are expropriated. The capitalist mode of appropriation, which
springs from the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private
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property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on
the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the
inexorability of a natural process, its own negation. This is the negation of the
negation. It does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish
individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: namely
co-operation and the possession in common of the land and the means of
production produced by labour itself. (Capital 929)
The pathway to communism, which isn’t a preconceived place so much as it is the
unrepresentable negation of capitalism, requires, according to Marx’s dialectic in this
instance (which comes to change later in his life), the universalization of wage labor. In
other words, to arrive at a social formation based on cooperative labor and free
association, the world’s populations must be first transformed into organized laborers
who have the political power to realize the total negation or defeat of capital whose
“achievements” are preserved and retained in the construction of a new mode of
production based on communal ownership and cooperative labor.
While Marx condemns and decries the violent means by which the masses are
made into wage laborers, he nonetheless understands this process as a modernizing force
insofar as it creates the conditions out of which can emerge a mode of production
wherein universal human emancipation is possible. As he continues:
The transformation of scattered private property resting on the personal labour of
the individuals themselves into capitalist private property is naturally an
incomparably more protracted, violent and difficult process than the
transformation of capitalist private property, which in fact already rests on the
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carrying on of production by society, into social property [communism]. In the
former case, it was a matter of the expropriation of the mass of the people by a
few usurpers; but in this case, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the
mass of the people. (930)
The solution to the free worker’s dilemma of exploitation, of indirect slavery, of
alienation, of being robbed of one’s labor power and time, is envisioned in Marx’s
completed map of capital: the very conditions that create the asymmetry between free
workers and capitalists not only will set the workers free but will have transformed them
through exploitation and the struggle against it into modern emancipated subjects. They
are made into persons of the same status as the oppressors, yet this status of the modern
human subject is not destroyed in the negation of capital. It is recuperated as the ground
on which the next stage of development will be erected. While the free status of the wage
laborer (which is not offered to the slave because it is premised on the slave’s social
death), might be the mechanism through which the worker is exploited in capitalism, it is
also what gifts the free worker his or her shared humanity with the capitalist. What
capital grants wage laborers when it “frees” them from former modes of production, their
humanity, is the same as what capital attacks when it exploits them. Capitalism, for Marx,
both creates and threatens to destroy a modern humanity that its next stage will
recuperate and affirm.
Marx must see slavery (or anti-Blackness), then, as a stage, even as at moments
he reveals it is a founding antagonism, precisely because Marx, from the standpoint of the
wage laborer, imagines modernity as a project to be resolved rather than one to be
dismantled.35 Marx offers this stagist view most clearly in the preface to A Contribution
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to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) which was published in London the same
year Blake was serialized in the United States:
In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of
production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic
development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic
form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of
individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’
social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within
bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this
antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social
formation.
If capitalism violently ushers in a modernity premised on antagonism, communism,
which goes unnamed in his passed but is implied, is the solution to it. The modernity that
capitalism creates has a resolution in which the social categories produced by capital such
as the modern subject with the capacity to possess and not to be dispossessed are not only
recuperated but are to be affirmed in the synthesized stage to come. Because Marx has in
mind the future synthesis of capitalism, or an image of how capitalism leads to the
fulfillment of modernity, this prevents him from fully conceptualizing and accounting for
the ongoing material role of white supremacy or the racialization of populations into
categories of ontological inferiority and superiority in his map of capitalism.36
If Marx’s story of wage slavery ends in reconciliation at a higher level,
Delany’s global vision of insurrection ends without an ending. The event of insurrection
the novel promises to narrate that would complete its image of slavery never takes place
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in the novel. Famously, it ends showing the slaves of Cuba preparing and planning for an
insurrection that never emerges. It is always yet to come: “That the time to strike was fast
verging upon them, from which, like the approach of the evening shadow of the hilltops,
there was no escape. It would overtake them whether or not they desired it, though in
accordance with its own economy, would be harmless and unfelt in its action and
progress” (292). The last scene is of the slave Gondolier who leaves a meeting of
conspiring slaves and free workers of color in which it was discussed that violent action
was imminent to avenge recent acts of violence done to free workers of color in Cuba.
The novel’s last lines are not of rebellion or insurrection, but the threat of it: “Gondolier,
rejoicing as he left the room to spread among the Blacks an authentic statement of the
outrage: ‘Woe be unto those devils of whites, I say!” (313). One simple explanation put
forth for the novel’s unfinished ending is that Delany, for reasons unknown, either didn’t
complete the last chapters of the novel, or if he did, they have been lost to history. Still, if
treated as a completed narrative (a full version of Blake was serialized with Delany’s
permission in The Weekly Anglo-African from November 1861 to May 1862), its socalled failed ending begs the question of why does a novel whose scope of vision covers
every scene of Atlantic slavery fall short of offering a manifest or positive image of
insurrection?
While most scholars are satisfied with the answer that Delany simply didn’t
finish the novel, Susan Kay Gillman, in her study on slave conspiracy, has suggested that
Blake’s failure to represent insurrection, combined with its historical anachronisms and
elisions of slave rebellions within the novel’s temporal frame, serves as a “clarion call for
future liberation. The simultaneous impossibility of slave revolt in any of [the novel’s]
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temporalities paradoxically provides the means of its invocation, just as the truncated,
non-ending of the novel works to underscore the absent representation of revolution”
(111). Building on this, I read the novel’s non-ending, its stopping short of providing an
image of the insurrection, as a third instance of an irresolvable formal tension, one that
crystalizes what Marx believed would be dissolved by the value-form, namely the
founding antagonism of anti-Blackness in the project of modernity. Where this
irresolvable formal tension lies is in Delany’s attempt to synthesize or offer a totalized
view of a world based on slavery by narrating the very event that if successful aims to
dismantle this world. In not offering an image of insurrection, the novel might fail to
narratively totalize a world based on slavery, yet such a failure becomes the
acknowledgment that the political ontology of Blackness is the negated position against
which this world has been constituted. The novel’s non-ending narratively registers and
pre-figures Afro-pessimism’s conceptual claim that the social death of the enslaved is the
constitutive exclusion on which rests the very same modern liberal world the novel sets
out to map in its goal of narrating mass insurrection. In this way, by not providing a
positive image of the insurrection, the novel suggests that there is no escape or path to
liberation for the slave without also dissolving the superstructures of a world built on the
infrastructure of anti-Blackness.
Unlike other antebellum literary fictions and abolitionist discourses which
wrote a place for the slave within an imagined reconciled white nation, or the stagism of
Marx’s dialectic which sees that the same modern world that exploits wage laborer will
lead to their redemption and emancipation, Blake’s nonrepresentation of insurrection
demonstrates that there is no synthesis or movement forward out of social death from
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within the very world determined by it. Fanon had called this dilemma the manicheanism
of the white settler colonial world: “this world [is] divided into compartments, this world
cut in two is inhabited by two different species” (40). The relationship between these
“two different species,” or zones of social existence—a settler-master class and the
colonized and enslaved—are structurally irresolvable, a negative dialectic: “The zone
where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two
zones are opposed, but not in service of a higher unity. . . they both follow the principle
of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for the two terms, one is
superfluous” (38-39). By suspending synthesis, the novel’s unfinished story of
insurrection ends up emphasizing and not falsely resolving this manicheanism of the
Black slave’s social existence.
The novel even dwells on its unfinished ending, auto-referentially
foregrounding the very tension it has created in deferring the representation of the
insurrection. In the last pages of the novel, a (white) eyewitness to the celebrations of
King’s Day describes that, “as it is the sights, the sounds, the savage shrieks, the uncouth
yells suggest very uncomfortable thoughts of Negro insurrection. . . It would be easy on
King’s Day for the Negroes to free themselves, or at least to make the streets of Havana
run with blood, if they only knew their power; Heaven be praised that they do not, for
who can count the lives that would be lost in such a fearful struggle?” (301). By
mimicking an anxiety-ridden white perspective that fears a violent insurrection waiting in
the shadows, the novel emphasizes the global significance of the very event Delany
promises but stops short, in the end, of narrating. The nonrepresentation of insurrection
becomes the affirmation of what the insurrection portends for a world premised on the
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slave’s social death: such a world’s undoing, the master’s destruction, the dismantling of
the slave relation itself, or, as Fanon had argued, “the destruction of the colonial world,”
which, as he explains “is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone [white
supremacy], its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country” (41).
It is in this way, then, that Blake’s narrative logic expresses the same logic
found in radical abolitionist and insurrectionist actions of the 1850s. These actions
attempted to accomplish the very same goal the novel’s negative dialectical form makes
explicit, namely the abolition rather than (false) reconciliation of modernity’s
asymmetrical zones of social existence. This logic of genuine or revolutionary abolition
could be found, for example, in Nat Turner’s insurrection or John Brown’s raid on
Harper’s Ferry, or Douglass’ violent fight with Covey, to name only a few.37 While
certainly not equivalent, these events nonetheless shared the similar goal of using force to
negate white supremacy’s violent negation of the enslaved. The novel’s last image of
Ambrosina wishing to burn the city, “I wish I was a man, I’d lay the city in ashes this
night, so I would” (313), and of Gondolier proclaiming that, “as they shed the blood of
our brother two days ago by dashing him on the pavement, and the blood of our sister
here today by a horsewhip, I would like to shed theirs with a knife,” also express this
same desire for revolutionary abolition. This is what Gondolier understands and voices
when he rejects Madame Barbosa’s plea for nonviolence and peaceful resolution to the
problem of slavery: “Thank you, Madame, for the advice . . . But we have a race of devils
to deal with that would make an angel swear. Educated devils that’s capable of
everything hellish under the name of religion, law, politics, social regulations, and the
higher civilization; so that the helpless victim be of the Black race. Curse them! I hate
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‘em! Let me into the streets and give me but half a chance and I’ll unjoin them faster than
ever I did a roast a pig for the palace dinner table” (312). These calls for destruction that
end the novel correspond to what its incommensurable narrative map already lays bare:
the negative dialectic relation of slavery is not to be (falsely) synthesized in a higher
stage of development or reconciled by liberal democracy—it is to be dismantled as a
condition for the creation of an alternative humanity.
In this way, Blake formally encodes a radical standpoint often ignored and
erased, or when noticed, demonized and disparaged, that was taken up by some in the
antebellum period, a standpoint from which its revolutionary actors—the enslaved and
their accomplices—imagined and struggled towards not the improvement or resolution to
but the abolition of a white setter modernity in their attempts secure Black liberation. In
fact, it was this standpoint and its politics that, whether its actors called it as such or not,
had come the closest to fulfilling Marx’s much earlier definition of communism found in
The German Ideology: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism
the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this
movement result from the premises now in existence” (Part 1. Section A). Delany’s one
and only entrance into the tradition of novel-writing thus results in directing readers away
from (false) resolutions found in the bourgeois aesthetic that the nineteenth-century novel
plays a central role in constituting toward the logics of on-the-ground revolutionary
movements or events that sought to overcome by dismantling and therefore abolishing
the social relations of an anti-Black, settler-colonial capitalist modernity that his novel
has revealed have no structural resolutions
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Chapter 3
Remaking Settler Colonialism and Slavery in the Age of Industrialization
In the Great Strike of 1877, 80,000 railroad workers and an estimated 500,000
other workers across the nation revolted for better wages and improved working
conditions. The strikes crippled cities like St. Louis, Chicago, and Pittsburg and left over
a hundred workers dead at the hands of state militias, police, and federal troops. In fact, it
was only the second time in US history (up to that point) that federal troops were required
to put down striking wage laborers—acts of rebellion that owners and state authorities
called domestic insurrections. To the owning class, the strikes of 1877 and the many
more that followed throughout the late nineteenth century dangerously portended a
possible workers’ revolution.1 These labor rebellions and the fears they produced kickstarted a new era of class conflict, one that shattered the nineteenth-century dream of
creating an egalitarian white republic.
This new period of class conflict indexed an underlying change in the relationship
between wage labor and capital beginning with the crisis of 1873. As economist Giovanni
Arrighi has shown, capital entered a period of crisis from 1873-96 in which intercapitalist competition led to overproduction and a system-wide falling rate of profit. The
centralization of capital through the rise of corporate capitalism or vertical integration
became the solution to this crisis.2 As a result, capital gained more power over labor.
Referring to the US context at this time, Arrighi argues that “the processes of
proletarianization and ‘enforced’ concentration of capital, encouraged by the fall in prices
and the rate of profit, completed the subordination of labour to capital by drastically
reducing such opportunities for subsistence outside of the wage-labour relation” (7).
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Capital increasingly absorbed workers into the wage labor relation, leading the absorbed,
or fully proletarianized workers, to depend on capital to reproduce themselves.3
In the United States, as a settler colony, this reduced opportunity for subsistence
outside of the wage labor relation meant losing access to (stolen) land as a means to
either escape proletarian life or, at a minimum, to partially reproduce life outside of it.
Staving off proletarianization, in other words, depended on the dispossession of
Indigenous lands. With less access to land, however, and increased absorption of workers
into the wage labor relation, labor not only lost some of its material leverage against
capital, but also confronted a growing absolute inequality, a conflict of power, between
owners and workers that previous dreams of realizing a white republic had always
promised to avoid.4 Without the expectation of property through land, the dream of
achieving settler democracy, in which access to Indigenous lands ensured egalitarian
social relations among settlers, came to be dashed on the shore of capitalism’s expanding
and maturing value form. 5 In short, settler sovereignty as a position of shared power
across class divisions began to falter in its function of resolving the conflict of
exploitation between labor and capital and the crisis of the reproduction of the capitalist
relation.
In combination with this faltering of settler sovereignty, the emancipation of
slaves and Reconstruction policies that followed challenged the meanings of wage labor
as free or white labor. Reconstruction promised to include freed slaves within the
categories of free labor and citizenship that had been forged by anti-Blackness in the first
place. Admitting freed slaves within such categories undermined the way they served to
produce a workforce of white labor that consented to and defended capital. W. E. B. Du
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Bois and Saidiya Hartman have highlighted in their work on this period how
emancipation required the reconfiguration of the ways whiteness was to be defined, lived,
and used to control wage labor.6 A central anxiety of both a Southern planter class and
white labor was how, as Hartman contends, “this laboring class [of freed slaves would]
be incorporated in the [white] body politic as citizens while maintaining the integrity of
whiteness?” (162). How could wage labor continue to signify as free or unenslaveable
labor for which consent and loyalty were offered to capital if Reconstruction policies
promised to give former the enslaved the same rights and opportunities as white workers?
Another way of saying the above is that the crisis and then subsequent
centralization of capitalism from 1873 and on, in which wage labor was increasingly
absorbed, disciplined, and alienated, appeared to outpace the capacity of settler
sovereignty and whiteness (as positions of shared power over the dispossessed) to
maintain the necessary intra-settler cohesion at these sites of power to reproduce the
capitalist social relation. If, as I have argued in earlier chapters, these positions had
enabled the emergence of the capitalist relation earlier in the century, its expansion in
response to crisis had threatened to break these positions. What happens, then, when
capital’s expansion outpaces the ability of settler sovereignty and whiteness to maintain
the necessary intra-settler equality to secure the reproduction of the capitalist relation?
One of the consequences, as outlined above, was that labor began to revolt in a much
more formidable way, creating costly instability within the process of the reproduction of
the capitalist relation, threatening to hinder its ability to expand into more mature forms.
This instability, however, recursively required the reinforcement of the structures of
dispossession that cohered these categories stabilizing the capitalist relation in the first
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place. It is this recursive relationship that this chapter will explore through the reading of
late nineteenth- and turn-of-the-century melodramatic narratives of Native and African
American writers.
While we often study realism and naturalism as the modes of representation that
historicize this transformation from market to industrial capitalism, I want to show how
the melodramatic narratives of Alice Callahan (Muscogee), Simon Pokagon
(Potawatomi), and African American writer Nat Love map how capitalism’s expansion in
the late nineteenth century rested on upholding and reproducing Native dispossession and
anti-Blackness. All three narratives contain both popular modes of melodrama in tension
with forms of realism at a time when these modes of representation had been increasingly
defined against one another in the literary marketplace. I argue that this contradictory
combination of melodrama and realism crystalizes and thus offers a view of the role of
colonial and racial dispossession in consolidating positions of shared power among
settlers that allowed for capitalism to expand into a more mature form of accumulation
and subsequently emerge as the twentieth century’s hegemon. The generic tensions
between melodrama and realism in these novels, in other words, offer literary maps of the
relationship between reproducing forms of dispossession and consolidating settler
sovereignty and whiteness as positions through which class conflicts could be sufficiently
overcome to ensure capitalism’s expansion moved forward without catastrophic rebellion
or refusal of labor.
While realism and melodrama are not necessarily mutually exclusive modes of
representation, particularly in earlier forms of realism, as Peter Brooks maintains, they do
begin to be defined against one another by the late nineteenth century.7 It is this
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opposition that helps explain how their combined use in the narratives of Callahan,
Pokagon, and Love form generic tensions that embody how ongoing forms of Indigenous
dispossession and anti-Black abjection played a constitutive role in ensuring capitalism’s
expansion in response to crisis. Realism’s claim to represent the truth or essence of social
life derived from the way in which its practitioners defined it against the naiveté and
fabrication of melodrama. William Dean Howells’ famous definition of realism as “let it
portray men and women as they are, actuated by the motives and the passions in the
measure we all know” (500), stood in opposition to melodramatic “novels that merely
tick our prejudices and lull our judgement, or that coddle our sensibilities or pamper our
gross appetite for the marvelous . . . [which] are not so fatal, but they are innutritious, and
clog the soul with unwholesome vapors of all kinds” (497).8 Because melodrama catered
to readers, it couldn’t, it was believed, represent the truth of social life. The verisimilitude
of realism came to signify as a more truthful form of representation, in part, from the way
it was defined against the way melodrama was seen to lie to readers by indulging their
interests and desires.
Realism, it should be remembered, had emerged in response to this new era of
class conflict resulting from the above outlined changes in capitalism.9 While many
scholars of a Lukácsian tradition argue that realism, in particular earlier forms of it,
offered a critical view of these changes in class relations, others have shown how realism
concealed them.10 Instead of representing how class relations underpin the atomized
experience of life under capitalism, realism reproduces the experience of class as a static
identity rather than a dynamic power relation between owners and the propertyless. As
Amy Kaplan argues, the schools of realism and naturalism practiced by authors like
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William Dean Howells, Henry James, Mark Twain, and Frank Norris, among others,
sought “to construct a homogeneous and coherent social reality by conquering the
fictional qualities of middle-class life and by controlling the specter of class conflict
which threatens to puncture this vision of a unified social totality” (21). Realism and
naturalism offered coherent, aestheticized identities of the experience of class conflict but
not views of the imbalance of power producing the conflict, thus accommodating readers
to the new realities of increased class inequality. A great example of this is Owen
Wister’s The Virginian in which the class conflicts in the cattle industry are aestheticized
for middle-class readers. Wister transformed the melodrama of the dime novel Western
into literary realism that resolved the specter of class conflict. The novel shows how the
wage laborer as cowboy in the West, could, through hard-work, defense of property, and
loyalty to owners, become an owner himself, putting at ease middle-class readers who
worried that labor was angry and rebellious about new changes in capital’s form.
Realism’s project, then, of representing the truth of social life, which is to say, an image
of unified social reality concealing the reality of class conflict, depended, in part, on
defining itself against the “deception” of melodrama.
The narratives of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love do not regard this opposition
between melodrama and realism. They instead treat both modes as necessary for telling
their stories rather than writing from the premise that the use of realism depends on
disavowing melodrama or inversely that writing in the genres of sentimentalism and
sensation would be compromised by modes of realism. This disregard for the opposition
between realism and melodrama is a symptom of the history these novels represent,
namely the antagonism of maintaining the dispossession of lands and lives to ensure
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capitalism’s successful reproduction in response to the expansion of its scope and power
over labor. To claim that the novels of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love map the history of
dispossession’s role in reconsolidating settler democracy’s capacity to prevent class
conflict during the time of capitalism’s late-nineteenth expansion, helps broaden our
understanding not only of the relationship between histories of dispossession and
capitalism, but also how literature at this time represented or not this relationship. We
also see, I suggest, that these melodramatic narratives bring to light the underlying
asymmetries of the colonial and slave relation that the major works of realism and
naturalism conceal in their focus on intra-settler class conflicts. These narratives also
show how resistance to dispossession threatened to unsettle the way capitalism secured
the necessary stability for its reproduction as the United States emerged after the turn-ofthe-century to become the world’s next hegemon or center of capitalism’s worldsystem.11
Assimilation as Elimination in Wynema
The first novel written by a Native American woman, Alice Callahan’s Wynema
(1891) envisions how white settlers can learn how to forge peaceful co-existence with
Indigenous America in a moment when the settler state’s genocidal campaign of Indian
Pacification had culminated in the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890. The novel’s
protagonist, Genevieve Weir, a white missionary-teacher sent to establish a school in the
Muscogee nation, serves as a model for the novel’s white readers of how to shed bigoted
perspectives of the Muscogee in order to be ally of the “poor Indians.” As Kara Mollis
argues, the novel envisions that assimilation must cut both ways for peace to be
achieved.12 Her guide and mentor in Indian country is Keithly Gerard who, with several
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years of experience teaching among the Muscogee as a Methodist preacher, trains and
tutors Genevieve, and white readers, to recognize capacity of the Muscogee to live their
cultural traditions while also helping them assimilate to bourgeois family relationships
and liberal democratic values.
Key to white settlers like Genevieve forging peace with the Muscogee is
sentimentalism. Genevieve and Keithly, along with the white reader over their shoulders,
learn to cultivate feelings of sympathy, good-will, and affection toward the Muscogee.13
Critics have argued that the novel’s sentimental plot sought to reconcile past and prevent
future violence between settlers and Indigenous people. Susan Bernadin suggests that
Callahan was following the example of previous sentimental novels that explored racial
injustice, most notable of which was Helen Hunt Jackson’s Ramona. As Bernadin argues,
“Callahan adapts conventional plots of courtship and union in the service of mending rifts
in national race relations. Like her Anglo predecessors, Callahan uses key tenets of the
sentimental ethos—evangelism, domesticity, motherhood—to model her vision of a
future interracial ‘national community’” (211). Sean Teuton contends that Callahan’s
vision in the novel is “that Indigenous people may be resilient enough to cast off their
outmoded cultural behaviors to achieve full citizenship in the American nation in this
first Indigenous novel of assimilation” (319). While critics recognize the sentimental plot
represents assimilation as a resolution to colonial violence, what they haven’t taken
adequate notice of is how it also historicizes assimilation at this moment as a more
“peaceful” method of Native elimination. That is, the novel’s sentimentalism inscribes
the structure of feeling of assimilation as a state-sponsored method of indirect elimination
of Indigenous people that ensured greater stability for settler democracy at this time of
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capitalism’s expansion. When sentimentalism is read in relationship to the novel’s other
narrative strategy of reform realism a generic tension appears. While this bind between
sentimentalism and realism may or may not register Callahan’s misgivings about
assimilation (as critics tend to focus on in their biographical criticism of the novel), it
more importantly, I suggest, maps how capitalism’s expansion drove forward the need for
more indirect or “peaceful” forms of Native elimination.
Before arriving at this point, however, we must first understand how assimilation
emerged as a state-sponsored strategy of indirect elimination. In a period when genocidal
campaigns of the settler state in North America had culminated in violent massacres and
concentration camps (the reservation system at this time), new forms of managing
occupied Indigenous nations within US national borders emerged to ensure greater
stability for the national economy. US leaders began to treat Indigenous insurgency as
internal disruptions rather than threats from foreign nations. They also had come to see
that methods of direct violence induced costly and unstable Indigenous insurgency. More
indirect methods like assimilation were in need to prevent these internal threats from
challenging the stability of the nation. “As a technique of elimination,” Wolfe points out,
“assimilation is more effective than either homicide or a spatial device. Unlike homicide,
it does not jeopardise the settler social order, since the policy is invariably presented, in
philanthropic terms, as offering Natives the same opportunities as are available to
Whites” (34). The Allotment policy of 1888 embodied this turn to a strategy of
elimination through forced incorporation that, it was believed, would be less costly not
only economically but also in terms of the internal peace of the nation.
The goal of allotment, then, was to continue to remove Indigenous peoples from
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their lands but in ways opposed to direct military or vigilante violence. As Patrick Wolfe
argues, “allotment, in sum, had two inseparable ends: the abolition of tribal government
and the assimilation of the individual Indian. It was not so much an alternative to removal
as its completion” (40). Elimination by forced incorporation reinforced and ran parallel to
the long history of military campaigns that removed Indigenous people through death and
imprisonment. Key to forms of state-sponsored assimilation like allotment policy was
embedding white settlers in Indian country. In this way, they could serve as the police of
Indigenous rebellion, while also encouraging and coercing Indigenous peoples to take up
private property ownership and bourgeois family relations.
Wynema shows how sentimentalism serves as the structure of feeling of this
campaign to embed settlers among the colonized with the goal of breaking up land-bases
and managing Indigenous insurgency in less costly, more stable ways. While Keithly’s
advice to Genevieve, “If you dwell among the Romans, you must abide by their laws and
follow their customs whenever practicable” (18), demonstrates a desire for cultural
understanding, it also reveals the tactic required to carry out indirect methods of
elimination. Through good feelings, settlers like Genevieve and Keithly aid in campaigns
of elimination but through more stable (for settlers) forms of forced incorporation rather
than outright military extermination.
Indeed, the novel makes clear how Keithly’s role is to surveil and police potential
unrest and rebellion, and how the success of this role depends on cross-cultural
relationships built up through sentimentalism. In one scene, the father of Wynema, Choe
Harjo, relates how the Muscogee are angry that their delegates have stolen head-right
money that was to be paid out in exchange for ceding land, relating that “They say if
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these men do not explain their conduct, they will investigate the matter and ‘make it hot’
for them when they get back. I fear trouble and bloodshed will yet result from this” (31).
This scene illustrates how Keithly’s intimate relationship gives him a greater ability to
recognize such unrest and the power to suppress it. This intimate relationship won
through sentiment allows Keithly to be a spy: “the people in and around my school are
holding secret meetings and passing resolutions that, if carried out, will seriously
incommode these criminal officials. I attended one of their meetings the other evening
and felt rather uncomfortable over the warmth and feeling they expressed” (31). It also
allows him to be an informant. He recounts a story he has heard from a speech delivered
by an “old, gray-haired Indian” in one of these secret meetings (31). The story recalls a
moment years earlier before the forced removal of the Muscogee when a delegate
disobeyed the collective will of the community and sold land in exchange for land west
of the Mississippi. The people treat the delegate as a traitor and kill him as punishment.
Keithly’s point in reporting the story is to suggest that he has uncovered how such
feelings of violent retribution for dispossession are still very much present among the
Muscogee despite the appearance of pacification and good feelings toward white settlers.
With this advanced knowledge garnered through his embedded position among the
Muscogee, such rebellions can be more easily managed.
While settlers gaining cultural knowledge may help shed bigoted views, it also
serves as a tool helping them censor activities that might incite rebellion. We see how
Keithly weaponizes his knowledge of ceremonies to determine which are tolerable and
which are to be squashed:
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The ceremony to-day was simple and innocent; there was no harm done to any
one—and if it please them to keep such a custom, I say, let them do so. Now, if it
were the scalp-dance or war-dance or any of their ceremonies calculated to harm
themselves or others, I should use all my influence in blotting it out; but these
Indians have long ago laid aside their savage, cruel customs and have no more
desire to practice them than we have to see them do so. (28)14
Opposed, then, to the direct violence of the soldier, Keithly is the sentimental, culturally
sensitive agent of counterinsurgency preventing rebellion. In a context when the Ghost
Dance mobilized pan-Indigenous rebellion, sentimentalism in the novel serves as the
vehicle for preventing violence not because it engenders cross-cultural sympathy (as
maybe Callahan wanted readers to learn), but because it allows settlers to subdue
insurgency before it can get off the ground.
If sentimentalism is the affective register facilitating indirect forms of elimination,
the novel draws attention to the ways such forms of elimination become important for
generating greater social stability in which settlers could better resolve conflicts arising
from capitalism’s expansion. One of these conflicts the novel addresses is that of
patriarchy among white settlers. During this period, white middle- and upper-class
women’s struggles for greater inclusion in settler democracy, a struggle Genevieve
embodies in the novel, were animated not only by the formal enfranchisement of former
slaves but also by capitalism’s expansion. While Melissa Ryan contends that the novel’s
comparison of (white) women’s struggle for inclusion to Native struggle against
colonialism draws out a “shared experience of dispossession and misrepresentation” (42),
it should be understood that Genevieve gains greater inclusion in settler democracy
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because of and through her counterrevolutionary role embedded among the Muscogee.15
That is, she demands to be recognized as a self-possessive, rational, and modern subject
precisely through her role as an agent of assimilation.16 She treats her structural position,
a minoritized subject within a colonizing class, as equivalent to the position of the people
being colonized, in her fight against patriarchy.
Of course, the novel’s sentimentalism presents Genevieve’s demand for inclusion
as equivalent to Wynema’s desire for assimilation. Yet the fight for inclusion in settler
democracy and the fight not to be eliminated are not equivalent. To see them as
equivalent conceals the more important relationship the novel has also highlighted,
namely how the success of assimilation as a more “peaceful” form of elimination has
enabled or generated a resolution to Genevieve’s intra-settler conflict with her patriarchal
husband Maurice. Genevieve gains strength and power to demand greater inclusion in
settler democracy, resolving the conflict of patriarchy within her colonizing class, from
her work as a colonizer implementing indirect methods of elimination. The key to
Genevieve’s success in demanding inclusion is not that she sees how her situation is
parallel to Wynema’s, or that readers see this parallel. Rather, it is in seeing how
Genevieve’s work as an agent of more stable forms of elimination enabled her
confrontation with Maurice and thus a resolution to her gendered exclusion from sharing
power with her fellow white male settlers.
If the novel’s sentimentalism appears to endorse and legitimate this enabling
relationship between assimilation and resolution to intra-settler conflicts, what does it
mean that the novel also contains moments of realism that formally clash with its
sentimentalism? What does it mean that realism breaks in on the novel’s sentimentalism
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interrupting its formal coherence? The realism of the novel can be found in the moments
when characters read from newspaper accounts or relate second-hand stories, mostly
white characters repeating the stories of unseen Indigenous people. The novel’s realism
echoes the language of reform journalism. Newspaper accounts voice informed political
views on contemporary issues that intervene in debates on topics like allotment and the
“Indian problem.” In these moments, the novel often recounts and describes the violence
committed against Indigenous people as well as their actions of resistance and rebellion.
Maria Windell suggests that this tension between sentimentalism and realism allows
Callahan to undermine the binary of assimilation or resistance: “Wynema’s sentimental
realisms disrupt sentimental/realist and assimilationist/traditionalist or resistant binaries
and complicate the association of ethnic women writers with a sentimentalism that is
presumed assimilationist” (246). Adding to the work of critics like Windell and others
who have pointed to the novel’s formal contradictions as sites where the novel’s
assimilationist politics break down, I read the place of realism in the novel as forming a
generic tension with sentimentalism that registers the antagonism found in achieving
greater stability for settler democracy precisely through indirect but no less violent forms
of elimination.17 The novel’s generic tension between a sentimentalism of
counterinsurgency and a realism of social protest rehearses the dynamic opposition
between forging settler stability and pursuing the elimination of Indigenous people.18
This generic tension, then, not only undermines the novel’s politics of endorsing
assimilation, but it also serves as a map offering a view of the way that capitalism’s
expansion at this time and the way the conflicts it produced came to be resolved
depended on the settler state innovating its methods of elimination.19
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For instance, when Robin reads to Wynema an article from the Cherokee
Telephone that relates recent mistreatment suffered by Indigenous people, the question of
stolen land it raises interrupts the sentimental plot’s vision of the “peaceful”
incorporation of Indigenous people in the United States:
Remember, too, that for every acre of land the United States government holds today, which it acquired form the Indians of any tribe, from the land of Columbus, it
has not paid five cents on the average. The Government owes the Indians of North
America justly to-day, ten times more than it will ever pay them. Search history
and you will find that these are facts and figures and not mere sentimentalism.
(98)
It is implied that the wealth of the United States depends on the land taken by force from
Indigenous nations and that to repay Indigenous peoples for stolen land is not possible
precisely because the value to be returned would make the United States impossible.20
Here, through the voice of the newspaper editor, the novel questions its own use of
sentimentalism, suggesting that it functions to conceal the histories of dispossession and
coercion that have yet to be materially resolved.21 The coherence of the sentimental plot
is thus interrupted in a moment like this when it is brought to light that sentimentalism
conceals historical truths and that the problem of dispossession the sentimental plot had
promised to resolve appears irresolvable. If sentimentalism is the vehicle for a more
peaceful elimination/colonization that enables greater stability for settler democracy, then
the relationship of realism to sentimentalism as interruption formally dramatizes how the
coherence of settler democracy through which conflicts among settlers can be resolved
structurally rests on the violence of Indigenous colonization. The stability of the former
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isn’t possible without violence of the latter. If this relationship must be disavowed for
settler democracy to appear and be lived as a legitimate position of power in which to
overcome conflicts, Wynema makes legible the antagonism structuring this relationship
through such moments of realist language interrupting the coherence of the novel’s
sentimental plot.22
This generic tension the novel self-referentially reflects on when it stages the
limits of sentimentalism to resolve the problems of violence between settlers and
Indigenous people—the very problems for which the good feelings of sentimentalism
first appeared as the solution. When Carl Peterson, a fellow white missionary-teacher of
Keithly and Genevieve, travels to South Dakota to help broker peace between the Lakota
and the US military, (a conflict alluding to the recent Wounded Knee massacre that took
place only months before the novel is published), his appeal for peace through a language
of sentimentalism breaks down. Peterson arrives with feelings of good-will and
sympathy: “I came to cast my lot among your misguided and mistreated people, to do all
I can for them, toward reconciling them to my people and to the Government. I came by
the military camp and informed the commander of my object, and he let me pass. I shall
not be harmed” (83). With such feelings, he begs the Lakota to disarm and surrender
themselves to reservation life: “Go into the reservation and surrender your fire-arms,
friends . . . Place yourselves in a submissive attitude, and the Government will protect
you; you will not be starved again, for those criminal agents have been discharged and
better ones employed” (80). However, the leader of the resisting Lakota, Wildfire,
responds by suggesting that reconciliation is impossible with a state premised on the
elimination of the Lakota: “let this arm wither, let these eyes grow dim, let this savage
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heart still its beating, when I stand still and make peace with a Government whose only
policy is to exterminate my race” (81). In contrast to Peterson’s call for peace, Wildfire’s
call for violence shows how cultivating feelings of mutual sympathy appear naïve and
useless when confronting a state pursuing a policy of elimination. Peterson’s
sentimentalism also prevents rather than enables an understanding of Indigenous people’s
situation. As Wildfire reminds Peterson, “You are kind, and you mean well, but you can
never understand these things as I do. You have never been oppressed” (85).23 This
staging of the failure of sentimentalism clashes harshly with other moments when it is
suggested that forging bonds through good feelings is the only way to prevent violence
and help Native people co-exist with settler society. Wynema thus highlights the
shortcomings of its own sentimentalism to generate peace between settlers and
Indigenous people. It questions its own narrative strategy that imagines assimilation as
the enabling device not only for peace between Indigenous peoples and settlers, but also
for settlers to resolve intra-settler conflicts.
Here is where I maintain, then, that it is through the staging of the failure of its
own sentimentalism that the novel confronts the implication of what its generic tension
between sentimentalism and realism has already brought to light, namely how the internal
peace of settler society is a fiction when it depends on the violence of Native elimination.
The implication is that this stability (that sentimentalism plays a role in producing)
cannot hold or must constantly be remade when it is premised on methods of elimination
that are met with resistance. This stability, in other words, requires constant vigilance and
counterrevolutionary violence as its constituent element. Native elimination, whether
through indirect methods or not, produces resistance and thus the potential for instability
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at all times. The project of creating internal stability in which intra-settler conflicts could
be overcome at this time of capitalism’s expansion faced the contingency of resistance to
elimination or the defense of Native sovereignty. Just as the success of assimilation to
carry out the project of elimination without inducing further rebellion and instability
animated Genevieve’s demand for greater inclusion in settler democracy, resistance
would unsettle the conditions animating Genevieve’s attempt to resolve the conflict of
patriarchy among settlers. In other words, if indirect forms of suppressing insurgency and
achieving elimination generated greater stability in settler democracy as a requisite in
helping to manage capitalism’s expansion, defenses of Native sovereignty posed a
roadblock to this stability and the expansion it afforded.
This contingency of Native sovereignty in the movement of capitalism to higher
stages of accumulation comes into full view in the tension between the sentimental plot’s
closing vision of racial harmony and successful assimilation and the novel’s closing
denunciations and condemnations of the United States. The former vision suggests that
assimilation leads to a reconciliation and peaceful future between settlers and Indigenous
people: “[t]here they are, the Caucasian and American, the white and the Indian, and not
the meanest, not the most ignorant, not the despised; but the intelligent, happy, beloved
wife is Wynema, child of the Forest” (104). The latter suggests that settler futurity will
always be haunted by its original sins of colonial dispossession. As the narrator warns,
the United States “will surely be visited with troubles and sorrows and afflictions, as it
has afflicted and troubled the poor, untutored savage” (102), and that “there will be wars
and pestilence, anarchies and open rebellions. The subjects of the Government will rise
up in defiance of the ‘authorities that be.’ Oh, it will be trouble—trouble!” (102). These
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final visions of simultaneous peace and instability carry the novel’s generic tension
between sentimentalism and realism to an end but without ideological closure. It is the
contingency of Native sovereignty in the futurity of settler capitalism that produces this
refusal of ideological closure. If the drive for stability means completing elimination or
removing the threat of resistance, then settler futurity or capitalism’s successful
expansion (which depend on this stability) will always be haunted by the specter of
Native sovereignty. Defending Native sovereignty disrupts settler sovereignty as the
position of shared power through which conflicts among settlers are resolved. Which is to
say, if the novel’s generic tension between sentimentalism and realism maps the
irreconcilable relationship between Indigenous dispossession and the coherence of settler
sovereignty and hence capitalism’s reproduction, it also shows how the defense of Native
sovereignty threatened to halt this reproduction precisely by destabilizing settler
sovereignty and its capacity to enable settlers to overcome internal conflicts.
Native Elimination, Romantic Anticapitalism, and Alienated labor in Queen of the
Woods
If Callahan’s novel maps how changes in the methods of elimination related to the
securing of greater stability for settler democracy and capitalism’ expansion, Pokagon’s
novel represents how colonization was constitutive of the ideologies resolving the
problem of alienated labor. That is, Pokagon’s Ogimawkwe Mitigwaki or Queen of the
Woods (1899) responds to and offers an important map of the ideologies of romantic
anticapitalism and their role in resolving the problem of worker alienation. Like we see in
Callahan’s novel, Queen of the Woods uses both sentimentalism and realism to appeal to
white readers’ sympathy. However, a tension forms between these two modes of
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representation that becomes telling of the historical ground to which the novel responds.
This tension demonstrates how one of the more important strategies for managing worker
alienation in the late nineteenth century—romantic anticapitalism—rested on Native
elimination. It also, inversely, shows how Native sovereignty is the troublesome
contingency within this process of generating/reproducing ideologies, like romantic
anticapitalism, that secure labor’s support of capitalism during this period of its rapid
expansion.
Queen of the Woods is ostensibly a melodramatic temperance novel that tells the
story of how settler colonialism weaponizes alcohol to attack and decimate Pokagon’s
family and nation. Pokagon uses sentimentalism, in particular the Vanishing Indian trope,
to lament and elicit empathy for this destruction. In fact, Pokagon dedicates his novel to
Helen Hunt Jackson’s Ramona signaling the generic tradition in which he writes his
novel, one that decries but also legitimizes the passing of Native people as tragic but
inevitable. The Vanishing Indian trope serves as a convention within the genre
Indigenous historian Jean O’Brien calls a “lasting” narrative. Indigenous characters in
lasting narratives surrender their land to settlers before passing away, a symbolic act
sanctioning the dispossession and erasure of Indigenous sovereignty, while authorizing
settler sovereignty, history, presence, and futurity. “Such narratives,” writes O’Brien,
“performed the cultural and political work of purifying the landscape of Indians, using a
degeneracy narrative that foreclosed Indian futures. Through the multilayered process of
‘lasting,’ non-Indians argued for a rupture that enabled their own modernity and
demonstrated their progress” (143). Lasting narratives are as old as settler colonialism
itself, the most famous of which is Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans, yet by the turn-of-
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the-century they came to serve a more specific purpose of counterposing the Indian as
either the noble or hostile savage to a new capitalist modernity. Lasting narratives wrote
Indianness as either a state of savagery opposed to modern progress or a state of romantic
unity and egalitarianism found in nature untouched by the evils of capitalist abstraction
and alienation.
It must be remembered that at this time the centralization of capitalism entailed
more forceful forms of abstraction, atomization, and thus alienation. This anxiety of
alienated life manifested in discourses of a closed frontier. The worry was that a closed
frontier, as a process of Indian removal to make land available for settlers, signaled the
end of the egalitarian dream of settler democracy. In this moment, then, when the frontier
came to serve less as an actual place to escape proletarian life, it would emerge
nonetheless as a space on which fantasies of escape and refuge from alienated labor could
be projected. While this is often called the mythologizing of the West, it was the
retooling of a long-standing ideology of settler indigenization in response to
transformations of capitalism at this time.24 As the prospect of acquiring land as the
means of becoming an owner or of producing one’s life outside of the wage labor relation
dimmed, settlers indigenized themselves in the imagined spaces of a frontier where they
found refuge from and resisted the alienating forces of capitalist modernity.
Theorist Iyko Day in Alien Capital offers a useful framework for understanding
how capitalism’s expansion beginning in the late nineteenth century depended on the
racialization of capitalism’s abstract and concrete qualities. The abstraction of labor that
produced alienation was racialized in the form of the threatening alien Asian laborer,
while the concrete side or use value of labor was racialized as white. In this way, white
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labor sees the cause of capitalism’s alienating effects not in capitalism’s form itself but in
the racialized populations of Asian workers. Racializing capitalism’s abstract and
concrete qualities depended on settler indigenization in the form of what Day calls
romantic anticapitalism in which white settlers indigenize themselves as persons living in
an organic, unified, concrete state of nature, or temporal/spatial location of the “noble
savage” opposed to capitalist modernity. As Day explains, “what romantic anticapitalism
offers is an ideological framework for settler colonialism to respond to economic and
technological crises by imagining whiteness through indigenizing tropes of purity and
organic connection to land that function to distort and deflect responsibility for capitalist
modernity” (36). Settlers indigenizing themselves in the spaces of an imagined Indian
nature could also be described as a form of Phillip Deloria Jr calls, “playing Indian” in
order to cohere white settler identity as it faced changes in modernity.25
Pokagon’s sentimental plot offers white readers such images of romantic
anticapitalism and thus invites settler indigenization. While Pokagon represents his
community’s destruction for reasons of gaining sympathy from white readers, this
representation nonetheless participates in the vanishing Indian trope which invites white
readers to project themselves onto the lives of Pokagon’s Indian characters where they
can play out fantasies of finding refuge from alienation. One of the opening scenes of the
novel illustrates this ideological work:
On my return home from Twinsburg, O. where I had attended the white man’s
school for several years, I had an innate desire to retire into the wild woods, far
from the haunts of civilization, and there enjoy myself with bow and arrow, hook
and line. . . from various conversations with educated people of the white race, I
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have come to the conclusion that there is a charm about hunting and fishing,
planted deep in the human heart by Nature’s own hand, that requires but little
cultivation to lead the best educated of even the most civilized races to engage
heartily in the sport. (99)
This is the language of romantic anticapitalism. Suggesting there is a charm to
subsistence modes of production appeals to white readers’ fantasies of escaping the
abstractions of capitalism. The charm of hunting and fishing is the feeling of concreteness
they offer in a world of increasing abstractions, commodity culture, and alienated labor.
For these spaces of nature or the Indian frontier to be lost as the novel shows later, invites
readers to see the Indian’s fight to save such spaces as their fight for refuge from
capitalist modernity. White readers can play Indian against the forces of modernity, but
instead of actual elimination, they can find catharsis in the feeling that they live opposed
to the alienation that has come to surround them.26
If intemperance in the novel allegorizes market exploitation, it is easy to see, then,
how the novel invites white readers to project their desires to resist exploitation onto
Pokagon’s sentimentalized fight against intemperance. Because sentimentalism tries to
generate sympathy from white readers, it asks them to see themselves in the Indian
characters under attack by exploitation. The narrative strategy of sentimentalism is such
that white readers are asked to see themselves or their own children in the image of
Pokagon’s son passing or his daughter’s drowning. Yet in this move to sympathize by
comparing one’s self to the plight of the Indian character, a false equivalence between
settler and Native takes place. Sympathy for the Indian character’s victimization becomes
a lament for settlers who fear exploitation has undermined their sovereignty as settlers.
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As sympathy is gleaned from white readers, the conditions of colonialism that the novel
seeks to highlight are effaced in the sentimental plot. The fight against elimination is
erased and is replaced by the fight for settler sovereignty against exploitation. Losing the
fight against intemperance or the vanishing of the Indian completes the ideology of
romantic anticapitalism. Not only is the Indian disappeared and settler futurity
sanctioned, but in projecting themselves onto the Indian characters, the lost fight of the
Indian becomes the ongoing fight to preserve the frontier/Nature as the concrete, unity,
and autonomy outside of/opposed to alienated life of capitalism.
Yet, importantly, Pokagon doesn’t finish the sentimental plot with the Indian
vanishing and losing his or her battle with oncoming civilization. Like we saw in
Wynema, Queen of the Woods veers away from its sentimental plot and introduces a
language of realism through which it continues the critique of intemperance as stand in
for exploitation. Specifically, Pokagon breaks out of the frame of the sentimental plot and
offers direct critiques of the alcohol industry and the state’s role in supporting it. The
language of these direct critiques is cut from the same cloth of muckraking journalism
and its condemnation of monopoly enterprises at the time.27 Recounting to the reader the
vision he has seen in a nightmare/dream, Pokagon describes alcohol as an invading,
conquering monster dressed in the US flag and stamped with its seal:
I beheld marching among the mighty throng the most vicious-looking creature my
eyes ever beheld; no brush of ‘mautchi manito’ (the devil) could paint his wicked
‘kinjig’ (face); no language of ‘Kitchiiskuto’ (hell) could describe it. About his
form was wrapped ‘wabeyon’ (a blanker) with ‘anongog’ (the stars) and stripes
thereon, among which was outline and American ‘migisi’ (eagle), with wings half
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spread, while across ‘nikatigwan’ (his forehead) deeply impressed, I read, ‘United
States and City Seals’ . . . Thus clothed with civic and national emblems, the
despot marched forth . . . defiantly treading, with feet of steel, upon beating
human hearts that were yet struggling in ‘miskwi’ (their own blood). (176-7)
If the novel’s sentimentalism allows white readers to resolve the conflict of alienated life
under exploitation, the muckraking critique of exploitation suspends this ideological
work. It forms an impasse with the sentimental plot and its ideology of romantic
anticapitalism. The Indian never vanishes in Pokagon’s novel because Pokagon as
narrator turns into a muckraking journalist. Without this ideological closure, the vision of
romantic anticapitalism offered to white readers that the novel begins with dissolves by
its end. While muckraking language is not incompatible with the sentimental novel,
particularly the social reform sentimental novel, its presence in Pokagon’s novel makes
impossible the ideological work of its sentimentalism.
Phillip Deloria Jr. suggests that such formal tensions in Pokagon’s novel index the
contradictions of the Pokagon’s targeted audience and literary marketplace:
Pokagon’s slippages of form, style, and language point to a complicated,
ambivalent cultural politics, one in which he sought opportunities to speak to nonIndian Americans through resonant ideological tropes: primitivism, temperance,
sentimentalism, Christian brotherhood, and racial tolerance. At the same time,
however, Pokagon clearly wanted the reader to understand the consequences of
history and to know something of Indian dispossession and struggle. . . How to
guide the content of readers’ engagement with the Indianness coded in the novel?
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How to use the familiar tropes to speak to readers in ways that allowed them to
see Indian histories? (viii)
Yet I contend that the generic bind between sentimentalism and the muckraking language
is not merely a matter of audience. Rather, it encodes the underlying contingency of
romantic anticapitalism as an important ideology securing labor’s support of capitalism at
a time when more intense forms of abstraction and alienation emerged. This contingency
is of course Indigenous resistance to elimination, or Native sovereignty.
The muckraking realism forms a generic bind with the novel’s sentimentalism
through the way it treats the temporalities of colonialism and capitalism as co-present
rather than as stages, with the latter replacing the former. It does this in two ways. The
first is how Pokagon’s muckraking voice suggests that resistance to elimination is copresent with settlers’ resistance to new forms of exploitation. Pokagon warns that alcohol
is an invading monster targeting simultaneously Indigenous people and settlers: “He is
now fully satisfied the mighty Kraken is not in the sea, but on the land, and that the
dreaded monster regards not age, race, or condition, but tramples down alike both chief
and king; the white man in his palace, and the red man in his hut; alike the gray-haired
sire, and the little son of tender years” (178). By placing the settler and Native on the
same level of being targeted by exploitation, Pokagon traverses the temporal divide
between colonial and capitalist relation that the novel’s sentimental plot has tried to
reinforce. The sentimental plot which seeks sympathy from white readers for the
vanishing Indian writes the temporality of the colonial relation as completed or finished.
Colonialism is over when the project of elimination has been completed, at which point
the settler takes the Indian’s place, marking the arrival of the capitalist relation. Romantic
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anticapitalism depends on this temporal break or linear stagism between colonialism as a
past and completed project ushering in the emergence of capitalist modernity. That is,
settler indigenization as a way to access refuge from alienation in an Indian nature
depends on this temporal framework in which the time of colonialism precedes the time
of capitalism. Yet suggesting that Natives and settlers are targeted as the same time
unsettles this linear temporality of capitalist modernity, or the way the settler of
modernity replaces the Native of a romantic past when the settler goes to indigenize
himself against alienation.
The second way the novel unsettles the temporal divide between colonialism and
capitalism on which depends romantic anticapitalism is how the muckraking narrative
voice treats the destruction of Native and settler society as intertwined and
contemporaneous. If the generic expectation of the sentimentalized vanishing Indian plot
is to envision the total destruction of Pokagon’s family and nation, the muckraking voice
inverts this expectation by offering images of the destruction of the United States. Instead
of envisioning only the vanishing of the Indian race, the novel offers an apocalyptic
vision of exploitation’s impact on settler society:
Pokagon believes with all his heart, that if some dire ‘nibowin’ (contagion) should
sweep our land as disastrous to health and life as the alluring cup, that those wild
scenes which were enacted in London during the great plague there, would be
repeated here. Business would be paralyzed; social gatherings cease . . . My dear
white friends, Pokagon is fully convinced; yes, he doth know that this firewater of
‘anamakamig’ (hell) should give you greater cause for alarm than any ‘nobowin’
(disease) that has ever visited our shores. (180)
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It was common among vanishing Indian narratives for Indian characters to suggest that
just as apocalypse has visited them, so too would it, like a curse, befall settler society at
some point in the future. Wynema makes this move as we saw in its ending. While this
common trope appeared to denounce the crimes of settler society, it functioned to
legitimize elimination by affirming that settler conquest had delivered an inevitable
settler futurity.28 Yet here Pokagon as the muckraking narrator inverts this trope. What he
asserts is not that just as the Indians of the past were destroyed, settlers of his time would
face a similar fate. Instead, he suggests there are co-present destructions taking place. His
voice is a contemporaneous voice bearing witness to exploitation’s attack on settlers. He
is not the vanishing Indian of the past cursing settler society from the grave. The
muckraking voice does not follow the linear temporality on which romantic
anticapitalism depends. The end of Native society does not give birth to the beginning of
settler society. Rather, there is a co-presence of the terminal endings of both societies.
They appear in the novel structurally and temporally intertwined.
If Indian characters are not viewed, then, as vanishing but as co-present actors in
their battle against colonialism, settlers cannot find refuge from capitalism in the spaces
of an Indian nature that the novel’s sentimentalism had initially represented. For romantic
anticapitalism to work, Indians have to vanish. Put slightly differently, romantic
anticapitalism doesn’t work when colonialism and resistance against it are shown to be
co-present with capitalism. The temporality of the colonial relation must be experienced
as preceding and constitutive of the temporality of a settler capitalist present. In
Pokagon’s novel, however, Indians break in on this present in their struggle against
elimination, refusing the way in which sentimentalized vanishing Indian tropes helped
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settlers accommodate themselves to capitalism. If the temporality of the Indian, the
temporality of colonialism, appears intertwined with a capitalist modernity, the settler
worker cannot find refuge from alienation in the space of a premodern, organic Indian
frontier.
In this way, the generic bind between the novel’s sentimentalized vanishing
Indian plot and its muckraking realism gives form to the way romantic anticapitalism as a
central ideology cohering settler sovereignty (that capitalism’s expansion had strained)
not only depended on elimination. It also shows how resistance to elimination, or Native
sovereignty, made impossible the ways romantic anticapitalism helped racialize
capitalism’s abstract and concrete qualities that helped white labor to side with capitalism
by seeing its abstractions embodied in the menace of Alien labor.29 In this way, the novel
doesn’t reproduce colonialist tropes of the vanishing Indian, nor does it offer a positive
image of Native sovereignty. Rather, its generic bind demonstrates the illegitimacy of
settler sovereignty (how it depends on elimination/made impossible by Native
sovereignty) precisely in the moment when capitalism’s expansion had strained the
capacity of this position of power to promise settler workers autonomy or semi-autonomy
from proletarian life through the expectation of property. In doing so, Queen of the
Woods hails the specter of catastrophe for capitalism, namely not only Indigenous
rebellion but also labor rebellion.
In other words, with an understanding of how its generic bind reveals the
illegitimacy of settler sovereignty, the novel can be said to offer an important intervention
in the debates of the period on how labor should respond to capitalism’s expansion. A
leading and typical voice for white labor, Henry George, had argued in his Poverty of
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Progress that capitalism’s growth was premised on the production of inequality between
labor and capital and that the solution was for the state to nationalize or de-privatize land
to be equally distributed among all settlers. Underpinning this view was the assumption
that the state had the obligation to ensure the integrity of settler sovereignty rather than
the profit-motive of capitalism.30 In the context of this kind of demand, the novel’s
mapping of the illegitimacy of settler sovereignty suggests that the settler state’s goal was
not to ensure intra-settler equality but to advance the interests of capital. Pokagon
questions why the state doesn’t tackle the problem of intemperance as allegory of
exploitation: “if there is any reasonable excuse why partisans, politicians, and statesmen
should not tread upon the neck of that soulless ‘mawtchi’ (tyrant) of humanity” (187). He
continues, “my petitions have always been answered, but not in the voice of ‘animiki’
(thunder), nor emblazoned in characters of living ‘ishkote’ (fire) across ‘wawkwi’ (the
heavaens), but in murmurs soft and low it has fallen upon ‘nin gomowin odaw’ (my
waiting heart) as gently as the dews of evening upon the grass and flowers, whispering in
‘nintchitchang’ (my soul), ‘Pokagon, there is no good excuse’” (187). While this passage,
and others like it in the novel, might sound like reformist appeals for an improved
democracy, they take on much more radical meanings when set against the backdrop of
the novel’s generic tension that brings to light the contingency of romantic anticapitalism
as the ideology reconsolidating settler sovereignty. Suggesting that the settler state will
not defend settler workers from the monster of exploitation reinforces the way
muckraking realism has already unsettled the politics of the novel’s romantic
anticapitalism that promises settlers’ refuge from exploitation.
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In this way, Pokagon’s open critique of the state and its role in enabling
exploitation’s targeting of settler laborers draws white readers’ attention to the
contradiction of the settler state in its role of managing capitalism while also maintaining
colonialism. It upholds the colonial relation, which gives power to all settlers over the
colonized, but at the same it protects the capitalist relation, which gives power to owners
over workers. The state’s task, then, in defending settler sovereignty as shared power
across class divisions doesn’t come to mean ensuring economic equality. It means instead
only ensuring labor sides with capital as a requisite for capitalism’s expansion. Pokagon’s
novel thus offers a way of seeing settler sovereignty not as a position of power generative
of egalitarian social relations among settlers—as the dream of settler democracy had
always promised—but one in which inequality between capital and labor was not only
permissible but cultivated, legitimated, and managed precisely through settler sovereignty
in order to ensure capitalism’s successful expansion.
Slavery After Slavery in The Life and Adventures of Nat Love
If Callahan and Pokagon represent the role of colonial relation in the expansion of
capitalism at the turn-of-the-century, Nat Love’s The Life and Adventures (1907), an
autobiography of a former slave turned wage laboring cowboy, maps the way the slave
relation did not end with formal abolition, but continued in its function of cohering
whiteness to ensure labor didn’t turn the conflict of exploitation into catastrophe for
capital at this time. Love’s narrative details how in the years following emancipation, he
flees the conditions of tenant farming in the South for the life of a cowboy and then
Pullman porter in the West. It follows the conventions of the slave narrative by
describing Love’s entrance into the wage labor market of the West as his escape from the

Baker 172
conditions of slavery in the South, a lateral geographical movement, but a movement
nonetheless from bondage to freedom. Yet Love also uses the conventions of the dimenovel western that sensationalize and commodify his experience of freedom on the
frontier as a wage laboring cowboy and Pullman porter. In the tradition of the slave
narrative, Love’s story of freedom demands he be recognized as human, or be counted as
a fellow free citizen of the nation, while the dime novel sensationalism commodifies
Love’s experience of escaping slavery as a performance of freedom for the pleasure of
his audiences. A tension forms between these narrative strategies. The realism of the
slave narrative clashes with the melodrama of the dime-novel sensationalism. In other
words, Love’s slave narrative as autobiography depends on a form of realism that
convinces readers that the capitalist relation and liberal democracy are capable of
incorporating former slaves as wage laborers and citizens. The dime novel
sensationalism, however, serves as an aesthetic disruption to the realism of Love’s slave
narrative. It presents Love’s experience of escaping slavery and working as a wage
laborer not as evidence of his freedom and inclusion in humanity—a demand to be
recognized as an equal to white audiences—but as a literary commodity to be consumed
by white audiences.
This tension between demanding one to be recognized as human and
commodifying one’s story of freedom to be consumed, I suggest, formally encodes the
role anti-Blackness plays after emancipation in sustaining and reinforcing notions of
wage labor as white labor despite labor’s increasingly full subordination to capital from
1873 and on. The subsumption of the labor process required producing consent and the
commitment of labor to defend capital against colonial rebellions from below. For
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capitalism to expand with the consent of labor, the ontological hierarchy between
whiteness as freedom and blackness as slaveness, or as Frank Wilderson describes as
“being for the captor” had to be reinforced and guarded (2). The generic tension of
Love’s narrative helps us understand the way the capitalist relation depended on
reproducing the slave relation through new means not only for economic reasons of the
hyper-exploitation of Black labor, but perhaps more importantly for reasons of
maintaining the integrity of whiteness as a cross-class position of shared power on which
the reproduction of the capitalist relation rested.
To see how this tension forms in the novel and how it maps this antagonism, we
have to understand how Love’s slave narrative seeks to convince readers that freed slaves
could become wage laboring citizens. As a post-emancipation slave narrative, Love’s
autobiography exemplifies what Hartman shows was the expectation of slaves after
emancipation to see freedom as a gift from the very state and democracy that had
enslaved African people in the first place. As a “gift,” freedmen were under the
obligation of paying it back through obediently laboring in forms of involuntary
servitude, from tenant farming to under-waged labor. As Hartman explains, “involuntary
servitude and freedom were synonymous for a good many of the formerly enslaved . . .
the whip was not to be abandoned; rather, it was to be internalized” (140). In this way,
freedom meant placing the responsibility and burden of overcoming inequality and
violence on former slaves themselves rather than blaming their unfreedom on the ongoing
structures of white supremacy and capitalism. Hartman poses the question many former
slaves confronted, “was the only difference between freedom and slavery to be
ascertained in the choice to labor dutifully, bend’s one’s back joyfully, or act willingly as

Baker 174
one’s own inquisitor?” (141). This indirect form of domination complemented and
reinforced ongoing forms of direct violence the state and white vigilantes used against the
Black community: “consent cloaked coercion, and relations of domination and
exploitation were masked by the designation ‘free will.’ The contract enshrined
involuntary servitude as freedom and reduced the free worker to a debtor, peon, and
bonded laborer” (147). Hartman’s point, then, is that slavery didn’t so much end as it was
continued through new techniques and methods layered on top of old ones. Direct
violence and terror continued with added strategies of fashioning obligation of the still
enslaved.
Love’s slave narrative plot showcases this “fashioning of obligation” in its
representation of his commitment to possessive individualism and investment in free
labor as means of upward mobility. When Love and his mother pick wild berries to sell at
the market to supplement their poverty earnings as tenant farmers, wild pigs eat their
day’s work, leaving them in a dire situation with a day’s worth of labor wasted. Love
shows how his self-motivated attitude overcomes the set-back:
now the fruit of our labor was gone and the disappointment was great. . . So I
said, ‘Well, there is no use grieving over spilt milk. If we had not had them we
could not have lost them, and there are plenty more of the same kind for the
picking,’ Mother turned toward me, and said, with a look I will always remember,
‘My boy, whatever happens, you never get discouraged.’ I did not see the use of
losing courage and I think the only time I weakened was when father died, as he
could not be replaced. (34, 35)
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If here Love emphasizes how his own efforts and attitude produce his freedom, he soon
comes to see the West as the space in which these efforts and attitude will be most fully
rewarded. “On our own ranch, among my own companions my position was as high as a
king, enjoying the trust and confidence of my employers and the homage of the men
many of whom were indebted to me on occasions when my long rope or ever ready fortyfive colt pistol had saved them from serious injury or death” (70). The West appears as
the terrain of idealized abstract free labor, a colorblind free market, in which laborers sell
their skills and abilities in exchange for fair compensation. The more skilled and abled,
the higher the compensation or reward.
Love works as a cowboy contracted to move herds of cattle to market. He
repeatedly emphasizes how his skills at reading branding signs, riding, and shooting
make him employable over others and that he is an irreplaceable laborer. As Love
suggests
My expertness in riding, roping and in the general routine of the cow boy’s life,
including my wide knowledge of the surrounding country, gained in many long
trips and with herds of cattle and horses, made my services in great demand and
my wages increase accordingly. To see me now you would not recognize the
bronze hardened dare devil cow boy, the slave boy who a few years ago hunted
rabbits in his shirt tail on the old plantation in Tennessee, or the tenderfoot who
shrank shaking all over at the sight of a band of painted Indians. (70)
While the West hasn’t given him land, it has given him skills that function as property in
terms of the means of carving out a space of semi-autonomy in the labor market to
ensures one’s superiority over other laborers. By showing this to readers, Love fulfills the
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expectations of the slave narrative that asks readers to see Love no longer as a slave but
as a fellow free citizen and wage laborer.
Indeed, as a free laborer, Love must also prove he is a good defender of property
and enforcer of whiteness. If as a slave he was the chattel, now as a wage worker he
proves that he has switched places and is the free laborer chasing, catching, and
defending with his life the company’s stock against cattle wrestlers and Indigenous
people looking to expropriate property. Love describes how he is fully committed to this
task of sacrificing his life to defend the property of the cattle companies: “It was our duty
to save the cattle, and every thing else was of secondary importance” (54). In both of
these ways of showing his marketable skills and abilities, and his commitment to
defending property, Love works not only for wages but for the status that waged labor
promises to offer, that is, of whiteness. Love’s pride in defending his company’s
property, even risking life and limb to do so, becomes the badge, he hopes, of his
inclusion into this category of free labor as white labor: “We did not care much for
ourselves, as we were always read and in most cases anxious for a brush with the Indians,
or for the other dangers of the trail, as they only went to relieve the dull monotony of life
behind the herd. But these cattle were entrusted to our care and every one represented
money, good hard cash” (63). In this category, the free laborer can make claims to
unenslaveability or immunity from full subordination to capital. The slave narrative thus
details Love’s move from the position of slave to the position of freedom or whiteness, a
move indexed by his success as a wage laborer. He has demonstrated that he is capable of
occupying this position and that this position is capable of absorbing him.
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While his slave narrative works to convince readers that Love should be counted
as equally or many times a more adept laborer and citizen, his autobiography also uses
dime-novel conventions that commodify these his life-experiences as a cowboy and later
Pullman porter. Like Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show, someone Love claims to have
met and know personally, Love sells the Western experience of frontier freedom and
mobility:31
I am naturally tough as I carry the marks of fourteen bullet wounds on different
parts of my body, most any one of which would be sufficient to kill an ordinary,
but I am not even crippled. It seems to me that if ever a man bore a charm I am
the man, as I have had five horses hot from under me and killed, have fought
Indians and Mexicans in all sorts of situations, and have been in more tight places
than I can number. Yet I have always managed to escape with only the mark of a
bullet or knife as a reminder. (103-4)
Dime-novel conventions help Love to commodify his experiences in sensationalized form
to be consumed/enjoyed by the audience. Expressing his life experiences in such a way
works against the way the conventions of the slave narrative signal Love’s successful
inclusion in wage labor. Love sensationalizes moments of autobiography for the sake of
the pleasure they provide. Like how a commodity is produced not for its use-value but for
an exchange-value, these slippages where Love sells his life experiences are offered not
to document the evidence of his humanity as a free or unenslaveable subject but to
indulge his audiences. While it might be easy to say that Love was merely trying to sell
more copies of his narrative by commodifying his life experiences, this is too simple of
an answer. When read in relation to the aims of his slave narrative, these moments of
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selling his life experiences create a strange formal effect. They undermine the truth-factor
of his slave narrative on which rests his demand to be recognized as human, that is, as
unenslaveable in his new role as free laborer in the West.
In other words, the way Love narrates these experiences in order to be consumed
for pleasure troubles the aims of the slave narrative plot which seeks to prove Love’s
humanity marked by his inclusion in wage labor. How can the narrative demonstrate
Love’s successful ascent to positions of equality and freedom when it also turns his life
experiences into objects of entertainment and pleasure? One contradicts the other. Asking
to be recognized as human, as a free, self-possessive subject through his success as a
wage laborer becomes incompatible with the strategy of writing his life as a commodified
performance of freedom to be consumed by readers. The latter labors for the audience,
while the former makes demands on the audience. This tension, however, becomes a
formal symptom, I suggest, marking the history of how the slave relation after the
emancipation continued to underpin the production of wage labor as white labor. The
way Love uses sensationalism to commodify his life for the pleasure of audiences
analogizes the way the slave relation, in which the Slave is positioned through direct
violence as an object to owned, was reproduced after emancipation in order to continue to
cohere whiteness as a position managing the conflict between labor and capital. For as
much as Love seeks to prove through his slave narrative that his success as a wage
laborer indexes his escape from slavery, the dime novel sensationalism dramatizes the
way Love continues to be positioned as a “being for the captor,” or an object to be owned
for reasons of providing symbolic value to white settlers through which the internal
conflicts of class, like labor’s conflict with capital, could be resolved.
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What do I mean that Love remains positioned as a Slave and that the tension
between his narrative strategies of the slave narrative and dime novel sensationalism
reveals this? When Love becomes a Pullman porter mostly because the cattle industry has
shed cowboy labor required for moving cattle to the market, he attempts to convince
readers that his new line of work is an extension of his status as free laborer. There are
long passages when he moves away from speaking about his life and takes on the voice
of an advertiser for the Pullman company and the railroad industry in general. “The
modern Pullman sleeping car is a veritable palace on wheels furnished in the best
materials, without regard to expense, comfort, convenience and the safety of the
passengers being the main object. . . Fine carpets cover the floors, the seats and charis are
upholstered in the best and softest material, while every convenience is provided for the
use of the lucky mortal who is called across the continent on business or pleasure” (137).
He also sells the romanticized image of Western America: “I always say to the traveling
American, ‘See America.’ How many of you have done so? Only those who have seen
this grand country of ours can justly appreciate the grandeur of our mountains and rivers,
valley and plain, canyon and gorge, lakes and springs, cities and towns, the grand
evidences of God’s handiwork scattered all over this fair land which waves the stars and
stripes” (144-5). In these two passages, Love sells status and nationalism. It is in this
commodified narrative voice that he expresses the way his job as a Pullman porter is to
be an object for another, a being for the captor, rather than a free wage labor as Love
wants readers to believe. In his own autobiography which convinces readers of the
freedom he found as a Pullman porter, Love reveals his unfreedom demonstrated by the
fact that he continues to labor for the railroad industry by selling the experience of
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westward travel, suggesting that the railroad company still owns his life not only or just
his labor since in the story of his own life—which he writes himself—he promotes and
thus serves the interest of the railroad industry just as much as himself. His life
experience is treated as equivalent and fungible to the commodity of train travel he sells
in his narrative. In doing so, this commodification of his life experience works against the
way Love maintains that he achieves freedom through his work as a Pullman porter.
What we see in this disruption is how Love, as both a cowboy and Pullman porter
remains positioned as a Slave, even though he receives wages for his labor. His work as a
wage laborer is secondary to his primary role to serve as a being for the captor. He
remains positioned as a Slave even as he attempts to convince readers he is free through
wage labor.
If this tension shows how Love continues to be positioned as a Slave, we see,
then, how Love within this position produces the symbolic value cohering whiteness as it
came to be strained by capitalism’s expansion. For instance, Love learns from his
manager that “the whole secret of success,” of the Pullman porter, “was in pleasing all
my passengers. I told him I thought it was all right about pleasing two or three passengers
but when it came to pleasing a whole car full of passengers, that was another matter”
(133). There is a difference between attending to the needs of individual travelers and
pleasing them as a group. Everyone must be pleased or no one is pleased becomes the
task of the job. While Love says he is there for the money and it is his choice, the role of
the Pullman porter as the minstrel figure is shown to serve to affirm white superiority and
black inferiority, the master-slave relation dramatized in the rituals of the train car service
where white passengers enjoy access to the freedom of mobility and status of superiority
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against the immobility and subservience of an all-black porter staff waiting on them hand
and foot. It is not about exploitation of labor power here as it is about rehearsing the
master-slave relation to affirm the integrity of whiteness at this time.
In another example of this, Love describes how the Pullman porter knows no
boundaries in terms of his dedication to serving white passengers. The Pullman porter
must be expected to serve as an entertainer and nurse to white passengers:
The Pullman porter of today must be a very versatile sort of a person, he must
have plenty of patience, be a good judge of human nature, quick, kind and
observant. Many are the times a gouty and crusty passenger has traveled in my
car, who was in such a bad humor that it was next to impossible to please him, yet
before he had ridden a hundred miles with me, I had him in good humor and
laughing with the rest of the passengers. ‘Laugh and the whole world laughs with
you.’ It is by no means an uncommon thing for us porters to called upon to turn
nurse for sick or invalid passengers in our car, and often have I watched by the
bedside of a sick passenger, feeding him, giving him medicine, bathing him and in
fact becoming for the time being a hospital nurse, and many are the blessings I
have received from my sick passengers, both men and women, whose pain I have
eased, and their last moments on earth I have cheered. And this, dear reader, we
do in the name of humanity and not in the name of tips. (141)
To work in the name of humanity rather than for wages, which elsewhere Love has
emphasized repeatedly is his motivation for becoming a Pullman (along with the freedom
to travel), expresses the difference between exploitation of the wage laborer and being for
the captor. Willing to do anything necessary to please white passengers not for wages but
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for humanity stages the way Black life must remain an object of pleasure and violence
against which the cohesion of whiteness or humanity is maintained. While Love suggests
in these moments that he overcomes the way is positioned as a Slave, where he is told to
labor for humanity and not wages, by convincing readers he is a free wage laborer, the
other moments when he commodifies his life experiences reveal his ongoing positioning
as a Slave. The commodification of his life that render his experiences as objects of
pleasure for readers points up what his slave narrative must conceal in order to make its
demand on readers to recognize him as human, namely that blackness continues to
position him as a Slave.
The importance, then, of Love’s narrative is how it maps this relationship between
producing blackness as slaveness and maintaining the wages of whiteness on which
depended the reproduction of the capitalist relation during a time when its expansion
intensified labor’s conflict with capital. The conflicts of this expansion Love’s
autobiography have demonstrated throughout his story as a wage laborer. The cattle
monopolies treated their workers as disposable, expected them to be trampled to death for
the production of beef as a commodity, or how these same industries used labor-saving
technologies to shed labor, leaving workers superfluous. Love as the wage laborer seeks
to convince readers of his obedience, loyalty, and willingness to defend capital despite
the way capital has intensified its conflict with labor through an increased subsumption of
the labor process. In fact, Love’s story as a wage laborer, from a worker made disposable
and then superfluous by the cattle industry to Pullman porter to security guard for a
California bank, tracks this expansion of capitalism that increasingly moves toward more
abstract forms of accumulation, and Love has shown to have endured it all. Yet the novel
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has made visible that what underwrites this appearance of the resolution between labor
and capital has been the maintaining of the slave relation, which has registered formally
in the moments when Love commodifies the experience of his life he tries to prove is one
of freedom. Which is to say, that the tension in these narrative strategies embodies the
way the slave relation was reproduced after emancipation not only to extract value from
Black labor but to sustain the meanings of wage labor as free labor and thus labor that
consents and defends the capitalist relation.
While Love’s autobiography appears to reinforce narratives of whiteness, and for
this is considered a minor African American narrative, we can see that it’s generic
tension reveals what more serious novels at the time addressed at the level of their
content. Love’s narrative structure embodies the violence of the slave relation in which
terror and force produce Blackness as slaveness, whereas other African American
narratives at the time represented this same violence through manifest images. Charles
Chestnut’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), or Sutton Griggs’ The Hindered Hand
(1905), or Ida B. Wells writings represented stories of anti-Black violence, demonstrating
how its role, among many things, was to ensure the integrity of whiteness as a position of
power in the decades following emancipation and Reconstruction. Love’s narrative
shouldn’t be seen, then, as a divergence from the concerns of these other African
American narratives. The way its formal tension embodies the ongoing role of the slave
relation in maintaining whiteness as the site at which labor and capital can be reconciled
not only corresponds to the concern of more politicized antiracist writings, but it also
offers an insightful view of capitalism’s relationship to slavery, of the wage labor
relation’s dependence on anti-Black violence. That his novel slides into this commodified
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language is the way it shows how wage labor cannot be understood without also
confronting the underlying anti-Black violence sustaining it as free or white labor.
Love’s narrative also forms a third piece to the map the novels of Callahan and
Pokagon had drawn up of colonial and racial dispossession’s relationship to capitalism in
the late nineteenth-century. If Callahan and Pokagon represented how ongoing forms of
Native elimination consolidated settler sovereignty as a site of shared power where intrasettler conflicts could be overcome, such as gendered exclusions from holding settler
power or worker alienation, Love’s narrative illustrates how wage labor didn’t replace
slavery so much as the slave relation remained ongoing as a structurally necessity for
maintaining wage labor as white labor. Love’s narrative reveals how capitalism’s
expansion depended on wage labor remaining consenting labor in the face of increased
exploitation, disciplining, absorption, and superfluousness. By keeping wages white,
wage labor could consent to increased exploitation and overcome the crisis of their
reproduction, thus allowing capital to avoid catastrophic rebellion or refusal. And history
would prove Love’s narrative true: from the turn-of-the-century to the 1920s, European
labor would come to increasingly consent to the wage labor relation through whiteness.
While labor did rebel intensely during this time, these rebellions never became
catastrophic in ways that they could have been if they had been aligned with rather than
opposed to anticolonial rebellion and Black liberation movements.
Becoming the Twentieth-Century’s Hegemon through Nineteenth-Century Dispossession
I have argued that Callahan, Pokagon, and Love map the way dispossession
helped (re)cohere the positions of settler sovereignty and whiteness to ensure the
reproduction of capitalism during its time of rapid expansion. As this expansion increased
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intra-settler conflicts and crisis, the fortification of settler sovereignty and whiteness
ensured that this expansion moved forward without catastrophe. From this we can draw a
few conclusions. The first is that the novels of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love offer a view
of capitalism that is broader in scope than the view some of the major works of realism
and naturalism offer. That is, such works of realism and naturalism focus on the conflict
of the wage labor relation which nonetheless remains an intra-settler conflict. Whether
realism or naturalism map or conceal class relations is of secondary importance to the
fact that their concern solely lies in responding to the changes in the wage labor relation
among settlers and how these changes remade settler civil society at the turn-of-thecentury. Yet the problem of labor’s conflict with capital is only half of the story of
capitalism. It cannot be fully approached without also thinking of its relationship to the
colonial and racial structures of dispossession underpinning it. This other half of
capitalism’s story is what the works of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love have wrestled with
in their attempts to envision solutions to colonial and racial violence.
If in Chapters 1 and 2, Ridge, Ruiz de Burton, and Delany represented how the
wage labor relation emerged from the process of colonialism and slavery creating
ontological hierarchies between the white settler and the colonized and enslaved, here in
Chapter 3 we see how colonialism and slavery were structurally integral to capitalism’s
transition to more mature, centralized forms of production and accumulation. The
colonial relation and slave relation not only continued to deliver the land and bodies
necessary for this transition but also, as the generic tensions in the works of Callahan,
Pokagon, and Love have made visible, helped re-consolidate the positions of power of
settler sovereignty and whiteness in which the conflict between labor and capital arising
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from this new transition of capitalism could be successfully managed. We see, then, how
the colonial and slave relation constitute the capitalist relation and how, in turn, the
movement of the capitalist relation to higher forms of accumulation dialectically requires
maintaining through new means the colonial and slave relations. Assimilation continued
the project of Native elimination but in less costly ways. Segregation, state violence, and
vigilante terrorism continued to make Blackness mean slaveness. This helps answer the
question of how to historicize the relationship between the capitalist, colonial, and slave
relation after the formal abolition of slavery or after the period of militarized conquest of
Indigenous nations. I have shown how the capitalist relation does not supplant or outgrow
the colonial and slave relation but, as the maps of these novels reveal, depends on them
for its reproduction as it expands into more mature forms.
Because these novels represent the role of dispossession in consolidating positions
of power in which capitalism could expand without catastrophe, they also help explain, in
part, why the United States’ national economy emerged as the world’s hegemon in the
twentieth century to come. Arrighi suggests that the United States emerged as the world’s
hegemon because of a few factors. One of the central causes he cites was the rise of
corporate capitalism or the vertical integration of the production process that gave the
United States economy the power to outcompete other national economies in replacing
the waning British empire. It was “the emergence of this kind of corporate structure in the
United States,” Arrighi argues that, “became the effective foundation of a new stage of
capitalism on a world scale” in the twentieth century (302). While Arrighi identifies the
corporate form as the cause of the United States’ rise to dominance, the works of
Callahan, Pokagon, and Love offer a view of some of the underlying conditions in which
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corporate capitalism could emerge at the turn-of-the-century. If one of the primary
features of vertical integration was the increased absorption of labor as well as the drive
to further subsume the labor process to increase productivity, these changes were met
with resistance at every step of the way.
Yet, as these novels have demonstrated, settler sovereignty and whiteness began
to be remade to ensure the conflicts producing labor resistance didn’t turn into
catastrophes preventing the transition to corporate forms of production. For example, it
was Andrew Carnegie, the owner of one of the most infamous vertical integration
enterprises, his steel company, who had revealed this fear of disloyal workers and the
specter of catastrophe. In his famous essay, “The Gospel of Wealth,” Carnegie’s view on
philanthropy was less about what to do with surplus wealth than about regaining the
consent of wage labor, or ensuring wage labor continued to be lived as white labor.32
Achieving this required reconsolidating whiteness and settler sovereignty, and it is this
history of dispossession’s role in doing so that Callahan, Pokagon, and Love’s narratives
bring to light. In this way, then, they also narrate how reproducing the colonial and slave
relation ensured that the rise of corporate capitalism was more easily achieved, thus
clearing the path for the US economy to emerge as the world’s hegemon.
Still, if the generic tensions in the works of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love map
how forms of dispossession created the conditions in which US capitalism could emerge
as the world’s next hegemon, they at the same time also highlight how resistance to
colonial and racial dispossession was always a very real threat to capitalism’s expansion.
Resistance to Native elimination and anti-Blackness destabilized the positions of power
of settler sovereignty and whiteness through which the wage labor relation could be
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resolved to ensure capitalism expanded without facing catastrophic setbacks. If ongoing
dispossession delivered the United States the strongest national economy in the worldsystem, resistance to dispossession held the potential to create the catastrophe that could
have made this rise to dominance impossible. In this way, the generic tensions in the
works of Callahan, Pokagon, and Love that make explicit the way resistance to
dispossession unsettles capitalism’s forward movement, undermine the teleology of the
“American century” to come, suggesting it was never inevitable and always
irredeemable.
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Chapter 4
Recognition, Refusal, and the White Nationalist Welfare State
In the years following the economic crisis of 1929, Native, African, and Mexican
American novelists represented the Great Depression as an event unfolding on top of a
much longer and uninterrupted history of colonization and racialization. Yet the plight of
white workers and small farmers gained attention where the suffering of the colonized
and racialized continued, as we saw in Chapter 1 in the case of Ridge’s Murieta, to be
ungrievable. In The Surrounded (1936), Salish novelist D’Arcy McNickle emphasizes the
disparity between the recent economic troubles of white ranchers and the continuous life
of dispossession of Indigenous peoples in the 1930s. In one scene, the novel’s
protagonist, Archilde, “heard the complaints of the white ranchers . . . but he felt no
sympathy. It made one smile to hear them talk about their troubles” (232). In fact,
Archilde points out that if white ranchers “would walk through Indian town . . . they
would see that one summer was like another. In years of abundance no less than in lean
years, the Indians sat in their dark doorways with no expectations, looking out upon a
world of meaningless coming and going” (232). In The Street (1946), African American
writer Ann Petry points out how the wealth of white families in times of economic
hardship depends on Black female domestic labor. As a domestic worker for the
Chandlers, a white family in the Connecticut suburbs, Lutie Johnson, the novel’s Black
female protagonist, observes that because her employer “manufactured paper towels and
paper napkins and paper handkerchiefs, why, even when times were hard, he could afford
to hire a Lutie Johnson so his wife could play bridge in the afternoon while Lutie Johnson
looked after [the family’s son] Little Henry” (29). In George Washington Gómez (1936-
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40, 1989), Américo Paredes shows the uneven experience of the Great Depression for
Mexican Americans of South Texas: “to the Mexican laborer who tilled the American
landowner’s fields and orchards, such a thing as a depression was beyond his
understanding. He could not imagine a state of things where he would be poorer than he
already was. He had heard about the people of Oklahoma, who were leaving their land,
getting on their trucks and going west. To the Mexicotexan laborer, anybody who owned
a truck was rich” (195). All three novels register a concern that colonized peoples’
longstanding demand for freedom continued to be disavowed precisely in the moment
when New Deal reforms rescue working- and middle-class whites from economic crisis.
In doing so, these authors ask not only why is there such a disparity in the experience of
the Great Depression, but how might literary representation help Native, Black, and
Mexican American communities garner the same recognition and redress?
The literary genre to emerge after 1929 representing this demand for redemption
from the Great Depression was a revived form of naturalist protest fiction, a political
aesthetic, what Theodore Adorno would consider “committed art” distinct from
modernist autonomy.1 As literary historian Donald Pizer points out, the economic crisis
of the 1930s helped produce a “new flowering of the naturalist novel” (TwentiethCentury 14). This revival of the naturalist novel was a continuation of how literary
naturalism had always been an art of the polemic, an art of protest, in particular the
protest against industrial capitalism.2 Works like Frank Norris’ The Octopus, Stephen
Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Street, Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, Jack London’s
Iron Heel, or Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle or King Coal highlight conditions of economic
oppression in ways meant to shock and alarm a reading public. But where the early
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naturalist novel saw only determinism, 1930s naturalist novel sees hope for change. As
Pizer argues, “the basic cast of the naturalist novel of the 1930s” was “the diagnosis of an
illness and the suggestion of a remedy,” and that this “creates an effect different from that
of the naturalistic novel of the 1890s. The concluding impression is not now one of
circularity, of blankness and puzzlement. . . It is rather an effect of understanding and
therefore of an element of hope” (Twentieth-Century 15).3 Working class writers and
authors writing on behalf of the working class turn to naturalist fiction, then, as workerist
propaganda that documents conditions of economic determinism in order to advocate for
the redemption of workers, whether through reforms from the state or more radically a
socialist future. The latter was, of course, the aim of the proletarian novel, which I
consider a genre emerging from literary naturalism, whose purpose was to raise class
consciousness among a working-class readership to help transform workers from a classin-itself to a class-for-itself.
In this way, like the reform or civic novel of the nineteenth century, naturalist
protest fiction of 1930s should be understood as reinforcing the logic of the liberal social
contract. Through documentary description of worker abjection and plots of economic
determinism, naturalist protest fiction showcases for readers conditions in violation of
liberal civil society that the state is expected to correct. Keith Newlin has argued that
naturalists “employed the narrative devices of melodrama as an efficacious means to
convince readers of the truth of their theses and to elicit sympathy for their protagonists
or even . . . to prompt readers to take action to redress social imbalance” (“Introduction”
6). Similarly, Jude Davies suggests that naturalists “interpolate readers as fellow
members of the middle-class and offer them access to the public, domestic, and laboring
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spaces of those who work manually or who are unemployed” (307). By representing
poverty as a spectacle for the reform-minded middle-class subject, naturalism advocates
for the amelioration of poverty but not the elimination of the class structure producing
such poverty. It advocates, in other words, for reforms as a way to prevent class
inequality turning into labor rebellion. As June Howard points out, the representation of
worker suffering as spectacle for the middle-class outside observer equaled the politics of
the Progressive Era and New Deal reforms to come: “progressive agitation consistently
served to channel unrest into movements which did not challenge the fundamental order
of society, that is, which reproduced the relations of production; and one can argue that
their reforms strengthened the position of the powerful by extending the influence of state
apparatuses” (131). If, as Howard also maintains, naturalism anticipated Progressive Era
reforms, we can see perhaps why this mode of representation has a revival after 1929 as a
vehicle for demanding recognition and redress for the plight of workers and small
farmers.
If naturalist protest represents the plight of workers and small farmers in ways
that demand redress through state actions, I want to explore how McNickle, Petry, and
Paredes use this narrative mode to represent ongoing conditions of colonialism and antiBlackness. I argue that these writers use naturalism not so much to demand recognition
from the state than to show how the state will never offer such recognition to colonized
and enslaved peoples in the United States. Their use of naturalism demonstrates how the
recognition white workers receive through New Deal reforms is denied to colonized and
racialized peoples precisely because the legitimacy of these reforms and the welfare state
they create, which maintains harmony between labor and capital, depends on upholding
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projects of elimination and social death.4 They use the very genre at the time most
forcefully reinforcing and appealing to the liberal social contract to suggest not only how
their communities are positioned as the exterior to this contract in a zone of nonrecognition, non-being, and thus outside of the welfare state protections, but how this
exclusion and exteriority are constitutive of liberal recognition in the first place.5 In other
words, it is in how they take the very genre garnering recognition for white workers and
show how it cannot produce the same visions for colonized people that these authors use
naturalist narrative strategies to prove that there is no reciprocity across colonial
difference. Their novels thus make visible how colonized and enslaved peoples’ demand
for recognition from the US state is a lost cause, that the welfare state does not offer
redemption for these groups like it does for white labor because, as a settler state, its job
is to secure settler unity between labor and capital, the integrity of the liberal social
contract, required for capitalist expansion, a forging of a mutuality between labor and
capital enabling US capitalism’s Fordist stage of production. 6
From this, I will demonstrate that the novels of McNickle, Petry, and Paredes
reveal how the welfare state is the project to restore the nineteenth-century dream of
achieving a settler democracy.7 In the welfare state, the security and protections offered
to the Fordist worker, a promise of immunity from disposability and a greater share of the
value labor produces, seek to achieve a permanent mutuality between worker and owner
like was promised in the nineteenth century. Instead of promising workers escape from
their proletarian status, New Deal reforms promise that the Fordist worker will make
gains precisely through the further growth of welfare state capitalism that depends on
colonialism at home and imperialism abroad. The welfare state as restoration of settler
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democracy is not the dream of eliminating class difference among settlers but one of
forging a more permanent unity despite of it. Furthermore, by demonstrating how the
protest novel is a form of asking for recognition from a state and settler public that will
never offer it to colonized peoples, these writers offer models, as I will show, of refusing
welfare state hegemony that comes to discipline and control white workers. Their works
are refusals to seek redemption and freedom in and through the same categories
underpinning the welfare state and Fordist production, namely nation-state sovereignty,
the nuclear family, the industrial collective or “universal” worker, that are premised on
their peoples’ death and elimination.
The Surrounded and the Indian New Deal
D’Arcy McNickle’s The Surrounded tells the story of how the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation in Western Montana
struggle to overcome the disastrous effects of allotment policy, while confronting new
changes in the federal government’s relationship to tribal nations in the 1920s to early
1930s. The novel’s protagonist, Archilde Leon, has returned to the reservation after
working as a fiddle player in the Northwest. He seeks to reconnect with his Salish
mother, Catherine Wolfe and his white father Max Leon, an early settler of the area of
Spanish descent. While many critics read The Surrounded in the context of modernism,
mostly because McNickle himself had travelled and studied in Europe and sought
intellectual community with other modernist writers, I maintain that the novel be
understand within the tradition of 1930s naturalist protest fiction that demands
redemption for poor and working class people feeling the pains of the Great Depression.8
The novel itself suggests that it is the overrepresented plight of white small farmers and
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workers that drives its impulse to document a much longer but overlooked history of
abjection among Indigenous people. In response to the economic crisis following 1929,
the narrator remarks:
If they wanted to see misery and hopelessness let them look around . . . If they
would walk through Indian town—that part of St. Xavier given over to crumbling
log cabins and dogs and Indians, with the high brick church overtowering all—
they would see that one summer was like another. In years of abundance no less
than in lean years, the Indians sat in their dark doorways with no expectations,
looking out upon a world of meaningless coming and going. (232)
McNickle uses strategies of naturalist protest fiction to bring attention to and demand
justice for what are the novel emphasizes very distinct conditions of colonization the
Salish people face when compared to conditions of economic crisis settlers confront.
What are these conditions? Through the story-telling of Old Modeste, a chief and
uncle of Catherine, and Father Grepilloux, the local priest, the novel gives an account of
the long history of colonialism shaping the present conditions of poverty and unfreedom
of the Salish. Modeste emphasizes the role of genocidal military campaigns and the
church in colonizing the Salish. Father Grepilloux emphasizes that allotment was a policy
that further dispossessed lands and weakened tribal sovereignty and not one ever intended
to generate economic prosperity among the Salish people. While Father Grepilloux tries
to exempt himself from his own role as colonizer, he nonetheless makes clear: “‘these
people have lost a way of life, and with it their pride, their dignity, their strength. Men
like Jeff Irving have murdered their fathers and their sons with impunity. Gross-natured
officials have despoiled them, they are insulted when they present grievances” (59). The
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point of these stories is to show that what the novel protests are conditions with a much
longer history and severity than those of the most recent economic crisis of 1929. The
novel’s strategy of representing them, then, has a much different task ahead of itself than
that found in novels protesting worker suffering at the time.
There are two ways that McNickle uses naturalist techniques to protest these
ongoing conditions of colonialism.9 The first is the novel’s naturalist plot of pessimistic
determinism in which colonialism is the overpowering force that robs Archilde of any
choice or agency to be free. As the title suggests, Archilde cannot escape or find freedom
in a world determined by settler colonialism. Initially, Archilde appears as the modernist
figure who finds refuge from the modern world in the primitive, pre-industrial scenes of
Salish land: “He looked toward the mountains in the east, and then upward to the
fleckless sky. Nowhere in the world, he imagined, was there a sky of such depth and
freshness. He wanted never to forget it, wherever he might be in times to come. Yes,
wherever he might be!” (5). Like a Nick Adams of a Hemingway short story, Archilde
finds refuge from modernity in the simplicity of the primitive: “Tomorrow he would go
fishing. He would look at the sky some more. He would ride his horse. Then wherever he
might go, he would always keep the memory of these things” (14).10 This refuge,
however, is quickly shown to be nothing less than a prison, spaces of containment and
unfreedom from which there is no escape. Miscommunication and tragic coincidences
lead to the murder of Archilde’s brother, Louis, and later Archilde’s capture, and what
will be his imprisonment for the deaths of the game warden and sheriff.
The novel’s last scene captures this well in which Archilde embraces and accepts
the inevitability of his containment and unfreedom. As the BIA agent Parker tells
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Archilde, “It’s too damn bad you people never learn that you can’t run away. It’s
pathetic” (297). The response is that “Archilde, saying nothing, extended his hands to be
shackled” (297). For Archilde to passively embrace his own capture completes a plot that
asks readers to see how the reservation continues to function as a prison where the
institutions of the state, the church, and private business police and exploit the Salish
people as prisoners on their own lands.11 If economic determinism is the concern in
1930s naturalist fiction, McNickle represents a form of colonial determinism as the force
underpinning his novel’s fatalist plot ending in containment and impossibility for escape.
To represent Archilde as a naturalist figure fated, it seems, to remain contained and
imprisoned by forces beyond his control attempts to elicit reader sympathy, but not in the
way sentimentalism had done in the nineteenth century in which such sympathy
legitimized the “vanishing” of the Indian.12 Rather, using a naturalist plot of fatality, the
novel demands Archilde be seen in the same way as other proletarian subjects facing
conditions of abjection and thus deserving of state recognition and redemption.
Along with its naturalist plot of fatality, The Surrounded also uses documentary
description to expose conditions of abjection in the reservation. Take for instance the
following description that opens one of the novel’s chapters:
It is muddy spring. A horse carries its ride at a heavy legged gallop, throwing
clumps of earth far to rearward. The trailing dog keeps to one side, leaping
puddles, disdainful of the ooze. Horse and dog, when they reach town, will have
pellets of mud hanging from tips of hair, and the dog will seek a dry spot where it
can lie down and clean its paw. . . The land, on such a day, is barren. Having been
first withered by frost, then crushed by a burden of snow, only the strongest forms
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are left standing; only the hardy pines bear their natural aspect, and they seem
more black than green. Everywhere on the land is the imprint of ruin, dead grass
pressed into mud, and in hollow places leaf forms massed in decay. These are
shells and husks. The juices that flowed strengtheningly were blackened and
destroyed by the first frost of the autumn [sic]. (167-8)
The land is a naturalist metaphor for the Salish people and colonialism is the long winter
that has left the land barren and without, it seems in this description, a hope for renewal
or regeneration with the coming spring. Keith Newline suggests that the documentary
mode of naturalism, like seen here in this passage, is about a didacticism through affect:
“naturalists are more concerned with the symbolic or emotional potential presented by the
‘human document.’ And their descriptions tend to reflect their interest in showing the
emotional resonance of a scene, which they then present to the reader as a spectacle for
amusement or instruction” (106). It is the focus on objects of ruin, death, blackness, and
destruction that evoke feelings of lament and sympathy.
The same documentary mode represents the extreme poverty of the Salish people.
For instance, Archilde in one scene confronts Salish women returning from the slaughter
house with entrails as food:
When Archilde drove by the slaughter house, a mile out of St. Xavier, he saw
women carrying off pots of blood-smeared entrails, and he felt helpless. Once he
stopped at sight of a very old woman who was going home with such a feast. A
battered washtub, filled with the greenish-blue guts, on which flies were
swarming, was loaded on a child’s wagon. The wheels of this cart were of odd
sizes and the whole affair swayed on the point of collapsing. The old woman, in
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her rags and filth, was really revolting, if one did not remember that she could not
help her looks or her condition. Presumably she had not chosen such a life. . . She
had to live without decency, like an animal, with nothing to live for, except
perhaps an old man who was no better off. He stood before her and could do
nothing. (232)
After Archilde asks the woman if she has no food and where she lives, he learns she is
also deaf. “She could not even understand that he wished to help. The notion was foreign
to her, whether she heard or not. He offered money, held it out to her, even pressed it into
her hands; but her fingers were nerveless for lack of recognition. She stood motionless
for a long time after he had gone, gazing at the money note in her hand. What did it
mean? Her old man, no doubt, would shake his head and scold her for being so foggy”
(232-235). Like other naturalist figures of abjection such as Crane’s Maggie or Dreiser’s
Hurstwood, the aging Salish woman appears controlled by her circumstances, without
agency, and serves for readers as an object of sorrow. Like the land left barren by a long
winter, the old woman is rendered a spectacle of abjection for the spectator reader, a
relationship in which the documentation of poverty is about eliciting recognition that
leads to redress.
That is, it is meant to shock and unsettle readers who as a result are encouraged to
support measures of amelioration. As Donald Pizer argues, naturalism was always about
“emotive reportage which asked readers to share in the shock and dismay” of the
mistreatment of the lower classes. Speaking on the strategies of Crane and Garland says,
Pizer says, “the writer’s stress is not on demonstrating the origins of an inescapable
prison but on encouraging the reader to accept the idea that conditions within the prison
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are intolerable and that its walls must be torn down and its prisoners freed” (“ReIntroduction” 197). This documentary description becomes the way of seeing the truth of
colonialism countering the ways settlers, as the novel reveals, look at Indians during the
summer festival where dancing Indians are a spectacle for entertainment. “There was
nothing real in the scene [Archilde] came upon. The rows of carriages and wagons were
bad enough, but that wasn’t the worst. The idea was of a spectacle, a kind of low-class
circus where people came to buy peanuts and look at freaks” (216). The image of the old
woman confronts readers with the pitiable truth of colonialism who otherwise are
expecting to be entertained by performing Indians.
However, to document abjection and containment for reasons of shock and
sympathy, is to appeal to a public and the liberal state to remedy such conditions, the
same state causing such conditions in the first place. By representing abjection in
naturalist language, the novel seeks a recognition productive of redress from the state. In
this way, the novel’s naturalism parallels the same logic of recognition that underpinned
the creation of the “Indian New Deal” with the passing of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934. With John Collier’s IRA, the state promised to move away from allotment era
policies that had sought to break up the land-bases and communal economies of
Indigenous peoples. Moving away from this, the IRA promised to recognize tribal
sovereignty. If allotment policy sought to transform Indigenous people into individual
private property holders, the IRA was a gesture that these former policies would be
reversed by acknowledging the right of tribes to govern and manage their own
economies. Like other middle-class reformers and moral citizens who advocated for
progressive reforms to ameliorate the conditions entrapping workers, Collier sought
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similar reforms for Native America that could bring reconciliation or harmony between
settler society and Indigenous peoples. It was from the recognition of the dire conditions
among tribal nations, its authors argued, that prompted the Indian New Deal, an attempt
to correct the harm done to Indigenous people.
However, the IRA was not a correction but a continuation of allotment policy
through its aim of assimilating forms of tribal governance to serve the interests of capital
accumulation through uneven development between the United States and the newly
recognized tribal nations. Tribal nations could gain federal recognition, aid, support, and
guidance only if they set-up governing structures conducive to this uneven development
favoring the United States and further impoverishing tribal economies. Mark Rifkin
shows how the assimilation practices of allotment paved the way for the assimilation of
tribal governing structures:
reorganization foregrounds the existence of tribes as polities but in ways that
presume allotment-era ideologies with respect to kinship and residency, resulting
in the displacement of existing tribal councils . . . Under reorganization, the sorts
of privatization at play in the previous policy help define the boundaries of
federally acknowledged tribal identity, naturalizing conjugal homemaking and
using the supposedly self-evident distinction between domesticity and governance
to normalize liberal assumptions about citizenship, property, and the work of
political institutions that then are cast as the foundation for native politics. (184)13
The face of IRA policy in the novel is the BIA agent Mr. Parker who sees his role on the
Salish reservation to work with local tribal authorities like the tribal sherriff to indirectly
manage reservation life rather than working with Sherriff Dave Quigley who embodies a
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former “Old West” method of direct violence. At the level of form, it is the novel’s
naturalist mode that encodes the liberal recognition of IRA policy in which it is promised
that the state will offer redress and redemption for conditions Indigenous people face that
violate the liberal social contract.
But as Glen Coulthard (Yellowknives Dene) argues such liberal recognition is a
ruse meant to reproduce the colonial relation.14 The settler state is only interested in
ameliorating conditions it has created insofar as such reforms maintain the colonial
relation. As Coultard explains:
In these contexts, the ‘master’—that is, the colonial state and state society—does
not require recognition from the previously self-determining communities upon
which its territorial, economic, and social infrastructure is constituted. What is
needs is land, labor, and resources. Thus, rather than leading to a condition of
reciprocity the dialectic breaks down with the explicit nonrecognition of the equal
status of the colonized population, or with the strategic ‘domestication’ of the
terms of recognition leaving the foundation of the colonial relationship relatively
undisturbed. (40)
The Surrounded’s naturalist aesthetic is one, then, that legitimizes the settler state and the
colonial relation. By seeking recognition from the state, the naturalist strategy cements in
place the asymmetrical relation between Native life and settler society by calling for a
less violent form of this relationship but not the destruction of the relationship and the
forms of life and death it produces.
The Surrounded, however, is very much aware of the limits of the IRA and of this
logic of recognition. Its political content criticizes what the novel’s naturalist form
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appears to legitimize, or put slightly differently, the novel’s political messaging serves as
a criticism of the politics of its own naturalist narrative strategy. For example, we see
how the novel shows recognition to be a colonial ruse in the allegorical scene of Archilde
trying to rescue a dying bay mare. While riding the just outside of the reservation in a
location known as the “badlands,” Archilde comes across a lame and starving “aged bay
mare” and her young colt (238). Archilde wants to help the ailing mare, but in trying to
catch her, the mare resists and he only ends up exhausting her to the point of death.
Aware that in helping the mare he is killing her, Archilde nonetheless persists: “he had to
show her kindness in spite of herself. It was more important than ever” (240). Archilde
feels responsible for her condition: she is a former work-horse of the reservation that has
endured many hours of forced labor. Eventually catching her, Archilde grooms, feeds,
and waters the mare, but “as everything was coming to a happy conclusion and Archilde
was feeling cheered. . . the perverse creature at the end of his rope suddenly stumbled,
pitched forward, and rolled over. She groaned aloud, a final note of reproach for the ears
of the man who had taken it upon himself to improve her condition” (242). In this
allegory, the bay mare is a figure for Native America, and Archilde, as her pursuer,
embodies the settler state. The mare is disposable and wants nothing to do with what
made her disposable. As critic Alicia Kent remarks on this scene, “He had taken it upon
himself to improve the mare’s condition but fails miserably, invoking . . . the paternalism
of federal policy toward Native Americans” (32). By helping her in spite of herself,
Archilde acts in the same way IRA policy treats Indigenous people, namely seeking to
help solve a problem that the settler state has caused in the first place.
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Archilde sees the mare, however, as naturalism would have him see her, as an
object of sorrow and abjection in need of redemption. In this way, Archilde cannot
recognize the mare’s refusal. While the allegory lays out a criticism of IRA as a ruse, a
ruse of state recognition, it’s also a criticism of naturalist social protest as a mode of
seeing colonialism, one that reinforces the logics of liberal recognition maintaining
colonialism. It is the way Archilde sees the mare as an object of abjection, the way he
feels bad for her from this view of her as abject, that compels him to step in and try to
save her in spite of her attempts to refuse such help. Her refusal makes her that much
more abject in his eyes, leading to the absurd result of his help being the force that kills
her. The allegory of the mare thus demonstrates how the novel’s naturalism, its strategy
for demanding recognition and redress for the abject conditions of colonialism, supports
the very colonial relation underpinning and producing these conditions. The content of
the allegory suggests that the mode through which it is expressed stands in the way of
what this content calls for, namely a refusal of the settler state and the colonial relation.
That is, we are to learn through this allegory that Archilde cannot recognize this refusal
because he himself is caught up in the ruse of recognition: not only does he show he
trusts the state agent, Mr. Parker, and appeals to him for justice, but Archilde also see the
conditions of colonialism in St. Xavier through the lens of naturalism, which is to say, he
sees them as objects of sorrow for which state reforms should remedy. The lesson, then,
Archilde doesn’t learn but the reader is to learn is that killing the mare by helping her
results from this misrecognition or incapacity to see the mare’s refusal of his help as an
act freeing herself from the cause of her demise, which in the allegory, is a turning away
from the state and the paternalism of IRA policy.
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The mare’s refusal is not the only refusal we see in the novel. Catherine and Elise
both enact refusals to recognize the legitimacy of settler law. Catherine kills the park
ranger who has killed her son Louis and Elise kills the sheriff who seeks to capture and
imprison Archilde. Catherine and Elise do not recognize the authority of these figures.
The violence they use against them is in defense of their lands and lives. Formally, these
actions of defense are what drive forward the plot. It is not deterministic forces that create
coincidences of a fatalistic plot. It is the refusal to recognize the settler state’s legitimacy
that creates narrative itself in the novel. Catherine and Elise’s actions put in place the
series of events that lead to Archilde’s capture and naturalist containment. If the
completion or closure of the plot of fatality suggests a determinism which elicits
sympathy, these refusals on which this plot depends reveal how the plot is not so much
one of determinism as it is the result of the settler state crushing/containing defenses of
Native sovereignty. There is no story of deterministic containment to tell without these
acts of refusal or defenses of sovereignty.
Yet, the scenes themselves of Catherine and Elise killing the state authorities in
defense of their own land and lives are not described in naturalist language, nor are
Catherine or Elise represented as naturalist figures in terms of objects of sorrow for
which readers offer pity. When Catherine kills the game warden, “there was no
accounting for what happened next. Archilde saw only the final action, not what had led
up to it. He was near the warden, watching him stoop to examine Louis. Then he saw the
officer bend at the knees. His face was twisted with pain. The old lady had hit him in the
head with a hatchet” (127). Archilde goes on to note that “he could not explain how his
mother had been able to move without being seen or heard. That was inexplicable” (128).
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Catherine’s refusal of the state registers as an action of the plot and not a naturalist object
of spectacle. The same is the case in Elise’ killing of the Sheriff. While Archilde, the
naturalist figure, is helpless to stop the Sheriff and his own eminent arrest, Elise plots her
action beyond the view of the narrator: “what was she up to? Something. Archilde sensed
it. He wanted to stop her. He could have reached out his hand and held her back. He
stood motionless, seeming to hold his breath” (294). After Elise throws coffee in the
sheriff’s face and shoots him, Archilde is shaken and disturbed, but Elise was “unshaken.
Calmly she looked down and if Dave Quigley had stirred she would have been on top of
him. She talked as calmly as she looked” (295). Here, it is the way in which these refusals
of state authority escape naturalist description even as they serve as the catalyst of the
novel’s naturalist plot that demonstrates how their formal role in the novel serves as an
analogy of the political role of Indigenous feminist refusals of settler state paternalism in
this context of the Indian New Deal. Just as the novel doesn’t render these refusals in
naturalist language that would present them as objects of recognition, such refusals relate
to the settler state as illegible actions. They are not actions seeking external recognition,
but are actions internal to the community, a defense of the community through a rejection
of the settler state. They are refusals productive of sovereignty through a turning away
from the state, which is why the naturalist narrative strategy appealing to the state cannot
capture them in its language.15
The formal role, then, of these feminist refusals in the novel’s narrative structure
embodies the logic of what theorist Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (Michi Saagiig
Nishnaabeg) calls generative refusals of the settler state. Such generative refusals do not
“allow settler colonialism to frame the issues facing Indigenous peoples, and this is
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critical because settler colonialism will always define the issues with a solution that
reentrenches its own power” (Location 2850). Similarly, Coulthard suggests that “those
struggling against colonialism must ‘turn away’ from the colonial state and society and
instead find in their own decolonial praxis the source of their liberation” (48).16 In a
context in which it appears the settler state’s recognition of tribal sovereignty will rescue
Native people from the conditions of colonialism this state created in the first place, the
novel registers a politics of generative refusal precisely in the way it represents feminist
refusals of state authority as actions integral to the plot but not representable through the
novel’s naturalist language. In this way, these feminist refusals as actions defending
Native sovereignty, are forms of decolonial praxis serving as the absent cause shaping the
novel’s form. This absent presence inscribed in the novel’s form indicates that Native
sovereignty lies in not seeking recognition but in refusing the colonial relation altogether
as an opening for building autonomy and power that would unsettle this relation in the
first place. McNickle’s The Surrounded uses naturalist strategies, the same strategies
garnering recognition for white workers of the New Deal, to show how the Indian New
Deal does not enable but stands in the way of achieving sovereignty. Sovereignty lies in
the actions of the community itself and not in how the community relates to, or is
legitimated by the settler state. Of course, this form of sovereignty outside of the
recognition of the state is always illegible or disavowed by the state. Yet it appears in The
Surrounded in these refusals that escape naturalism but are what make the narrative
possible.
The Street and the New Deal Nuclear Family
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Petry’s The Street is a naturalist novel protesting the poverty and exploitation of
the Black female domestic worker of Harlem in the 1930s and early 1940s.17 It shows
how racialization continues to position people of African descent in ways that they serve
as a super-exploitable pool of cheap labor, while also filling the ranks of what Marx
called the reserve army of the labor, unemployed laborers shed from the production
process who exist in superfluity.18 For instance, Lutie, the novel’s protagonist, works for
several years far from her home in New York as a domestic servant for a wealthy white
family in the Connecticut suburbs because her husband Jim, like her father, has become
chronically unemployed. Her cheap reproductive labor sustains and underpins the white
family’s pursuit of wealth. Her husband being made unemployable, a member of a
surplus population, serves as the lever driving down the wages of the employed, helping
white business-owning families like those who employ Lutie to accumulate wealth.
Lutie serves as the naturalist protagonist who fights and struggles against
conditions which in the end she cannot overcome. The novel’s plot of demise, in other
words, begins with Lutie very much committed to the idea that her conditions do not
determine her future. As critics of the novel note, she internalizes the “self-made man”
myth, believing that her poverty or potential wealth and stability is determined by her
choices and individual efforts. She has moved to Harlem and rented a small apartment as
the necessary preconditions, in her eyes, for what she believes will be her ascent into the
middle-class: “now that she had this apartment, she was just one step farther up on the
ladder of success. With the apartment Bub would be standing a better chance” (26).
While working for the Chandlers, Lutie comes to believe that if her attitude toward
pursuing wealth were to match her employer’s success would come her way as it does for

209
them: “After a year of listening to their talk, she absorbed some of the same spirit. The
belief that anybody could be rich if he wanted to and worked hard enough and figure it
out carefully enough. . . She and Jim could do the same thing, and she thought she saw
what had been wrong with them before—they hadn’t tried hard enough, worked long
enough, saved enough.” (43) It is the deterministic world set against her faith in
possessive individualism that elicits a sympathy for Lutie. She also sees freedom and
stability in the nuclear family, but is shown to be arbitrary prevented from having one of
her own. In this way, she becomes a pitiable mother. However, while Lutie notes that “all
through Harlem there were apartments just like this one, she thought, and they’re nothing
but traps. Dirty, dark, filthy traps. Upstairs. Downstairs. In my lady’s chamber. Click
goes the trap when you pay the first month’s rent. Walk right in. It’s a free country. Dark
little hallways. Stinking toilets” (73), she retains a determination to escape such
conditions. The novel emphasizes that Lutie doesn’t lose faith in upward mobility for she,
not her conditions, determine her success, “the same combination of circumstances [of
poverty harming other characters in the novel] . . . None of those things would happen to
her, Lutie decided, because she would fight back and never stop fighting back” (57). In
fact, Lutie at one point compares herself to Ben Franklin and invokes scenes in his
autobiography of being thrifty and self-motivated. Lutie believes that if Ben Franklin
could overcome his circumstances, so can she (64).
However, Petry uses this naturalist technique to illustrate how the empathy this
strategy seeks to elicit for Black subjects functions to erase not bring attention to Black
abjection. Petry demonstrates how the sorrow readers are to feel for the destruction of
Lutie’s family is a sorrow not for Black subjects but for white subjects who project
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themselves onto Black characters when readers are encouraged through naturalist
aesthetics to empathize with their suffering. Saidiya Hartman explains how the enslaved
body makes this empathetic projection possible:
the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty
vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values;
and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the
master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign
of his power and dominion. Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body
presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of
suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by
other signs of value, as well as other bodies. (21)
Here Hartman details how the master not only owns the Slave’s body but also his or her
suffering. That is, the Slave’s suffering is erased in its hypervisibility. The master owns it
as a means of cohering his or her own subjectivity. Referring to plantation social
relations, Frank Wilderson points out, “what you find is that the families on these
plantations all participate in the regular beating of slaves—children, wives, husbands. . .
It sustains the psychic health of the people in the first ontological instance. In the second
instance, it gets good sugar cane production out of them—and that could even be
questioned” (24). In a moment when the nuclear family merges with Fordist production,
and it becomes important to further consolidate this form in which the formal wage
worker depends on unpaid reproductive female labor, the novel’s naturalist strategy of
eliciting empathy for Lutie and her attempt to rescue her nuclear family rehearses this
relationship between the Slave’s suffering and the coherence of the life of the master. In
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other words, Lutie’s family is a surrogate for the white nuclear family, and its destruction
in the novel, coded in naturalist language, encourages readers to consolidate and uphold
their own nuclear families in seeing the suffering of Lutie’s. In this way, I want to show
in what follows how Petry uses naturalism to reveal the ways Black suffering enables the
cohering of the nuclear family form so central to the welfare state model and Fordist
production. She does this by writing within the generic codes of naturalism, while at the
same time, including strategies that undermine or block the work of these generic codes.
The first way Petry does this lies in how documentary description of Black
poverty is always coupled with a description of white wealth. This relational
documentary mode disrupts the way naturalism reifies conditions of abjection. June
Howard notes how the imagined reader of naturalism relates to the objects it represents as
the bourgeois subject visiting the scenes of poverty and despair of the lower classes:
the specter of proletarianization itself implies the need for the spectator to slum in
determinism in order to learn through vicarious experience what that repellent yet
fascinating world of the Other is like. The spectator must try out the role of the
brute in order to control it. Thus one of naturalism’s documentary strategies take
the form of a virtually anthropological expedition into the alien territory of the
working class and the underclass. (151-2)
However, Petry’s relational description works against such ways that naturalism
maintains a separation between objects of spectacle and the outside middle-class
reformer, a relationship between conditions and spectator that reinforces the class
structure producing them both.
For instance, after Lutie finds Bub shining shoes on the street to help earn extra
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money, she is upset that he is, at such a young age, is laboring for pay rather than using
his time out of school to study or rest. To understand this injustice, the novel focuses on
the conditions of luxury and privilege of Little Henry Chandler whom Lutie labored to
care for out of necessity to support her own family: “you know that isn’t all there is
involved. It’s also that Little Henry Chandler is wearing gray flannel suits and dark blue
caps and long blue socks and fine dark brown leather shoes. He’s doing his home work in
that big warm library in front of the fireplace. And your kid is out in the street with a
shoeshine box” (67). We also see this comparative description when Lutie confronts a
man murdered by a white shop owner. After a lengthy description of his poverty and
abjection, Lutie imagines how his condition contrasts to the wealthy of New York: “what
did he think about when he passed store windows filled with sleek furs and fabulous food
and clothing made of materials so fine you could tell by looking at them they would feel
like sea foam under your hand? How did he feel when the great long cars snorted past
him as he waited for the lights to change or when he looked into a taxi and saw a delicate,
soft, beautiful woman lifting her face toward an opulently dressed man?” (196). If
naturalist description of Black abjection is meant to elicit an empathy for such suffering
through witnessing and recognition, the relational description that brings into view white
wealth and power through the same mode of documentary language, disrupts the chances
for empathetic projection and thus ownership of Black suffering. In short, the parasitic
outside observer of naturalism cannot own Black suffering when his or her role as
parasite is included in what is documented or made available as the spectacle for viewing.
Thus, where documentary description reifies class identities, Petry’s mode of description
shows class as relational. One cannot see Black poverty without seeing white wealth
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since the former produces the latter. In this relational documentary mode, there is no
asking for empathy, but rather a demand to see how one’s stability derives from another’s
exploitation and exclusion.
If this relational documentary description disrupts the strategy of eliciting
empathy that erasures Black suffering, the novel’s moments of political messaging, true
to the naturalist genre in which the narrator pauses the plot to offer explanatory
perspectives on the themes the novel addresses, ensures readers do not miss this point:
that kitchen sink in the advertisement or one just like it was what had wrecked her
and Jim. The sink had belonged to someone else—she’d been washing someone
else’s dishes when she should have been home with Jim and Bub. Instead she’d
cleaned another woman’s house and looked after another woman’s child while her
own marriage went to pot; breaking up into so many little pieces it couldn’t be put
back together again, couldn’t even be patched into a vague resemblance of its
former self. Yet what else could she have done? It was her fault, really, that they
lost their one source of income. And Jim couldn’t get a job, though he hunted for
one—desperately, eagerly, anxiously. (30)
Here the narrator makes clear that it is the destruction of the Black family that sustains
the coherence of the white nuclear family. Not only the labor but also the
unemployability of Black subjects makes possible the stability of the white family. It is a
parasitic relationship. Here we see, then, how the novel’s content reinforces what its
relational documentary description has already revealed. By doing so, the novel autoreferentially suggests that its own naturalist description reproduces this parasitic
relationship between whiteness and blackness. In fact, when Lutie hires a lawyer to help
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free Bub from his charges of mail theft, the lawyer assures Lutie that he can portray Bub
as a victim of his circumstances in order to gain sympathy from the judge (391). Readers
learn that Lutie doesn’t need the lawyer but he doesn’t disclose this in order to profit off
of her desperation. The novel’s own narrative strategy of documenting deterministic
conditions is the same representational strategy the lawyer promises to use to free Bub. In
such hands, however, it is shown to be merely a gimmick, something instrumentalized to
tug at the heartstrings of a white judge and white audiences rather than a legitimate
strategy for confronting Black suffering.
June Howard also notes how in naturalist fiction lower-class subjects receive
empathy precisely through the way they are represented as passive objects in relationship
to the forces that control them: “The brutes who inhabit determinism are treated as
objects rather than as self-aware subjects; they are merely components of the spectacle
displayed to the reader” (150-1). Petry uses naturalist description to represent Black
subjects as passive objects but in ways that suggest such description conceals or stands in
the way of seeing the presence of Black resistance. This is the second way I identify that
Petry undermines her novel’s naturalist protest strategy to demonstrate how its politics of
representation reinforce rather than reveal Black suffering. For instance, in the scene
when Lutie comes across the man stabbed to death by a white bakery store owner, the
novel represents the attitude of the man’s sister toward his death as one of resignation.
She becomes the object without a say or ability to do anything but endure such
deterministic conditions:
it was as though for a fraction of a second something—hate or sorrow or
surprise—had moved inside her and been reflected on her face. As quickly as it
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came, it was gone and it was replaced by a look of resignation, of complete
acceptance. It was an expression that said the girl hoped for no more than this
from life because other things that had happened to her had paved the way so that
she had lost the ability to protest against anything—even death suddenly like this
in the spring. (197)
Yet in this same scene the novel mentions activity hiding in the open that is nothing like
the passive resignation of the sister. Readers learn that the community has come together
and has a plan of action to defend against such acts of vigilante violence happening
again: “‘white man in the store claims he tried to hold him up.’ ‘If that bastard white man
puts one foot out here, we’ll kill him. Cops or no cops.’” (198). Upon learning this,
however, the narrator continues to focus on resignation and other details of abjection that
serve as objects eliciting pity from the outside observer of the naturalist tale. Lutie “went
home remembering, not the threat of violence in that silent, waiting crowd, but instead
the man’s ragged soleless shoes and the resigned look on the girl’s face. She had never
been able to forget either of them. The boy was so thin—and she kept thinking about his
walking through the city barefooted. Both he and his sister were so young” (198). In
doing this, the novel stages how naturalist strategy of documenting abjection as spectacle
for the reader forecloses the recognition of the presence of Black autonomy.
In the very scene where the narrator directs readers to the details of passive
resignation, the narrator also mentions how the community is already organized and
doing the work of redeeming the murdered man in ways that he won’t be redeemed by
state that has enabled his murder in the first place. As readers come to see, Lutie, passes
by
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the bakery shop again the next afternoon. The windows had been smashed, the
front door had apparently been broken in, because it was boarded up. There were
messages chalked on the sidewalk in front of the store. They all said the same
thing: ‘White man, don’t come back.’ . . . Their faces were turned toward the
store. They weren’t talking. They were just standing with their hands in their
pockets—waiting. (199)
Here like we saw with the feminist refusals in The Surrounded, the novel doesn’t render
these actions in naturalist language. That is, there is no language of resignation, of
pessimistic determinism, and so on. Furthermore, Lutie notes that “there were two cops
right in front of the door, swinging nightsticks. She walked past, thinking that it was like
a war that hadn’t got off to a start yet, though both sides were piling up ammunition and
reserves and were now waiting for anything, any little excuse, a gesture, a word, a sudden
loud noise—and pouf! It would start!” (200). In what appears as a deterministic plot of
demise, such actions of Black self- and community defense hide out in the open,
undermining the ways Black subjects appear as passive objects for which empathy should
be given. In this way, the novel shows how such naturalist strategies asking for
recognition are ones defending whiteness precisely by erasing or blocking the
confrontation with Black autonomy.
In doing so, the novel seems to suggest that the question should not be how can
the novel demand white America see Black suffering or not. It demonstrates how
strategies asking for recognition are lost causes when the same state and settler public
that would offer this recognition are at war with the people whose suffering they have
caused in the first place. In the same scene, the narrator asserts that if only the lynched
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man could be seen as a pitiable subject instead of a racialized criminal, such violence
would not happen: “The reporter saw a dead Negro who had attempted to hold up a store,
and so he couldn’t really see what the man lying on the sidewalk looked like. He couldn’t
see the ragged shoes, the thin, starved body. He saw, instead, the picture he already had
in his mind: a huge, brawny, blustering ignorant, criminally disposed black man who had
run amok with a knife on a spring afternoon in Harlem” (199). Yet the novel has also just
revealed that the same forces to which these more sympathetic representations might
assuage are waging a war against the Black community. It seems, then, futile to think that
more sympathetic representations of Black subjects would compel the same state and
public which commits such violence and depends on it for their coherence to begin to
protect Black life. As Lutie suggests:
Streets like the one she lived on were no accident. They were the North’s lynch
mobs, she thought bitterly; the method the big cities used to keep Negroes in their
place. And she began thinking of Pop unable to get a job; of Jim slowly
disintegrating because he, too, couldn’t get a job, and of the subsequent wreck of
their marriage; of Bub left to his own devices after school. From the time she was
born, she had been hemmed into an ever-narrowing space, until now she was very
nearly walled in and the wall had been built up brick by brick by eager white
hands. (324)
We see how there is no recognition to offer because the state’s task is to keep people of
African descent in positions of social death where their lives are not their own to possess,
making their labor and their suffering available for settlers to own and benefit from.
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A similar disruption to the novel’s naturalist strategy can be found in the role of
Lutie’s anger within the plot of the demise of the nuclear family. While trying to secure
money to pay for the lawyer who can help free Bub from jail, Lutie is forced to ask Boots
for the money. Unkown to Lutie, Boots has been ordered to coerce Lutie into to having
sex with Boot’s boss the white business owner Junto. Boots, however, intends to rape
Lutie once his suggestion that she can exchange sex with Junto for the money she needs,
is rejected. Acting in self-defense, Lutie’s anger surfaces and she bludgeons Boots to
death with a candlestick:
He was the person who had struck her, her face still hurt from the blow; he had
threatened her with violence and with a forced relationship with Junto and with
himself. These things set off her anger, but as she gripped the iron candlestick and
brought it forward in a swift motion aimed at his head, she was striking, not at
Boots Smith, but at a handy, anonymous figure—a figure which her anger
resentment transformed into everything she had hated, everything she had fought
against, everything that had served to frustrate her. (429)
Here I maintain that Lutie’s anger can be read as the defense of a self not recognized nor
positioned as a self allowed to have possession of one’s self, that is, the defense of a body
assumed to be open for possession by others, namely the personhood of the Slave.
Hartman shows how the Slave was made to be an object available to be owned by
others for whatever reason the master desired. The Slave was denied not only the right to
self-defense but the right to have a self to defend in the first place:
The interdiction against self-defense and the inability of a slave to testify against
whites permitted the slave to be used in any capacity that pleased the master or
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whomever. . . the uses of property also included the sexual violation of the
enslaved. The few restrictions placed upon the uses of slave property concerned
only the master’s rights of property. Indeed, the dissolute uses of slave property
came to define the identity of the captive and hence the nature of the Negro. As
well, these actual or imagined usages established the parameters of interracial
association. (25)
Using this lens to understand how an element of making people of African descent into
the enslaved by stripping them of any rights or means to self-defense, we can see how
Lutie’s anger becomes a disruption to the ways her existence itself is owned by a master
class and its agents. Her anger thus becomes a figure for the fugitive act, a stealing back
her body and existence: “Finally, and the blows were heavier, faster, now, she was
striking at the white world which thrust black people into a walled enclosure from which
there was no escape; and at the turn-of-events which had forced her to leave Bub alone
while she was working so that he now faced reform school, now had a police record”
(430). In a plot of demise in which the object of pity for which redress should be offered
is the pitiable mother trying to save or hold together the nuclear family, Lutie’s anger
prevents the closure of this plot. Lutie kills Boots and buys a ticket to Chicago to avoid
imprisonment. She abandons Bub, leaving him with the state. By leaving her son, Lutie
no longer serves as the sympathetic naturalist protagonist in terms of readers seeing her
as one who tried to save her family but couldn’t because of conditions beyond her
control. Instead she appears to choose to save herself rather than her son. Her act of
defending herself, a fugitive act, registers formally in the way her anger disrupts a plot
that would present her as an object of empathy for readers to use to cohere the nuclear
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family. The closure of this plot in which Lutie would trade sex for the money to save her
son, or where she would risk arrest for murder in order to pay to bail Bub out of jail,
would demonstrate a commitment to saving the nuclear family model. That her anger as
self-defense has prevented this is a way such fugitivity registers formally in the novel. It
is what prevents the closure of a naturalist plot of demise that would evoke empathy for
and thus legitimize the anti-Black nuclear family.
It is in this way, then, that the novel shows how the nuclear family—that is key to
Fordist production—is ruse of freedom for Black subjects. This form’s very integrity
depends on not only Black labor but maintaining people of African descent in a position
of slavery, of social death. In her reading of Black abolitionist critiques of the nuclear
family, theorist Tiffany King argues not only that “Black people’s entrance into the
category of the [nuclear] familial functions as a ruse of incorporation that conceals the
historical and enduring surveillance and violence to which Black sociality is subjected”
(71), but that “the [nuclear] family is not a grammatical structure through which Black
people can annunciate their human existence.” (79). A naturalist narrative strategy of
generating empathy for Lutie’s destroyed nuclear family supports a form premised on
anti-Blackness. Undermining this strategy becomes a refusal of this form, and it is in this
undermining of its own naturalist strategy where Black autonomy emerges in the text. It
is the force disrupting the stability of forms premised on Black abjection. That is, without
Black labor and social death, there is no white nuclear family holding together Fordist
production model. Petry thus uses naturalism not only to suggest that the empathy it
elicits for Black suffering is always about reproducing whiteness but that Black
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autonomy lies in actions that refuse forms of sociality like the nuclear family that depend
on Black death.
George Washington Gómez and the Collective Worker
Américo Paredes’ George Washington Gómez represents how Mexicans
Americans of South Texas struggle against the colonization of their lands—a white settler
invasion and occupation—from the early twentieth century to the 1930s. White settlers
enclose the lands, stripping Mexican people of the means of producing their life, turning
them into landless proletarians forced to sell their labor to the newly arrived settlers for
subsistence wages. The narrator details this process:
the American had begun to ‘develop’ the land. He had it cleared and made it into
cotton fields, into citrus orchards and towns. And it was the Mexicotexan’s brown
muscular arms that felled the trees. He wielded the machete against the smaller
brush and strained his back pulling tree stumps out of the ground. For this he got
enough to eat for the day and the promise of more of the same tomorrow. As day
laborer clearing more chaparral, as cotton and fruit picker for as few cents a day
as he could subsist on. Every stroke of the ax, every swing of the mattock
clinched his own misfortune. (42)19
The novel begins by focusing on how the armed struggle against this invasion and
occupation is not only defeated but has prompted a violent counterinsurgency of Texas
Rangers and white vigilantes.20 The novel’s protagonist Guálinto, whose uncle Feliciano
is a fighter in this armed struggle, and whose father, Gumersindo, is murdered by Texas
Rangers in their campaigns against this armed struggle, comes of age in the years
following this violence. With revolutionary activity defeated, the novel is concerned with
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representing what forms of resistance are possible, how can Mexican Americans free
themselves from the ways they have been turned into a colonial proletariat, a class of
worker treated as less than human.21 While the novel is often studied as a novelization of
the corrido and this form’s limits, I suggest it be considered a work cut from the same
cloth of 1930s proletarian fiction.22
Barbara Foley’s study on proletarian literature of this era explains that workers,
intellectuals and organizers “envisioned revolution as the necessary path for achieving
workers’ power and saw literature as a means of arousing and preparing the proletariat
and its allies for their historical tasks. . . According to the leading Marxist critics,
proletarian texts should convey ideas and attitudes that would impel their readers to take
action against existing social conditions—that is, move them leftward” (118). In this
vein, Paredes’ novel represents the possibilities for the proletarian subject, like Guálinto,
to develop a revolutionary class consciousness through the experiences he and his
comrades face in these years when all revolutionary activity appears to be squashed. In
other words, it is from these conditions of defeat that the novel tells the story of how
Guálinto, the son of this revolutionary but defeated generation, can form a new
revolutionary identity that will help guide his people’s struggles to win their land back
and no longer serve as the colonial labor pool for white settlers.
However, I contend that Paredes uses the proletarian novel form to demonstrate
how this form cannot represent a revolutionary consciousness for Mexican Americans
like it does for working-class whites and proletarianized small farmers. Paredes uses the
proletarian novel in ways that show how the class identity this genre represents in the
1930s does not include Mexican proletarians because this class identity is entangled with
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US colonialism even as it might unify wage workers against capitalist exploitation.
Proletarian literature cohered a particular class identity through and from which workers
could make demands on capital and the state. In their criticism of the limits of workerist
politics, the Endnotes collective suggests that the workers’ movement during this time
sought to fashion a collective worker identity in order to secure demands from the state:
“Indeed, the capacity for demand-making in a given struggle may be grasped as
structurally linked with its capacity to draw upon an existing — or forge a new —
collective identity; demand-making and composition are two sides of the same coin”
(Web). Paredes takes this narrative strategy of cohering the workerist identity of the
1930s and shows how it fails to satisfy the demands of decolonization of Mexican
Americans as a colonial proletariat, and in showing how it fails them, Paredes uses this
strategy to highlight the ways settler colonialism maintains a colonial proletariat on
which the Fordist worker, fashioned out of New Deal reforms, forges unity with capital
as a labor aristocracy of the welfare state sharing in spoils of empire.23
To see how Paredes does this, we have first see how his narrative initially follows
the formula of the proletarian novel. The proletarian novel of the 1930s had many
variations. A popular version was what Foley characterizes as the proletarian
bildungsroman. Opposed to the proletarian social novel that focused on multiple
perspectives and class subjects, the proletarian bildungsroman focuses on a singular
protagonist and treats his or her development of revolutionary class consciousness as a
type or figure for the entire working class. “In the proletarian bildungsroman,” Foley
explains, “the trajectory of the plot must render inevitable the protagonist’s development
of class consciousness” (328). The goal behind this narrative trajectory in which the
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protagonist begins as an oppressed worker but becomes a revolutionary actor is to
develop the same consciousness in working-class readers. The proletarian bildungsroman
is propaganda encouraging such readers and their allies to commit to a revolutionary
politics. As Foley argues, “in these texts the protagonist’s espousal of—or at least growth
toward—revolutionary class consciousness embodies in microcosm the change that is
occurring, and must continue to occur on a larger scale, in the working class. The
mimetic encloses the didactic: positioned to identify with the protagonist’s ‘conversion,’
readers presumably carry the text’s implied lessons over into their own lives” (327).
Following the expectations of the proletarian bildungsroman, then, the plot of George
Washington Gómez narrates how Guálinto and his friends face oppression and how their
struggles to overcome this oppression are formative of a revolutionary class identity.
Paredes thus sets up his novel to be a proletarian conversion narrative. The novel poses
and explores the problem of how Guálinto will be converted to the revolutionary cause of
liberating his community from US colonialism.
The forms of oppression most formative of Guálinto’s developing proletarian
consciousness are found at the school. If Guálinto’s father and uncle faced colonial
violence at the hands of Rangers, this violence has been transferred to the institutions of
colonial education that function to fulfill the same goal of maintaining Mexican people as
a colonial proletariat. The school continues to be a battle ground. On the one hand, the
school is where Guálinto is to gain the skills that he can use to help his people:
A great man who would help and lead his people to a better kind of life. How this
would be accomplished they did not know. Sometimes they thought he would be a
great lawyer who would get back the lands they had lost. At other times they were
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certain he would become a great orator who would convince even the greatest of
their enemies of the rightness of his cause. Or perhaps he would be a great doctor
who would go around healing the poor and thus create an immense following. . .
But they agreed that he was not just another boy. He was greatly intelligent,
gifted, and destined for wonderful things. His family’s mission in life was to give
him every opportunity possible to their limited means. (125)
While the school appears as a space of democracy, behind this veneer, it reproduces the
racial hierarchies of settler colonialism. The school is a colonial institution where
Mexican students are to learn how to accept and not resist their status as a racialized
colonial proletariat.24
The plot, however, reveals that Guálinto overcomes such violence to develop a
class consciousness affirming the very Brownness that the education system has
attempted to convince him is a sign of his inferiority and subordinated status. When
Guálinto and his friends are excluded from their own prom because the venue doesn’t
allow Mexican Americans, he refuses to pass as “Spanish” and instead affirms his
Mexican identity. (173). Later at his graduation, Guálinto expresses perhaps the strongest
form yet of his revolutionary consciousness. During the ceremonies, he identifies his
oppressors and what he must struggle against to be free. White settlers,
were the cause of all evil, he thought. All the tales of hate and violence from his
childhood came back to him from the half-consciousness in which they had been
submerged. They came, they took away everything we had, they made us
foreigners in our own land. He thought how there had always been an Anglo
blocking his path to happiness, to success, even to plain dignity. An Anglo had
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taken away his girl, the same Anglo had ruined his sister. Because of the Anglos
he would never find decent work. And even when his uncle had made a few
dollars, and American banker had stolen most of them. Because of the Gringos he
had killed his other uncle. (273)
Here is where the plot of the proletarian bildungsroman would close with the image of
Guálinto embracing working class unity or a politics of communism as the answer to
problem he has laid out in the above passage. For instance, Mike Gold Jews Without
Money closes its bildungsroman plot in such a way. After detailing the hardships and toil
of working class life in New York City, and contemplating suicide because the forces the
protagonist faces seem insurmountable, he, in last scene of the novel, hears a communist
organizer speaking from a soap-box that “out of the despair, melancholy, and helpless
rage of millions, a world movement had been born to abolish poverty” (309). The
protagonist embraces the message completing his conversion to radical politics: “O
workers’ Revolution, you brought hope to me, a lonely, suicidal boy. You are the true
Messiah. You will destroy the East Side when you come, and build there a garden for the
human spirit. O Revolution, that forced me to think, to struggle and to live. O great
Beginning!” (309).
The plot of conversion does not close like this in GWG because Paredes sabotages
his own proletarian novel for reasons of showing how the worker identity, like the one
found in Gold’s Jews Without Money and other proletarian novels, this narrative form
tries to cohere doesn’t include, or cannot satisfy the demands for freedom of Mexican
Americans as a colonial proletariat. This image of the collective worker to which Gold
appeals, the worker of a world movement, containing the rage of millions, is one that the
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worker’s movement itself constructed through representation. “The heart of the workerist
vision,” writes the Endnotes collective, “lay a mythic figure: the collective worker — the
class in-and-for-itself, the class as unified and knowing its unity, born within the space of
the factory. The collective worker was presupposed in workers’ organising and posited
through that organising effort. But, to a large extent, the collective worker did not exist
outside of the movement’s attempts to construct it (emphasis in original)” (Web). The
collective worker was understood to be a universal subject in the way Marx’s critique of
capital suggested that capitalism encloses and break ups precapitalist formations,
absorbing the world’s people into the production process as laborers pitted against
capitalism’s owners. Whatever disparate identities people had before, they could find
unity in their new status as wage workers. In this way, as the Endnotes collective says,
“The class,” as the workerist movement saw it, “came to exist as an abstract identity that
could be affirmed, dignified and proud of” (Web).
To galvanize worker solidarity under the banner of this collective worker identity
in hopes of strengthening the workers’ movement and pity from the middle-class reader
that could lead to state reforms as building blocks for a more radical socialist future, the
proletarian novel featured documentary scenes of worker suffering. Paredes’ GWG
shows, however, how this documentary language of workerist suffering functions to erase
the suffering of unpitiable nonwhite workers like the novel’s colonial proletariat of
Mexican Americans. The pity that builds unity for white workers comes from denying
such pity for colonial workers.
In a series of scenes documenting how the Great Depression affects South Texas,
the novel focuses on the ways white workers receive preferential treatment—how they
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retain an immunity from disposability and precarity—compared to Mexican workers.
“Help wanted. Young white man to help with farm. That red-faced Gringo will get it. No
matter. That’s old man Lilly’s farm and he’s an anti-Mexican sanabaviche. Wanted.
Nursemaid for children two and five years old. Must be English-speaking. No chance for
the old woman there, not a chance. Wanted. White woman to keep old lady company.
Wanted, dependable, hard-working white man” (195). There is also the scene in which
two Mexican workers confront a cotton farmer who gives white workers better rows of
cotton to pick:
--Mr. Kelly, we’re working for you but we get paid for what we pick. Anybody
can see you’re giving those Americans the best rows.
--It’s my field, ain’t it? If I put white folks on them rows they’ll starve to death.
--But we’re just as human as they are. We can starve too.
--Those folks don’t know how to pick cotton. Never puck any.
--How about Manuel’s kids here?
--Don’t give me none of your lip. Get to work or get out. (199)
Here Paredes uses documentary language to show how the wages of whiteness not only
crowd out the recognition of suffering of colonial workers but also prevent class
solidarity between white workers and colonial workers. Suggesting that the Tom Joads of
the Great Depression are receiving better rows to pick cotton or higher wages compared
to colonial workers because their white settler status shields them from the kinds of
disposability reserved for the less than human colonial worker, undermines a strategy of
eliciting pity that builds unity and power only for white workers.25
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It is not that these scenes discount or deny white worker exploitation. Rather, by
undermining the power of these typical documentary scenes of white worker suffering,
the novel exposes the ideological work of such language in the first place: the pity it
elicits is not for capitalism’s exploitation of the worker but for capitalism’s exploitation
of the settler.26 The collective worker identity is rooted in affirming a settler status as a
means of creating unity to oppose capitalism. There is lament and worry over the
proletarianization of small farmers, of members of the petty bourgeois, and for white
workers whose chronic unemployment and precarity during these times appears to exceed
the bonds of whiteness and settlerism.
Paredes reveals how seeing and grieving the exploitation of wage worker as the
universal white worker is central to capitalism as racial capitalism: “You know you can’t
expect to make as much as Johnny Mize. His standard of living is higher than yours. He
needs more money to live on. You can do with less. . . Everybody knows that a Mexican
family can live on two dollars a week with things as cheap as they are nowadays. Now,
do you want that job or don’t you?” (200). Racialization values some workers over others
to create wage differentials and to justify who is made surplus and who receives
protections. For Paredes to use this documentary mode to emphasize how the wages of
whiteness are entangled with a workerist identity of the 1930s-proletarian novel suggests
that class unity will be achieved only through recognizing the ways racialization and
colonization create national oppressions and not through demanding such things be
ignored or come second to the goal of a universal workerist unity. While Paredes use of
the documentary mode to showcase worker suffering highlights how there is no class
unity between white workers and colonial workers, it is in pointing up this very
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asymmetry that the novel suggests from where possible worker unity will arise, namely
from attacking the ways the colonial relation creates two proletariats, one that benefits
from the super-exploitation and disposability of the other.
Paredes further sabotages what we can now see is the white proletarian novel in
the way the conversion plot of Guálinto ends with him renouncing any form of
revolutionary anticolonial consciousness he might have developed in favor of taking up a
counterrevolutionary consciousness, a class consciousness of settlerism.27 That is, the
closure of the proletarian bildungsroman plot becomes a betrayal of revolutionary
consciousness. Readers learn that after Guálinto goes to college, he marries a fellow
student, a white woman who has a Master’s degree in sociology and at one point studied,
“Mexican migrant labor in central Texas” and whose father was a Texas Ranger working
at the same when Guálinto’s father had been murdered by Rangers (283). Guálinto has
used his education to become an officer in the military assigned to do surveillance and
counterinsurgency work in his own border community. As he tells his uncle Feliciano,
“My job is border security. . . If any spying or sabotage takes place it will be by some of
our own people” (299). The novel dramatizes what should be the fitting closure to the
proletarian bildungsroman plot when Guálinto visits his school friends who in the years
since his departure have started political organizing. They invite him to a meeting
expecting Guálinto to return and use his skills to help their struggle. “Today he returns to
us, a famous lawyer from Washington, D.C. I propose a toast for the man who will give
us the benefit of his leadership and experience” (292). Guálinto, however, is there not to
help but to discourage and if necessary spy on their activities.
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What was before a budding revolutionary consciousness has turned into a
counterrevolutionary identity. Guálinto internalizes white supremacist attitudes toward
Mexican workers. “Getting the Mexican out of himself was not an easy job, he thought”
(283), or as he says to Feliciano, “Mexicans will always be Mexicans. A few of them,
like some of those would-be-politicos, could make something of themselves if they
would just do like I did. Get out of this filthy Delta, as far away as they can, and get rid of
their Mexican Greaser attitudes” (300). What the novel suggests here is if the proletarian
novel coheres a collective worker identity entangled with the wages of whiteness and
settler sovereignty, this also means, like we saw in Chapter 2, that such a worker is
required to police colonial populations. By finishing the proletarian plot with Guálinto
working as a border spy, the novel shows how the collective worker of the white
proletarian novel carries a counterrevolutionary identity defined against
insurrection/rebellion of colonial populations. As such, the novel’s proletarian conversion
plot of the white worker has been fulfilled insofar as converting to a politics advocating
for the universal white worker means developing a reactionary consciousness opposed to
the anticolonial politics of capitalism’s colonial proletariats.
In this way, we can see how writing the story of Chicanx liberation from within
the narrative strategies cohering the collective worker as white worker becomes an
analogy of Guálinto seeking freedom in and through the very institutions premised on
colonial dispossession. Paredes brings to light how writing a revolutionary identity of
Mexican Americans through the narrative strategies representing white worker
consciousness at this time, which is another way of saying, seeking freedom only through
workerist approach that ignores national oppression, results in reaffirming the colonial
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relation. Forms born out of and dependent on colonial violence will reproduce this
violence.28 Sabotaging his own novel’s proletarian conversion plot, then, becomes the
way Paredes’ GWG formally embodies how seeking freedom through the categories
premised on colonial dispossession is a lost cause for colonial subjects. In this light, the
welfare state that promises redemption for white workers by turning them into the Fordist
worker, an offer white workers easily accepted, appears as it has always functioned: as a
counterrevolutionary state. It secures a harmony between white workers and capital by
excluding and containing the rebellion of the colonial proletariat.
When read this way, Paredes’ novel teaches us about the role of border violence
in shaping the relationship between the New Deal, Fordist worker and the colonial
proletariat. Revealing how while the white worker might be proletarian, he or she is also
a settler and how this status requires a commitment to police the rebellion/resistance of
colonized people, suggests that a key feature underpinning welfare state reforms and
Fordist production is the white worker’s support of US settler sovereignty at home and
settler imperialism abroad. It is in this way we can see how with the rise of the welfare
state border security becomes an important tool for not only controlling colonized
populations but also securing settler unity across classes through a form of white
nationalism (support for settler sovereignty) defined against the Chicanx and Latinx
colonial proletariats. After Feliciano tells Guálinto, “you can turn me in if you want to”
referring to his former revolutionary and insurrectionist actions against the United States
government, “if it helps keep you in the good graces of your masters,” Guálinto says, “I
have no ‘masters.’ I am doing what I do in the service of my country” (302). Yet as
Feliciano points out this country is a settler nation premised on the exclusion of the
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people it colonizes from its white democracy and civil society. “Does ‘your country’
include the Mexicans living in it?” (302). The border Guálinto has been sent to secure
and police serves as a key instrument of counterrevolutionary violence necessary to
reproduce colonial hierarchies on which the welfare state depends.29 In short, the novel
demonstrates how border violence is integral to the ways the welfare state secures
harmony between white labor and capital.
By demonstrating how the 1930s proletarian novel represents a worker
consciousness supportive of colonization, Paredes offers a narrative that not only sees the
welfare state as a continuation of the settler state, but also locates anticolonial resistance
in the recognition of how the institutions and categories of settler colonial society are not
designed to incorporate/recognize colonial subjects. 30 It is in showing how the very
narrative form that promised to represent, and in doing so, bring about the redemption of
the worker fails to do the same for Chicanxs that the novel maps a path of decolonization
for such workers of a colonial proletariat class.31 Paredes suggests that Marxisms
centered on the white worker, like the view we see in the white proletarian novel at the
time, be accountable to critiques of racialization and national oppressions and thus the
struggle of decolonization, and that this struggle should not be placed second to a
universal workerist identity less workers struggles become reactionary and supportive of
a counterrevolutionary state. Of course, in a few short years it will be anticolonial
struggles—national liberation movements—that put Marxism into revolutionary practice
in ways that white workers at this time throw in with the New Deal reforms and seek
stability precisely through their relationship to capital in this dream of achieving a settler
social democracy.32 In this way, the novel highlights how the stage of Fordist production,
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the arrival of real subsumption, depends on the highest form of consent from white
workers as a labor aristocracy supportive of welfare state reforms and that this is possible
through colonialism at home and imperialism abroad.
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Conclusion
The novels of McNickle, Petry, and Paredes register a moment when colonized
and racialized writers approach the novel form with an awareness of its limits to demand
recognition of the sovereignty and humanity of their communities. If earlier writers of
these same communities, such as those discussed in Chapters 1-3, had turned to the novel
to produce such visions of sovereignty and humanity only to find how the genres of the
nineteenth century fail them in this regard, McNickle, Petry and Paredes approach the
novel much more conscious of the fact that when used within and from the locations of
elimination and social death, it cannot envision the colonized and enslaved being
included or redeemed through categories of modernity that it otherwise coheres at the
locations of white settler possession and freedom. Because of this, we see how McNickle,
Petry and Paredes use the naturalist novel to highlight how a settler reading public and
the settler state, in their goal of maintaining forms of unity and harmony among settlers
required for capitalist expansion, will not recognize the sovereignty and humanity of
Native, Black, Brown communities. In other words, these writers use a form of
committed art—one that at the time had powerfully demanded recognition of the how
capitalism had threatened to violate white workers’ expected immunities from
disposability and unfreedom—to show how the same demand for immunity would not be
honored for colonized peoples. Instead, it would only be met with non-recognition
precisely because the legitimacy of the liberal social contract, or these forms of settler
unity holding together liberal democracy and the marketplace are produced through
structures of Native elimination and anti-Black subjection.
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If earlier writers of this study sought out the novel with the assumption that its
genres could help them prove that their communities be made free in and through the
categories of modernity, McNickle, Petry, and Paredes see such a task as an impossible
one for they know that these categories are premised on their peoples’ ongoing exclusion
and subjugation. It is taking the genre at the time that proved to win recognition for white
workers and small farmers and using it to reveal how its narrative strategies cannot win
the same recognition for the colonized and enslaved that McNickle, Petry, and Paredes
emphasize the role of the novel in legitimizing a modernity that rests on the violence of
coloniality. For such writers, the only use the novel appears to have in this moment is to
serve as a vehicle for exposing the very impossibility of modernity and its narrative forms
like the novel itself. While they approach the novel form much more aware of its
limitations, in doing so, they continue what previous marginalized writers had done when
using the novel, which is to make explicit the ways the colonial and slave relation must
be maintained in order to uphold the expansion of capitalism and the integrity of US
democracy. Thus, if the novel fails Ridge, Ruiz de Burton, Delany, Callahan, Pokagon,
and Love in their task of imagining how the colonized and enslaved can be freed through
the categories of modernity, McNickle, Petry, and Paredes stage and highlight this failure
in ways that point up the importance of refusing and rejecting these categories once and
for all.
It is in this way that the novels of this study serve as an archive in the long
nineteenth century of narrative forms that make visible the irreconcilable contradictions
of modernity in a way that the late modernist aesthetic is valued for doing so in the same
moment this archive comes to an end. Adorno had best theorized this late modernist
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aesthetic. He argued that through the autonomy of its formal structure the work of art
brings to light the social contradictions of capitalist society. If ideology conceals such
contradictions, it is the role of art to spotlight them. In his essay “Commitment,” Adorno
argues that politicized art or works with political messaging reproduce the very politics
their authors’ oppose because the politics of a work of art lies in its form not in its
political message or content. If the formal experience of the work of art is not
autonomous from or opposed to the forms of experiencing the world its political
messaging decries, the work of art, no matter how radical its political message, will
nevertheless uphold or legitimate this world. As Adorno explains, “the notion of a
‘message’ in art, even when politically radical, already contains an accommodation to the
world: the stance of the lecturer conceals a clandestine entente with the listeners, who
could only be rescued from deception by refusing it” (193). Adorno identifies only a few
artists who produce autonomous works of art that do this political work of
defamiliarizing rather than accommodating audiences to modernity. It is Samuel Beckett
and Franz Kafka, who, as Adorno puts it,
arouse the fear which existentialism merely talks about. By dismantling
appearance, they explode from within the art which committed proclamation
subjugates from without, and hence only in appearance. The inescapability of
their work compels the change of attitude which committed works merely
demand. He over whom Kafka's wheels have passed, has lost forever both any
peace with the world and any chance of consoling himself with the judgement that
the way of the world is bad; the element of ratification which lurks in resigned
admission of the dominance of evil is burnt. (191)

238
If Beckett and Kafka create works of art that confront the reader with the impossibilities
of his or her world through modernist experimentation, we can see that the narrative
dissonances of the early ethnic American novel, as I have shown in this study, already
serve as an archive of forms doing this work that Adorno calls for in his theory of the
modernist aesthetic. To suggest this is to argue for a literary value of this archive of
dissonant forms not as autonomous works of art in the way Adorno sees literary value in
the works of Beckett or Kafka, but in the way these early novels through their dissonance
produce maps of the antagonisms of the colonial and slave relation as the structures of
violence underpinning modernity. Where this dissonance prevents images of freedom or
sovereignty of colonized and enslaved people, it inscribes perceptive views of the ways
the colonial and slave relation enable the expanded reproduction of the capitalist relation.
In this way, we should see how not only the novels of McNickle, Petry, and
Paredes, but also the earlier novels of this study, relate to the literary and cultural
nationalisms in the decades to come. The way that their formal dissonances express the
colonial and slave relation as irreconcilable antagonism, that is, as structures of
dispossession producing the cohesion of settler society, corresponds to what the global
anticolonial rebellions of the mid-twentieth century (that produce such cultural
nationalisms) are seeking to overcome in their revolutionary goal of liberation not
incorporation. To see these relations as antagonisms and not conflicts, is to see the need
for their destruction rather than synthesis. This was the political goal of mid-twentieth
century Native, Black, Chicanx, and other Third World liberation struggles: a destruction
of those projects that sought to destroy them rather than the further democratization or
reform of a social order premised on these antagonisms. It is these early novels and the
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way their dissonances make explicit colonialism and slavery as antagonisms that already
produce ways of seeing these structures that call for and support a politics of liberation
through destruction.
Of course, the literary and cultural nationalisms that emerge from these global
anticolonial rebellions and national liberation movements show how the novel takes on a
new role at this later time in its aim of cohering the identities of resistance of these
movements and rebellions. The novel of literary nationalism does not demand recognition
like the early ethnic American novel, but instead constructs identities of liberation
movements themselves, ones that are affirmable and thus help consolidate the (anticolonial) national or class identity of the colonized and enslaved. The novels of this
earlier period before the mid-twentieth global anticolonial rebellions, should be seen,
then, in line with the trajectory of what these international rebellions sought to achieve
rather than be seen as prior works of a period of assimilation that do not offer images of
resistance and agency. These earlier works encode the structural violence of settler
colonialism and anti-Blackness that later literary and cultural nationalisms write identities
of resistance to destroy as a condition of possibility for self-determination of Native,
African, and Chicanx peoples. In other words, these early novels reveal what shortly
thereafter global anticolonial rebellions prove true: not only is the goal liberation not
incorporation, but any kind of incorporation, recognition, or representation within liberal
democracy will only come as a concession won through the building of power/autonomy
among colonized and enslaved people.
We should also see that in our contemporary period of late capitalism and
neoliberal state policies in which neocolonialism and counterrevolutionary state strategies
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of liberal multiculturalism that offer cultural or ethnic recognition to marginalized people
as a way to disavow demands for liberation, the novels of McNickle, Petry, and Paredes,
as well as the other works of this study, serve as prescient critiques of these strategies.
These early novels demonstrate how capitalism and democracy in the United States
expand and progress precisely through the projects of elimination and social death.
Incorporation or achieving freedom in these projects will always come at the price of
furthering the genocide and death of others. In seeing this antagonism, there is a logic of
refusal and fugitivity found in the dissonant forms of these early novels that warns of the
dangers of neocolonialism and other ruses of recognition that only serve to reinforce
colonial and racial power disparities not remedy or overcome them.
It is in this way, then, I also want to suggest that by showing how state
recognition is offered only to those within the sites of settler sovereignty and whiteness in
order to restore settler unity required for capitalist expansion, the novels of McNickle,
Petry, and Paredes reveal how the very aspiration for social democracy in the United
States is always already the desire to achieve settler democracy. New Deal reforms
redeem white workers by upholding their status of settler, someone benefitting from
capitalism in ways that while exploited by capital, he or she nonetheless retains
protections, security, and benefits, a share of the spoils of colonial and racial
dispossession.
J. Sakai argues that the welfare state was created to ensure that white workers
could gain what had always been promised to them in settler democracy, namely the
benefits and power of being included as settlers:
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The victory they gained was the firm positioning of the Euro-Amerikan working
class in the settler ranks, reestablishing the right of all Europeans here to share the
privileges of the oppressor nation. This was the essence of the equality that they
won. This bold move was in the settler tradition, sharing the Amerikan pie with
more European reinforcements so that the Empire could be strengthened. This
formula had partially broken down during the transition from the Amerika of the
Frontier to the Industrial Amerika. It was the brilliant accomplishment of the New
Deal to mend this break. (195)
When seen as the attempt to restore the dream of settler democracy, the welfare state and
the aspiration for social democracy can be understood not as the attempts to bribe
potentially revolutionary workers as much as they are attempts to maintain cross-class
unity among all settlers required for the expanded reproduction of capitalism. That is,
while white workers as settlers fighting for greater rights or even collective ownership of
the means of production—a settler socialism—was a threat to capitalists, it was not
necessarily a threat to white supremacy or settler colonialism. This is why, however, the
novels of McNickle, Petry, and Paredes offer important narrative refusals of the New
Deal and the welfare state. Because their novels reveal how the creation of the welfare
state came as a result of the non-recognition and exclusion of Native, African, and
Mexican Americans, they register the ways this formation is designed to create equality
and thus greater unity among settlers precisely through the ongoing dispossession of the
colonized and enslaved.
In this way, then, these novels help us see the end of the welfare state from its
beginning. In the years following the 60s, neoliberal policies emerge premised on the
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dismantling of the ways the welfare state attempts to redistribute wealth from the top to
the bottom. David Harvey argues that this dismantling should be read as the result of a
capitalist class restoring its power by recapturing the state in response to the success of
workers’ movement of the decades before.1 However, the novels of McNickle, Petry, and
Paredes suggest that the welfare state model falls apart because already by the 1970s the
welfare state no longer does its job of maintaining a racial solidarity between white
workers and owners when after the racial and colonial rebellions of the 60s the result was
the state also extending welfare state benefits to the colonized and racialized, or the
people never meant to receive them in the first place, as was the case in New Deal
reforms of the 1930s.2 If the welfare state no longer promised only to provide security
and protections for white workers as a way to maintain the wages of whiteness, or the
defense of their status as settlers (that ensured their consent and cooperation with capital
allowing for its reproduction and expansion), but instead, because of the rebellions of
Native, Black, and Chicanxs of the 60s, also, extended some of these same benefits and
security to the colonized and racialized, then the welfare state no longer was worth its
cost to capital. Instead, as a way to continue to maintain settler unity and thus the consent
and obedience of white workers, capital would come to invest in mass incarceration and
the expansion of policing institutions as tools for maintaining colonial and racial
hierarchies. McNickle, Petry, and Paredes, of course, already predict this in the way they
show how the welfare state and social democracy were from their inception projects
attempting to restore and maintain unity among settlers through the exclusion of
colonized and enslaved classes to ensure favorable conditions for the reproduction of
capitalism.
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Today, then, when capitalism runs aground on the crisis of its own reproduction,
and its violence begins to carve into populations of white workers who expect their status
of settlers to be protected and backed by the state, it is not a coincidence that the two
most powerful visions to emerge promising to resolve capitalism’s betrayal of settler
unity are nostalgic visions of a return to when settler unity was upheld and defended. One
such vision is for a return to the (white) welfare state where the Fordist worker enjoyed a
greater share of the value he or she produced, and the other is a nostalgia for a settler
republic of the nineteenth century, a recuperation of the dream for something much closer
to what those like Franklin, Jefferson and Jackson had in mind of a white settler ethnoestate. The former could be called a form of settler social democracy or settler socialism,
and the latter a form of white fascism that has always been settlerism in the United States.
McNickle, Petry, and Paredes, however, along with the marginalized writers of this study
preceding them, teach us that from the structural standpoint of the colonized and
enslaved, these two nostalgic views have much in common, and that, as a result, both the
founding vision of the United States and its later iteration in the form of the welfare state
are not going to deliver freedom to all people, and thus should be rejected for a politics
that will—namely decolonization and Black abolition as the movements promising to lay
waste to the antagonisms of anti-Indianism and anti-Blackness upholding a capitalism
that has it out for all of us.
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Notes
Introduction
1

See Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and
Black Study.
2
Works that explore similar questions that my study builds on include: David Roediger’s
Class, Race, and Marxism which explores how capitalism produces and depends on racial
difference; Frank Wilderson’s “Gramsci’s Black Marx” that examines the more radical
proposition that the base of capitalism is less the exploitation of wage labor than it is
white supremacy, a relation of domination on which labor/capital relation is built; Chris
Chen’s “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality” that discusses the ways race and racism,
or the racialization process functions not only to create wage differentials among
proletarians in order to increase rates of exploitation, but also to manage through direct
violence capitalism’s unwaged and/or surplus or redundant populations; Iyko Day’s Alien
Capital that explores how the difference between exchange value and use value,
abstraction of labor power compared to its use value, produces the ways the mystifying
abstractions of capital are racialized onto the bodies of Asian laboring bodies as “alien”
and thus menacing in relationship to the ways white labor is racialized as concrete labor
grounded in use-value. The racialization of labor according to the binary of white
nativist/Alien foreigner obscures the way labor-power as a commodity in capitalism
contains both an exchange value and use-value and cannot be separated.
3
Here I refer to the work of theorists such as Iyko Day, Glen Coulthard, Jodi Byrd, David
Roediger, Chris Chen, Frank Wilderson, Lisa Lowe, Tiffany King, Robert Nichols, and
Jodi Melamed.
4
There are many critiques of Marx’s Europe-centered map of capitalism. See C.L.R.
James’ Black Jacobins, W. E. B. Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction, Cedric Robinson’s
Black Marxism, and more recently Lisa Lowe’s Intimacies of Four Continents, Walter
Johnson’s River of Dark Dreams, Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks, and George
Ciccariello-Maher’s Decolonizing Dialectics. For a succinct critique of Marxism’s
stagism, see Jodi Byrd, Alyosha Goldstein, Jodi Melamed, and Chandan Reddy’s recent
essay “Predatory Value: Economies of Dispossession and Disturbed Relationalities.”
5
See Michael Denning’s “Wageless Life.” See also Robert Nichols’ “Disaggregating
Primitive Accumulation.”
6
Harry Harootunian’s Marx after Marx suggests that because Marx seeks to see the
capitalist relation all at once, his map must totalize or complete capitalism’s movement
toward the real subsumption of labor, which, in doing so, occludes the view of ongoing
and co-present forms of formal subsumption and modes of primitive accumulation.
7
See Patrick Wolfe’s “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.”
8
For instance, the Oceti Sakowin Nation at Standing Rock in 2016 were not trying to
blockade an oil pipeline as exploited workers. Rather, their struggle was one over land
and Native sovereignty. As Indigenous subjects, their struggle was against a form of
ongoing primitive accumulation, an extractive capitalism attempting to turning their land
into a means of producing wealth by running a pipeline carrying a commodity to be sold
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for profit through it. For more on Standing Rock and the long history of Indigenous
resistance against colonialism and capitalism, see Nick Estes’ Our History is the Future.
9
Here I draw on definitions of how Indigenous peoples are structurally positioned within
colonialism and capitalism from the work of Byrd, Coulthard, and Jean O’Brien.
10
See Walter Johnson’s River of Dark Dreams.
11
See also Tiffany King’s work on why the slave is not a laborer, but a subject of social
death in her “Labor’s Aphasia: Toward Antiblackness as Constitutive to Settler
Colonialism.”
12
For instance, there can exist an anti-Black worker-run, democratically controlled mode
of production, just as this same mode of production can exist on stolen land or, in other
words, not be accountable to the demands of decolonization which call for repatriation of
lands to Indigenous people.
13
For Marx, capitalism is accumulation of value through the relationship between labor
and capital. In this relationship, labor produces surplus value for capital and capital pays
a portion of this value to labor to allow for the reproduction of labor. In this way labor
and capital reproduce each other. This is what Marx means when he says above that
“capital has become capital as such” when it “creates its own presuppositions.” Marx
elaborates on this further in Section 7 of Capital, the Law of Accumulation, where he
discusses the simple reproduction and expanded reproduction of the capitalist relation.
The crisis of the reproduction of this relationship arises from the tendency of capital to
accumulate surplus value that it cannot reinvest and to shed labor through its drive to
lower costs of production through labor-saving innovations that increase productivity
while decreasing the use of capital’s source of surplus value, namely labor. Workers
become redundant or superfluous and cannot reproduce themselves through the market
without wages. Capital cannot expand if it cannot reinvest its surplus in new ventures that
can exploit labor. For an extended account of this crisis of reproduction, also known as
capital’s secular crisis see, Joshua Clover’s “Subsumption and Crisis” and Endnotes
collective’s “Misery and Debt.”
14
This is debated if this is in Marx’s work or not, or if it is read into Marx’s work.
15
Settler sovereignty not only distributes the spoils of empire to labor allowing many to
escape or avoid proletarian life. It also recognizes labor to have productive capacity
which is immunity from disposability or surplus. This immunity from disposability,
however, is the right of a settler to demand the state not allow the settler laborer to be
treated like the Indian, the subject who is positioned as disposable and surplus to capital.
Labor consents, then, to capital despite the crisis of exploitation precisely because settler
sovereignty has first promised immunity from this crisis. Labor has only come to agree to
this relation, not rebelled in ways that stood in the way of its reproduction, because settler
sovereignty promised labor immunity from the forms of violence and disposability only
reserved for the colonized and enslaved. Exploitation was always to be a temporary status
resolved through colonial dispossession. The other side of this process of reproducing
wage labor despite crisis is whiteness as the position produced through anti-Black
violence. Whiteness promises wage labor will be free labor, which is to say,
unenslaveability. Wage labor emerges and is reproduced as white labor, which is
immunity from being positioned as the Slave. Wage labor emerges then through this
promise of unslaveability. Workers come to agree/consent to the wage labor relation
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because it promises freedom as unslaveability. This consent is reproduced by reproducing
blackness as slaveness.
16
Notable examples of this work include Glen Coulthard’s critique of Marx’s stagist
account of primitive accumulation in Red Skin White Masks where Coulthard argues that
Indigenous peoples struggle against colonial dispossession rather than exploitation, a
fight over land rather than labor power. Jodi Byrd’s Transit of Empire shows how
Indianness puts in motion and facilitates the expanded imperialist violence around the
world as well as conceals the ways liberal democracy and its attempts to include
“formerly” colonized and enslaved peoples remain premised on ongoing occupation of
Indigenous lands. See also Paula Chakravartty and Denise Ferreira da Silva’s
“Accumulation, Dispossession, and Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism” and
Jodi A. Byrd, Alyosha Goldstein, Jodi Melamed, and Chandan Reddy’s “Predatory
Value: Economies of Dispossession and Disturbed Relationalities.”
17
Jameson writes further that, “the deviation of the individual text from some deeper
narrative structure directs our attention to those determinate changes in the historical
situation which block a full manifestation or replication of the structure on the discursive
level. On the other hand, the failure of a particular generic structure . . . alerts us to the
historical ground, now no longer existent, in which the original structure was
meaningful” (146).
18
Adorno describes works of art that demonstrate this form of representation: “in
expression they reveal themselves as the wounds of society. . . The socially critical zones
of artworks are those where it hurts; where in their expression, historically determined,
the untruth of the social situation comes to light. It is actually this against which the rage
at art reacts” (237). The untruth of capitalism’s emergence and expansion during the
period of these early narratives is the history of colonialism and slavery as its necessary
conditions of possibility. The irreconcilable tensions, breakdowns, and binds in the forms
or ideologies of these early narratives bring this untruth to light.
19
We can see how the early literature of the colonized and enslaved make explicit what
later cultural nationalisms take as a given and that neoliberal multiculturalism wants us to
forget, namely that the reproduction of liberal capitalism is premised on the colonial and
slave relation. For this reason, we should read these early narratives not as assimilationist
texts even if their overt themes did support such politics but as precursory representations
of the antagonisms/impossibilities of liberal capitalism that the anticolonial struggles of
the mid-twentieth century had named and declared to dismantle in their cultural
representations. These early narratives also, then, should be seen as speculative visions
whose importance returns today in an era when neocolonialisms and promises of liberal
recognition try to stand in the way of liberation struggles, or when class-first models
stand in the way by not putting decolonization and abolition first, or suggesting that
communism can exist on stolen land or white supremacy is the effect that will melt away
rather than the base of a capitalist modernity.
20
Here I draw from Ciccariello-Maher’s study of what he calls a history of decolonial
dialectics that challenges Euro-centric forms of stagist dialectics. Coulthard’s work also
calls this “normative developmentalism” in which it is assumed that capitalism
homogenizes all peoples in ways that oppresses them but also creates the conditions for a
worker-centered communism, ignoring Indigenous peoples’ ontological relationship to
land-bases. The refusal of the colonial and slave relation is also then the refusal of
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capitalism’s teleology whether it be promises of liberal inclusion where universal human
emancipation is promised through capitalism or the stagism of a Eurocentric linear
dialectics where workers are redeemed through a democratically, worker-run mode of
production that is only possible by passing through capitalism in the first place where
never is it the goal to return lands to Indigenous people and be accountable to their laws
and ways of life on such lands.
Chapter 1
1

For more on how the working class formed out of what was first the creation of a
wageless or unemployed class, see Michael Denning’s “Wageless Life.”
2
Writing on the origins of modern policing, Kristian Williams points out how the
formation of the New York City police department in 1845 was in response to worker
riots. The police had the task of controlling crowds and disciplining worker behavior in
public: “the greatest portion of the actual business of law enforcement did not concern the
protection of life and property, but the controlling of poor people, their habits and their
manners” (70), and that, “with the birth of the modern policing, the state acquired a new
means of controlling the citizenry—one based on its experiences, not only with crime and
domestic disorder, but with colonialism and slavery as well” (76).
3
See the circular “Vote Yourself a Farm,” distributed by the True Workingman, Jan. 24,
1846 in John Commons’, A Documentary History of American Industrial Society: Labor
conspiracy cases, 1806-1842. Landless settlers of the North and South had “voted for a
farm,” which is to say, voted for genocide and slavery, when they voted for Jackson in
1832 and his successors Van Buren, and Polk, to follow. Lincoln would also use the same
slogan to win support of land reform free soil voters hoping to escape proletarian status
through increased enclosures of Native land in the West, a promise he kept with the
passage of the Homestead Act in 1863.
4
See Judith Butler’s Precariousness Life and Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?.
5
See Marx and Engel’s, “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848).
6
There is a rich history of scholarship on the politics of Bartleby’s refusal. See Louise K.
Barnett’s, “Bartleby as Alienated Worker,” Slavoj Žižek’s “Notes Towards a Politics of
Bartleby,” Giorgio Agamben’s “Bartleby, or on contingency,” Gilles Deleuze’ “Bartleby;
or, the Formula,” Jacques Rancière’s “Deleuze, Bartleby, and the Literary formula,”
Sianne Ngai’s introduction to Ugly Feelings, Branka Arsic, “Passive Constitutions or 7
1/2 Times Bartleby,” Dan McCall’s The Silence of Bartleby, and Russ Castronovo’s
“Occupy Bartleby.”
7
Jamie Bronstein explains how an “equal-rights ideology among American artisans”
during the antebellum period led once artisan but now increasingly exploited workers to
call for land reform: “the ideology was precipitated by the perception that the road from
journeyman to laborer was becoming increasingly difficult to travel.” The solution was to
appeal to settler democracy or what was called republicanism. “Land-reform
propagandists expanded this critique by presenting artisans with the specter of an
unfinished American Revolution, unfinished because there was as yet no social equality. .
. National Reformers appealed to their constituency as a group of citizens, and a call for a
landed democracy as the goal of the unfinished American revolution” (69, 70).
8
The prison has always been a racializing institution. To be imprisoned for vagrancy,
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marks Bartleby’s fall from whiteness. As Brenna and Davina Bhandar explain: “dating
back to the medieval era, and traveling from the transatlantic history of slavery to the
present, the categories of evildoer, criminal, vagrant, and terrorist operate as raced
categories, which work to produce the prison as a key institution of a racial and gendered
capitalism. As many prison abolitionists have shown, the presumed link between
criminality and colour means that racial categories function ideologically to naturalise
incarceration” (7). Nikhil Pal Singh in “The Whiteness of Police,” writes that, “If white
supremacy is understood as a form of group-differentiated power and pleasure that
accrues value, the racial distribution and directionality of the legitimate violence it exerts
over those regarded as ‘dangerous and inconvenient’ publicly confirms it and performs its
most essential work” (1098). For Bartleby to be policed instead of doing the policing of
non-white bodies, threatens the social contract, so to speak, of whiteness itself.
9
For an example of this aspiration, see Horace Greeley’s “socialism” in the Tribune
where he sought to harmonize employers and workers.
10
Graham Thompson in “‘Through Consumptive Pallors of this Blank, Raggy Life’:
Melville’s Not Quite White Working Bodies,” writes that “by having laboring bodies
perform ‘a not very white’ whiteness that never fulfills the whiteness attributed to them
by nativist labor activism, Melville’s short fiction, rather than producing the mea culpa
for his role in the Astor Place riot that Barbara Foley identifies, reinforces a distrust of
political movements whose rhetoric relies upon ideas of class superiority, national purity,
and genealogical fixity. Bartleby and the maids may appear to be white but the iterative
resonances of Melville’s narratives—the preferences for pallid and blank—suggest the
elusive nature and unreliability of this whiteness as any basis either for social change or,
ultimately, affiliation across class boundaries” (40,41). I argue that the story is calling for
a recuperation of whiteness and not offering a critique of it, independent of Melville’s
personal views on race.
11
See Barbara Foley’s reading which contextualizes the role of the Astor place riot in
shaping the story’s politics.
12
Marx had noted this conflict of the settler colony. In Capital, he writes “How, then, to
heal the anti-capitalistic cancer of the colonies? If men were willing, at a blow, to turn all
the soil from public into private property, they would destroy certainly the root of the
evil, but also — the colonies. The trick is how to kill two birds with one stone. Let the
Government put upon the virgin soil an artificial price, independent of the law of supply
and demand, a price that compels the immigrant to work a long time for wages before he
can earn enough money to buy land, and turn himself into an independent peasant.”
(Chapter 33: The Modern Theory of Colonisation).
13
For a critique of the mainstream settler liberal politics of the Occupy Wall Street
movement which drew so much from the figure and politics of Bartleby, see Sandy
Grande’s “Accumulation of the Primitive: The Limits of Liberalism and the Politics of
Occupy Wall Street.”
14
See Russell Thornton’s, “Cherokee Population Losses During the Trail of Tears: a New
Perspective and a New Estimate.”
15
See Castillo and Camirillo who argue, “Forced into a life that was outside of the newly
imposed Anglo-American law,” Murieta’s Mexican rebellion, “was a banditry in the form
of retribution and for the purpose of survival” (2). See also Eric Hobsawm’s reading of
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Murieta in Bandits. For an historical account of Joaquín Murieta, see Bruce S. Thornton’s
Searching for Joaquín: Myth, Murieta, and History in California.
16
For a summary of the question of whether Murieta is a novel of resistance or
assimilation, see Sean Teuton’s remarks in, “The Indigenous Novel.” Readings that fall
on the side that Murieta is a novel of assimilation see Christenson, Lowe, Rowe, and
Goeke. See also John Havard’s more recent study that argues “in speaking for the
concerns of Mexicans and the Cherokee, Ridge advocates for a world in which
exceptional, cosmopolitan peoples of color have the opportunity to rise to the social and
economic rank warranted by their elite capacities,” and that, “against the identity-based
ideologies he saw at work in Cherokee Removal, the laws of 1850s California, and
sensation fiction, Ridge reproclaims the Enlightenment message that access to a liberal
way of life should be open to all” (323, 343). For studies that read Murieta as a novel of
resistance, see Owens, Walker, Alemán, Rifkin, and Madragon, Crumpton, and Cox.
17
My reading of the novel’s formal structure builds on Owen’s early reading in which he
argues, “Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta can be seen as intensely dialogic, a hybridized
narrative within which the author is in dialogue with himself, within which two distinct
linguistic consciousnesses, two kinds of discourse, coexist in a ‘dialogically agitated and
tension-filled environment’” (35). Lori Merish similarly reads the novel’s form in terms
of hybridization: “written about the shifting (inter)national borderland of California,
Ridge’s novel enacts cultural hybridization in its very medium of expression, defying
literary classification and foregrounding the instability of formal, generic, and linguistic
cultural boundaries” (52).
18
For more on the historical novel, see Lukács’ important study The Historical Novel.
19
At the same, by the 1850s, writers like Hawthorne and Melville attempted to carve out
new literary meanings for the romance which rejected historical truth in favor of aesthetic
autonomy. As Hawthorne explains in his preface to The House of Seven Gables: “When
romances do really teach anything, or produce any effective operation, it is usually
through a far more subtile process than the ostensible one. The Author has considered it
hardly worth his while, therefore, relentlessly to impale the story with its moral, as with
an iron rod—or rather, as by sticking a pin through a butterfly—thus at once depriving it
of life, and causing it to stiffen in an ungainly and unnatural attitude” (2).
20
Indigenous rebellion in fact did serve as a backdrop to Ridge’s novel. The Garra
uprising of 1851, that both Alemán and Rifkin take note of in their readings of the novel,
was a multi-tribe coordinated effort led by Cupeno Chief Antonio Garra to kick out and
remove white settlers from southern California. While it was suppressed, it panicked the
settler communities, revealing the instability of settler sovereignty. For more on the Garra
uprising, see Douglas Monroy (197-198).
21
For my discussion of Indigenous sovereignty, I depend on the following key studies:
Joanne Barker Native Acts, Audra Simpson, “Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, the
Revenue Rule, and Juridics of Failed Consent,” Kevin Bruyneel’s Third Space of
Sovereignty, Alyosha Goldstein’s “Colonialism, Constituent Power, and Popular
Sovereignty,” and Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous
Sovereignty Matters.
22
For a history of Indigenous genocide in California, see Clifford Trafzer and Joel R
Hyer’s ‘Exterminate Them’: Written Accounts of the Murder, Rape and Enslavement of
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Native Americans During the California Gold Rush, 1848-1868, and Benjamin Madley’s
An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe.
23
Cheryl Walker argues that Chinese laborers in the novel serve as a type for Indigenous
people “who were also slaughtered in large numbers even when they did not resist” (129,
130).
24
Here I build on a point that Alemán makes when he argues that, “Joaquín Murieta
espouses the very ideals Anglo-Americans lack in the narrative, creating what is perhaps
the most criminal aspect of Joaquín Murieta–he is more ideally American than AngloAmericans are. That is, he earnestly attempts to live up to the country’s social ideals,
even after he realizes most Anglos fall short of them” (87).
25
We see such an example of this pure sensation in the follow scene, which is one among
many in the novel: “Dead men lay upon every side, both Americans and Mexicans, and in
front of Three-Fingered Jack were stretched five men with their skulls broken by the buttend of his revolver, which he had used as a club after emptying its contents, and, at that
moment that Joaquín’s eye met him, he was stooping with glaring eyes and a hideous
smile over a prostrate American, in whose long hair he had wound his left hand across
whose throat he was drawing the coarse grained steel of his huge home-made bowieknife. With a shout of delight he severed the neck joint and threw the gaping head over
the rocks. He was crazy with the sight of blood and searched eagerly for another victim.
He scarcely knew his leader, and the latter had called to him three times before he
recovered his senses” (59).
26
Rifkin reads the novel’s ending as a warning to white readers of the potential for future
unrest among the populations US settler colonialism dominates: “instead of generating
anything resembling a program for change, the effect of the novel’s deferral of (political)
resolution and multiplication of implicit referents is to leave the reader with a sense of the
(geopolitical) porousness of the nation and the potential for violence that inheres in the
existence of numerous conquered, alienated, and racialized collectivities within U.S.
borders” (40). Similarly, Rowe argues that, “the failure of democratic idealism in postwar
California is a social problem that Ridge’s narrative proposes both to analyze and solve.
But it does so not by staging a well-justified rebellion engineered by the heroic Joaquín
and his loyal followers, but by demonstrating the anarchic consequences of this failure”
(159). I argue that instead of offering a positive or manifest vision of a revolutionary
movement, Ridge’s Murieta succeeds in revealing the structural conflicts of settler
democracy. This view, like a negative dialectical critique, allows us to understand what
conditions must be overcome to bring about revolutionary change. To see the
impossibility of the present, is to find a path out of the present towards a different future.
In this regard, I contribute to a point Alemán makes: “Murieta undermines its author’s
ostensible assimilationist position and reveals instead the cultural and physical violence
American ideologies perform on individual and collective racial bodies that emulate
American ideals” (73-74), and “The larger point of Rollin Ridge’s narrative is thus not to
espouse America’s cultural myths but to expose their shortcomings by having the
Mexican racialized body politic perform them” (91).
27
Indeed, already in 1859, Murieta had been pirated and published as a sensationalized
crime-story by San Francisco’s California Police Gazzette. Ridge was upset and
denounced this version not only because he didn’t receive royalties, but because it
extricated the sublime and therefore literary meanings of Murieta as the honorable subject
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deserving recognition and thus respect of his individual autonomy. As Streeby points out,
“the California Police Gazette makes Murrieta into an example of an innate, alien
criminality” (266). In this way, the sensation industry conceals what Ridge’s novel laid
bare: the antagonism on which settler democracy is built and maintained. Although Ridge
prepared a second edition of Murieta that was republished a few years after his death in
1871, nothing came of it in terms of reclaiming the literary meanings of Murieta. Ridge’s
writerly reputation was quickly severed from the novel, after which he came to be
remembered mostly for his poetry until the republication of the novel in 1955.
28
John Gonzalez agrees, “In relying upon the racialized national claims of citizenship
through white descent, The Squatter and the Don demonstrates the dead end of national
allegory in contesting corporate restructurings of everyday life” (166).
Chapter 2
1

For more on John Brown and his raid on Harper’s Ferry, see the biographies of John
Brown from David Reynolds, Tony Horwitz, and W. E. B. Du Bois.
2
Blake is most widely recognized for its hemispheric vision of slavery, or how Delany
stretches the novel’s narrative vision beyond the borders of the nation-form. Paul Gilroy
has argued that “the suggestive way that it locates the Black Atlantic world in a webbed
network, between the local and the global, challenges the coherence of all narrow
nationalist perspectives and points to the spurious invocation of ethnic particularity to
enforce them and to ensure the tidy flow of cultural output into neat, symmetrical units”
(29). Gilroy’s reading of Blake has led to several readings over the years that build on his
initial hemispheric approach to the novel. Jeffory Clymer studies how Blake responds to
1850s legal discourses and cultural meanings of property and commerce. Clymer
demonstrates how Blake attacks essentialist notions in race, reveals the shared economic
interests between the North and South, and reflects anxieties concerning the South’s
imperialist desire to annex Cuba in order to prevent potential slave insurrections in the
Caribbean reaching US borders. Ifeoma C K. Nwakwo’s reads Blake, along with Gayl
Jones’s late twentieth-century novel Mosquito, as examples of US African American
fiction that “view the hemisphere in terms of a potential for collectivity while also
highlighting the differences among oppressed peoples, thus demonstrating that US
African Americans are not provincial—that they too can recognize, comprehend, and
embrace that which is different or unfamiliar” (584). Sharad B. Orihuela’s studies the
role of Black piracy in the novel. Against those who read Delany’s endorsement of
market values and self-help ideologies, Orihuela maintains that Delany’s representation
of the illegal economies of Black piracy serves as a transgressive and potentially
liberating transnational space for Black rebellion and revolution. Andy Doolen reads
Blake as offering a transnational vision of rebellion precisely because it reflects the actual
global borders of US racial capitalism. Through this transnational vision of racial
capitalism, Blake avoids casting the rebellion in terms of a struggle for liberal freedom
and redemption, and thus avoids reproducing the very views used to support US slavery.
3
Scholars of the novel have also attested to its unique premise. Eric Sundquist argues
that, “Delany projected a far more elaborate version of . . . the threat not of secession and
disunion but of African American resistance on a grand scale. . . In this alone Blake is set
apart from every other Black text of the period, many of which advocated . . . individual
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acts of resistance but none of which suggested that large-scale nationalist political action
was possible apart from emancipation and emigration” (199), while Adenike M.
Davidson has argued that Delany’s choice to include a “full Black protagonist, a blatant
disregard for a white audience, a willingness to abandon ‘Christianity’ and Christian
ethics, a move away from presenting either the North or Europe as a haven by centering
freedom in the Caribbean, and by presenting the possibility and necessity of Pan-African
unification against white supremacy” (28), made Blake unique compared to other fictions
representing slavery at the time. In studying why Delany’s novel of global slave
insurrection omits the Haitian Revolution, Gregory Pierrot argues that “Delany defined
his novel as a cultural intervention, a renewed literary model for a new Black American
nation” (177).
4
If Melville’s “Benito Cereno” shows how the nation depends on slave labor for which
the risk of rebellion threatens to destabilize it, Delany’s representation of insurrection
begins from a different set of coordinates in that it already assumes the US nation is not
worth defending. Melville’s layers of irony and ambiguity, which make it a literary
fiction in that it invites readers to read and interpret what Delano cannot perceive at his
own peril, lay bare the humanity and capacity for self-determination of the enslaved,
which becomes all the more frightening for a US nation premised on containing Black
rebellion. Nonetheless, Melville’s story resolves this contradiction between fearing the
enslaved because they are inhuman and human in its turn away from literary to legal
discourse at the end of the story. Douglass’ Heroic Slave ends offering an image of a
successful slave insurrection but that is confined to a ship rather than spilling out over the
land like we see in Delany’s novel. Madison Washington also becomes its captain,
suggesting that Douglass imagines the fulfillment of the Declaration of Independence.
Stowe’s Dread treats Black rebellion of dismal swamp as a form of protest that must be
transformed into a desire for inclusion and incorporation for there to be reconciliation
between the enslaved and white America. Delaney’s Blake, however, forecloses a view of
insurrection, which emphasizes the antagonism of Blackness instead of offering a (false)
resolution.
5
All references to Marx’s letters or newspaper correspondence I take from Andrew
Zimmerman’s edited collection of Marx’s writing on the Civil War found in The Civil
War in the United States.
6
For more on how Marx’s Capital is a conceptual representation of the totality of
capitalism that its forms of appearance conceal, see Jameson’s Representing Capital.
7
My reading attempts to builds on Adenike M. Davidson’s study on the genre of the
Black nation novel. In her chapter on Blake, she argues that the novel not only rejects
“dominant African American aspirations to inclusion” but also showcases “actions of
violence, spirituality, and racial uplift [that] are less in response to political exclusion and
more connected to the forming of a national community, the determining of the best
means for survival and success, and the self-defining of Blackness as a positive
manifestation of the community” (31). In Delany’s attempt to do this, the narrative
problem he creates, I contend, is how to represent the structure of slavery that has
violently made African slaves into a nation or class of people in the first place.
8
If Delany’s goal is to represent mass slave insurrection, to do so, he must offer a global
vision—a totalized view—of the structure of slavery. That is, to borrow from the
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language of Lukács, Blake should be considered a realist novel insofar as it aspires to
map the totality of its world, a world of slavery.
9
On the question of the novel’s formal failures, I contribute to Adéléke Adéè̳ kó̳ ’s reading
in which he argues that “Blake’s narrative structure commands an almost unanimous
negative critical judgment because it combines virtually all the major narrative genres
that have been devised for writing about the Black experience in the antebellum New
World—the fugitive slave narrative, ‘spiritual’ conversion, maroon resistance, Middle
Passage horrors, and so on—without seeming to be able to integrate them” (36, 37).
10
For studies on primitive accumulation see Marx’s later chapters on primitive
accumulation in Capital, Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism, and Silvia Federici’s
Caliban and the Witch. For work that has more recently revisited the term see Glen
Coulthard’s Red Skin White Masks, Jordana Rosenberg and Chi-ming Yang’s
“Introduction: The Dispossessed Eighteenth Century” Rosenberg’s “Monstrously
Unpositable: Primitive Accumulation and the Aesthetic Arc of Capital,” and Robert
Nichols’ “Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession.”
11
Here I build on the way Fanon is taken up in Coulthard’s Red Skin White Masks,
George Ciccariello-Maher Decolonizing Dialectics, and Frank Wilderson’s Red, White,
and Black. These theorists, despite their divergent interpretations, read Fanon’s dialectic
as one that rejects Hegelian synthesis in favor of a destructive, decolonial movement
forward out of the colonial relation. The key articulation of Fanon’s dialectic, as all three
of these theorist highlight, is found in a footnote in Black Skin White Masks where Fanon
revises Hegel’s formulation of the Master/Slave dialectic. If “for Hegel there is
reciprocity,” Fanon argues that in the colonial world, “the master scorns the
consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work.
Likewise, the slave here can in no way be equated with the slave who loses himself in the
object and finds the source of his liberation in his work. The Black slave wants to be like
his master. Therefore, he is less independent than that Hegelian slave. For Hegel, the
slave turns away from the master and turns toward the object. Here the slave turns toward
the master and abandons the object” (195).
12
Historically, for a minority group of Natives who owned slaves, slavery, they believed,
provided a means for achieving economic stability and preserving political sovereignty in
the face of further colonization. Yet the much more common position was opposition to
slavery. Many viewed it as a practice that further entrenched tribal economies in the same
plantation economy that had displaced their communities in the first place. Most of those
in opposition to slavery in the years before the Civil War were also those who refused to
acknowledge the authority of Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the treaties signed in its
aftermath. These communities refused to abandon their nation’s ancestral lands, and, as a
result, were forcibly removed by the US military and made to march West, with many
dying along the way. Patrick Wolfe has pointed out how slavery among the Choctaw
became the sign of permanence and economic stability that accelerated the South’s
genocidal campaign to forcibly relocate tribes (396). Slavery had created a strong
division among members of the Southeastern tribes, one that would not only intensify in
the years leading up to and during the Civil War, but also in the years that followed. For
notable studies on the role of slavery in the history of the Southeastern Tribes, see
Barbara Krauthamer, Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and
Citizenship in the Native American South, Tiya Miles, The House on Diamond Hill: A
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Cherokee Plantation Story, and Jodi Byrd’s Chapter 4 “Cherokee Freedman, Internal
Colonialism, and the Racialization of Citizenship” in Transit of Empire.
13
For more on how settler colonialism and slavery emerged as interlocking structures of
domination see Iyko Day, “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, AntiBlackness, and Settler
Colonial Critique.” and Justin Leroy, “Black History in Occupied Territory: On the
Entanglements of Slavery and Settler Colonialism.”
14
As Johnson argues, the economic crisis of 1837 drove plantation imperialism in ways
that led to wars of conquest with Mexico—first in the invasion and seizure of the lands
that became Texas and then the greater Southwest. See Johnson’s Chapter 11 on William
Walker’s invasion and occupation of Nicaragua in River of Dark Dreams, and for a
history of US filibustering in Cuba see Rodrigo Lazo’s Writing to Cuba: Filibustering
and Cuban Exiles in the United States and Tom Chaffin’s Fatal Glory: Narciso López
and the First Clandestine U.S. War against Cuba, or Robert May’s Manifest Destiny’s
Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America.
15
See Johnson’s analysis of filibustering as the South’s way to acquire cheap lands for
aggrieved poor whites (381-389).
16
For more on racial dispossession and speculation see Brenna Bhandar’s “Property,
Law, and Race: Modes of Abstraction.”
17
Johnson also notes that by the 1850s, the South was calling for Atlantic slave trade to
be re-opened as a way to lower the prices of slaves, making it easier for propertyless
whites to become slaveholders (407- 418).
18
Here I agree and build on Doolen’s point that “Delany’s critique defines the
[American] Revolution as a failure that cannot serve as the ideological origin for a Black
independence struggle that exceeds national time and space” (157). Katy Chiles offers a
similar understanding of Delany’s critique of the limits of the US nation, arguing that the
uneven and discontinuous intratextuality of Blake’s serial print form allegorizes the
uneven, contradictory, and fraught experience of the US nation as a project compromised
by the alternative temporalities of its minority/subaltern populations.
19
Marx shared a similar fear that Northern white workers might become formally
enslaved if the South’s economy expanded. He writes in an article, “The Civil War in the
United States,” published in Die Presse, November 7, 1861: “The slave system would
infect the whole Union. In the northern states, where Negro slavery is unworkable in
practice, the white working class would be gradually depressed to the level of helotry.
This would be in accord with the loudly proclaimed principle that only certain races are
capable of freedom, and that as in the South the real labor is the lot of the Negro, so in the
North it is the lot of the German and the Irishman, or their direct descendants” (61).
20
See also Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness and Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War which offer a history of
slavery’s role in the labor politics of white workers of the nineteenth century.
21
Labor reformers often compared white workers to the enslaved in order to emphasize
how the inequality of wage labor threatened to break the promises of a white democracy
rather than to raise concerns over the mistreatment and oppression of the enslaved. An
illustrative example of this can be found in labor reform leader George Evans address to
abolitionist Gerrit Smith in the Working Man’s Journal, 1844: “I know that families
cannot be separated by force among the whites, as they are among the Blacks, and I say
this is an abuse that ought to be speedily abated at the South; but does not the white poor
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man suffer even in this respect almost as much as the Black? See how families are
separated even under the present system; not, indeed, by brute force, but, with equal
effect, by the lash of want” (361).
22
For more on the consolidation and expansion of whiteness and the nation-form after the
Revolutionary war, see Maggie M. Sale’s The Slumbering Volcano: American Slave Ship
Revolts and the Production of Rebellious Masculinity. Sale argues that “the rise of
racialist discourse on white supremacy in the nineteenth century constituted a new—
different from distinctions between those already free and those enslaved—in which the
inclusionary potential of the discourse of national identity was simultaneously expanded
[for whites] and limited [for non-whites]” (9).
23
For instance, Roediger writes that “in the brutal, Columbia, Pennsylvania race riot of
1834, defenders of the white rioters modelled their appeal directly on the Declaration of
Independence, charging a plot by employers and abolitionists to open new trades to
Blacks, and ‘to break down the distinctive barrier between the colors that the poor whites
may gradually sink into the degraded condition of the Negroes—that, like them, they may
be slaves and tools” (58). White labor fought for improved conditions and greater power
not by weakening capital but by upholding racial difference.
24
In their studies of slavery, both Eugene Genovese and Orlando Patterson emphasize
that direct force was the principle mechanism upholding the master-slave relation in the
South. As Patterson puts it, “There is absolutely no evidence from the long and dismal
annals of slavery to suggest that any group of slaves ever internalized the conception of
degradation held by their masters” (97). Wilderson also emphasizes that unlike the wage
laborer, “consent is never a constituent element of the slave relation” (Introduction to
Afro-pessimism 24).
25
For an alternative reading of Delany’s critique of liberal humanism see Britt Rusert’s
new materialist study of Blake in which Rusert argues that the novel represents a
“fugitive science,” or object-centered, nonhuman understanding of personhood which
subverted and defied the race essentialist views housed in nineteenth-century liberal
humanism.
26
Rebecca S. Biggio argues that “Delany’s approach to the novel was informed by his
belief that the threat of Black community was more frightening to whites than the threat
of Black violence, because community among Blacks, both locally and on a national
scale, fundamentally undermined the system of slavery by creating a place, albeit
unsteady, where slaves could see themselves as something more than ‘socially dead,’ and
with capital and resources for the struggle ahead” (440).
27
For important studies on the relationship between white supremacy and class, see Ted
Allen’s Invention of the White Race, Du Bois’ “White Worker” in Black Reconstruction,
Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class, David Roediger’s Wage of Whiteness, Noel
Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White, and Joel Olson’s The Abolition of White
Democracy.
28
My point is that one possible reason why Delany has an interest in focusing on Cuba,
apart from its importance in the South’s expansionist desires of the 1850s, is that unlike
in the South, Cuba didn’t have a large free white population working to police the
enslaved. This allows Delany to imagine what cannot be imagined in the South, namely
the enslaved receiving help from those who were not only non-enslaved but also nonslaveholders.
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29

Here my reading of Cuba adds to but also diverges from scholars Robert Levine and
Gregg Crane who also focus on its significance in their readings of the novel. Levine
argues that Blake’s leadership role in Cuba offered white audiences who feared violent
slave rebellion, “an image not of Black homicidal fury but of responsible Black
leadership. The hopeful suggestion of such a possible ending, then, would have been that
the elevation of Delany’s heroic surrogate would contribute to the emancipation and
elevation of Blacks in the United States” (216). Crane has maintained that the Black
community envisioned in Cuba fulfills the very ideals of US liberal democracy that white
Americans have violated: “In contrast to the ‘white’ definition of the American ‘political
community’ through reference to the past ‘custom and policy of the country’ and a
national interest in racial dominion, parallel ‘Black conversations’ in Blake develop an
African American alternative—creating a pluralistic community and determining
individual rights through a present dialogue that discovers and establishes a civic
consensus” (540).
30
One of the foundational studies of Afro-pessimism, Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection
points out how “emancipation appears less the grand event of liberation than a point of
transition between modes of servitude and racial subjection. As well, it leads us to
question whether the rights of man and citizen are realizable or whether the appellation
‘human’ can be borne equally by all” (6).
31
For more on how Black rebellion shaped capital’s form and the political structures of
the United States as a counterrevolutionary formation see, Gerald Horne’s The
Counterrevolution of 1776.
32
As Wilderson succinctly puts it in Red, White, and Black, “If workers can buy a loaf of
bread, they can also buy a slave” (13). See also Wilderson’s “Gramsci’s Black Marx.”
33
Roediger tracks how white labor reformers began to turn away from using the
discourse of white slavery in their critiques of wage labor. Instead, white free labor
became the designation taken up to describe white labor of the North. The reason for this
shift had to with the expansion of wage labor and the consolidation of whiteness. As
Roediger explains, “To ask workers to sustain comparisons of themselves and Blacks
slaves violated at once their republican pride and their sense of whiteness,” (86) and that
“the defense of the free white labor, around which the Republican party gained ground in
the 1850s and to which opposing parties also sought to appeal, succeeded among white
workers because it better appealed to the values of herrenvolk republicanism than did
either the languages of white slavery or of abolitionism” (87).
34
A debate existed between abolitionists and labor reformers on the question of white
labor’s relationship to slavery. George Evans and Horace Greeley had argued that white
slavery was a more serious form of slavery and thus should be addressed first and
foremost, accusing abolitionists ignoring the plight of white workers closer to home than
the far off the enslaved of the South. Abolitionists, like Wendell Phillips, countered that
slavery could not even be compared to “white slavery” of the North and that efforts
should be made to free the enslaved of the South alongside reforming wage labor of the
North.
35
Similar stagist views of wage labor had circulated in debates on labor reform, abolition,
and slavery at mid-century. For instance, Brownson, like many, had argued that the
injustices of wage labor should be addressed before sympathy and action be taken on
behalf of the enslaved because slavery was already on course or fated to give way to
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wage labor. As he writes, “could the abolitionists effect all they propose, they would do
the slave no service. Should emancipation work as well as they say, still it would do the
slave no good. He would be a slave still, although with the title and cares of a freeman. If
then we had no constitutional objections to abolitionism, we could not, for the reason
here implied, be abolitionists. The slave system, however, in name and form, is gradually
disappearing from Christendom. It will not subsist much longer. But its place is taken by
the system of labor at wages, and this system, we hold, is no improvement upon the one it
supplants. Nevertheless, the system of wages will triumph. It is the system which in name
sounds honester than slavery, and in sub stance is more profitable to the master. It yields
the wages of iniquity, without its opprobium. It will therefore supplant slavery, and be
sustained— for a time” [sic] (12). Marx inverts the position taken up by Brownson by
suggesting that the emancipation of the enslaved gives life to the dialectical movement
wage labor’s battle with capital.
36
Here I hope to contribute to the work of C. L. R. James, Lisa Lowe, Cedric Robinson,
Ciccariello-Maher, Coulthard, and Wilderson who, in divergent ways, offer critiques that
attempt to decolonize Marx and Marxism’s dialectical stagism.
37
For an extended analysis on Douglass’ confrontation with Covey as a decolonial
praxis, see Ciccariello-Maher’s conclusion in Decolonizing Dialectics.
Chapter 3
1

See Philip S. Foner’s The Great Labor Uprising of 1877 and David O. Stowell’s Streets,
Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877.
2
Arrighi argues that because corporate capitalism or vertical integration emerged first in
the United States it was able to supplant the British Empire as the next world hegemon, a
process that began with the 1873 crisis. See also Alan Trachtenberg’s The Incorporation
of America.
3
This absorption of labor resulted from the drive of capital to restructure the labor
process to increase productivity. It was at this time, in other words, that the labor process
begins to be reorganized from a process producing what Marx calls relative surplus value
to the process of producing absolute surplus value. Instead of merely extending the work
day to extract further value from workers’ labor, capital reorganizes labor and machinery
within the production process to increase rates of exploitation. This difference between
absolute and relative surplus value is also understood as the difference between formal
and real subsumption of labor in capital. For more on this, see Marx’s Section 7 on the
Law of Accumulation in Capital.
4
Many understood this crisis in terms of the closing of the frontier in North America.
Fredrick Jackson Turner best captured this sentiment in his “Frontier Thesis” (1893). If
expansion had provided the life-blood to settler democracy, opportunities to acquire land
through conquest have reached an end: “since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed
into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for opportunity, and
the people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which
has not only been open but has even been forced upon them. . . But never again will such
gifts of free land offer themselves” (37). Without this access to land as property, the
power of settler democracy as settler sovereignty to overcome labor’s conflict with
capital appears in crisis since “the most important effect of the frontier has been in the
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promotion of democracy here and in Europe” (30). Turner defines democracy as a settler
popular sovereignty in which access to land through Indian removal gives settlers
leverage to curb the power of capital and a centralized state. Frontier anxiety, then, was
the fear that capital had strained, to the point of breaking, a cross-class alliance, formed in
the antebellum years and reconsolidated during Reconstruction, between white labor and
capital on which depended liberal democracy’s coherence and expansion. The closing of
the frontier, or the sign of less chances to escape proletarian life through stolen land,
signaled the potential breakdown of settler sovereignty as site of shared power/benefits
among settlers. It was this position of counterrevolution that Turner’s “Frontier Thesis”
had suggested created unity among a settler class: “the effect of the Indian frontier was a
consolidating agent in our history is important. From the close of the seventeenth century
various intercolonial congresses have been called to treat with Indians and establish
common measures of defense. Particularism was strongest in colonies with no Indian
frontier. This frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union” (15). “The
Indian was a common danger,” writes Turner, “demanding united action. . . It is evident
that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated by the previous
cooperation in the regulation of the frontier. In this connection may be mentioned the
importance of the frontier, from that day to this, as a military training school, keeping
alive the power of resistance to aggression, and developing the stalwart and rugged
qualities of the frontiersman” (15).
5
The expectation of property can be understood as the assumed right of all settlers to
possess and benefit from settler sovereignty. Nick Estes argues that this expectation of
property functions as a “fiction of ‘freedom’ . . . equaling political and capital
enfranchisement, [that] engages in the kind of speculative freedom through speculation of
eventual property ownership—a promise hardly fulfilled to any but a select few given the
short history of the U.S.” (195). Alyosha Goldstein explains how this expectation of
property is a form of property itself that settlers demand the state defend and protect by
making land accessible for ownership. Where this expectation of property has always
been understood to be realized is at the site of the frontier, a space viewed as terra nullius
that could be seized through conquest (i.e. the Doctrine of Discovery) and transformed
not only into value (accumulation by dispossession) but, perhaps, more importantly, the
means of production for settler workers to become independent producers not dependent
on wage labor.
6
Du Bois argues that “it was said that even if free Negro labor miraculously proved
profitable, Negroes themselves were impossible as freemen, neighbors and citizens. They
could not be educated and really civilized. And beyond that if a free, educated black
citizen and voter could be brought upon the stage this would in itself be the worst
conceivable thing on earth; worse than shiftless, unprofitable labor; worse than
ignorance, worse than crime. It would lead inevitably to a mulatto South and the eventual
ruin of all civilization” (130). He also notes that, “the poor whites, on the other hand,
were absolutely as sea. The Negro was to become apparently their fellow laborer. But
were the whites to be bound to the black laborer by economic condition and destiny, or
rather to the white planter by community of blood? Almost unanimously, following the
reaction of such leaders as Andrew Johnson and Hinton Helper, the poor white clung
frantically to the planter and his ideals; and although ignorant and impoverished, maimed
and discouraged, victims of a war fought largely by the poor white for the benefit of the
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rich planter, they sought redress by demanding unity of white against black, and not unity
of poor against rich, or of worker against exploiter” (130).
7
See Peter Brooks’ Melodramatic Imagination.
8
Howells also argued that the purpose of realism was to represent “human nature and the
social fabric, which it behooves us to know and to understand, that we may deal justly
with ourselves and with one another” (497).
9
For key studies on realism’s representation of class conflict see, Walter Benn Michaels,
The Gold Standard, June Howard’s Form and History in American Literary Naturalism,
Amy Kaplan’s The Social Construction of American Realism, Lukács” “Realism in
Balance,” and Jameson’s Antinomies of Realism.
10
In different ways, Kaplan, Howard, and Michaels argue that realism/naturalism conceal
class antagonisms and should be read as legitimizing the rise of industrial capitalism and
consumer culture. Jameson’s recent Antinomies of Realism is more complicated in its
assessment of realism. He finds an aporetic quality of realism between its affective
dimensions and its narrative dimensions that makes history appear. I suggest that the
melodramatic narratives of marginalized writers of this time also contain aporetic
qualities that make the history of colonialism and slavery appear rather than only class
conflict.
11
For more on sentimentalism and melodrama in the nineteenth century see Lauren
Berlant’s foundational study, The Female Complaint.
12
Kara Mollis argues that “Significantly, the novel stresses how Genevieve’s progressive
adoption of an identifiably Native American perspective enhances her relationship with
Wynema by ensuring mutual comprehension and respect and, on a larger level,
promoting intercultural bonds” (121). See Kara Mollis’ “Teaching” Dear Mihia”:
Sentimentalism and Cross-Cultural Education in S. Alice Callahan’s” Wynema: A Child
of the Forest.”
13
In one scene, after espousing a chauvinist view of the Muscogee performing a bathing
practice to prevent disease, a practice Genevieve calls “strange ceremonies” and
“barbaric customs,” she is corrected by Keithly who plays the role of anthropologist. He
instructs Genevieve to take part in the bathing in order to demonstrate her acceptance and
appreciation of the practice, which, in doing so, as Genevieve says, “I see I should have
strengthened my influence over my Indian friends, by pleasing them in performing their
water-ceremony” (28). Keithly excuses Genevieve, claiming his years embedded in
Indian country have given him a more culturally sensitive perspective: “you took the
same view of the case that many others of our race have taken, and you have not done
any harm. I may be wrong in the view I take of the matter . . . but I have thought often
and long over it, and my course seems best to me” (28). Through this cross-cultural
training, Genevieve produces feelings of reverence and admiration for Keithly, feelings
that bring them closer together in their work among the Muscogee: “there was a mist in
her eyes as she said this in a low tone. ‘Amen,’ he said soberly and reverently. This gave
the conversation a more serious turn and the speakers a kindlier regard for each other”
(29).
14
This can be read as veiled reference to an understanding of the Ghost Dance as a
political movement and uprising that at the time had prompted forms of counterinsurgency and white reactionary response that culminated in the genocidal violence at
Wounded Knee.
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15

My reading of Wynema differs from Melissa Ryan’s analysis of the relationship
between white middle-class feminism and Indigenous resistance to colonialism. Ryan
argues that in the novel, “the struggle for Indian autonomy can be seen as analogous to
white women’s own struggle with political disenfranchisement—and her readers may
come to see the real Indian ‘problem’ as the threat to Native sovereignty rather than the
resistance of Native people to so-called “progress.” (36). Furthermore, Ryan suggests that
“meaningful ‘solidarities’ with white women readers emerge not from the affectional
language of the ‘happy families nestling in the village’ but from Callahan’s more
subversive insistence on the shared experience of dispossession and misrepresentation.
Here, then, the conventions of the sentimental novel function not to collapse cultural
difference in shared emotion, but to re-establish the basis for cross-cultural sympathy on
a discourse of rights. Working within the rhetorical conventions established by white
women, in other words, Callahan attempted to transmute the silencing effect of sentiment
into a vehicle for an Indian voice” (42). I suggest that there is structural difference
between these struggles and that the novel reveals how the success of white middle-class
feminism is premised on falsely collapsing this difference by assuming the Indigenous
peoples and white middle-class women share an equivalent structural position.
16
This is dramatized in Genevieve’s confrontation with her fiancé Maurice Mauran upon
her return come from teaching among the Muscogee. The figure of patriarchy in the
novel, Maurice not only advocates for policies of Indigenous genocide, but also holds
repressive views of women. He upholds the domestic/public binary and typifies the view
that liberal democracy is reserved only for white settler men. Genevieve’s time among
the Muscogee, however, catalyzes her demand for recognition and inclusion.
17
Other scholars have similar readings of the tension between sentimentalism and realism
in the novel. Lisa Tatonetti contends that “In light of those tensions, I would argue that
her turn to Wounded Knee evinces a personal struggle to balance the injustice of the
massacre with the romance of her original story and the privileged narrative of her life,
which, like Wynema’s, was a picture of ‘successful’ assimilation” (26). Susan Bernadin
argues that “in its entanglement of popular generic and ‘historically real’ narratives,
Wynema manifests an unresolved tension between sentimental appeal and social
indictment, between cross-cultural affiliation and estrangement, that will repeat itself in
other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century novels by Native and African American
women writers” (221). Senier writes, “Wynema shows whites and Indians attempting to
mediate their cultures, but with more problems than successes. In the novel’s final
chapters, mediation itself comes up for question, and the novel appears to pull back from
much of its apparent early confidence in cross-cultural translation” (433).
18
Here my reading adds to Susan Bernadin’s point that, “in its pointed refusal to produce
a seamless narrative closure as dictated by conventional romance plots, and especially by
‘ending’ with a recent event whose consequences for Indian policy and peoples were still
part of public debate, Wynema contests the moral and legal grounds of US nationbuilding” (220).
19
The question, then, of whether the novel of assimilation or resistance is not something I
am focused on this essay. Instead, I am interested in showing how the tension between an
assimilationist plot and the novel’s realism serves as a map of dispossession’s role in
enabling the expansion of capitalism.
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20

In another moment of realism disrupting the sentimental plot, Keithly reads an editorial
on the Wounded Knee massacre. The author argues it was always the intention of the
United States to seek to eliminate Indigenous peoples: “‘The great Indian war is over—
nothing was done except what was intended to be done to start out with. A lot of
defenseless Indians were murdered; the Indian agents and contractors reaped a rich
harvest; that’s all. ‘Tis said but true’” (100-101). Genevieve remarks, “I think that editor
is rather bitter,” and asks, “is what this editor says literally so? Do you suppose the
United States Government intended things to turn out as they have?” (101). Robin says
the answer lies in the “results of their actions,” which is to say that Wounded Knee and
examples like it are not the exception but the normal results of a nation that removes
Indigenous peoples in order to replace them with settlers (101). To claim and contemplate
the intention of the United States is one way the novel thinks about dispossession and
elimination as a structure rather than bad choices of settlers in an otherwise progressive
democracy. If the structural design of the United States, as it is contemplated here, is to
remove Indigenous people, there is little to no hope for a future in which Indigenous
peoples and settlers will be able to find peace while remaining tied together through a
relation of violence. The suggestion that it was by design that Wounded Knee occurred
calls into the question the novel’s sentimentalist vision of future harmony between
settlers and Natives. It also at the same time demonstrates the uncertainty of
assimilation’s success as a form of indirect elimination and the progress this success
promises to uphold.
21
A second example of this in the novel can be found in the narrator’s condemnation of
US newspapers that lionize US soldiers who are celebrated for their Indian-killing at the
Wounded Knee massacre rather than decry Indigenous genocide: “‘But,’ you ask, my
reader, ‘did not the white people undergo any privations? Did not the United States army
lose two brave commanders and a number of privates?’ Oh, yes. So the papers tell us; but
I am not relating the brave deeds of the white soldier. They are already flashed over the
world by electricity; great writers have burned the midnight oil telling their story to the
world. It is not my province to show how brave it was for a great, strong nation to quell a
riot caused by the dancing of a few ‘bucks’ – for civilized soldiers to slaughter
indiscriminately, Indian women and children. Doubtless it was brave, for so public
opinion tells us, and it cannot err. But what will the annals of history handed down to
future generations disclose to them? Will history term the treatment of the Indians by the
United States Government, right and honorable? Ah, but that does not affect my story! It
is the Indian’s story—his chapter of wrongs and oppression” (93). Here the narrator
breaks out of the sentimental plot to suggest that settler newspapers legitimize empire
when they attempt to give both sides of the story in the history of colonization. Not to tell
the story from the perspective of the victim, is to already take the side of the oppressor.
22
While Craig Womack argues that Wynema is not a novel about Creek or Muscogee
sovereignty (and thematically, I agree it’s not), the presence of Indigenous sovereignty
nonetheless lies in these moments when realism disrupt the novel’s sentimentalism.
23
Here I add to Susan Bernadin’s point that that Wildfire’s speech, “exposes the
inadequacy of the reformers’ Christian sentiment to fit either Lakota experience or the
United States’ historical conduct toward Indian nations” (220).
24
For more on settler indigenization and “settler moves to innocence” see Tuck and
Wang’s “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.”
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25

Deloria summarizes this binary between the noble and hostile/savage Indian and its
role in shaping settler identity as follows: “Americans built the nation on contradictory
foundations: a highly positive interior brand of Indian Otherness coexisted with exterior
savages lurking outside societal boundaries. By the early twentieth century, however,
many Americans had become fascinated with a positive exterior Indian other, one who
represented authentic reality in the face of urban disorder and alienating mass society”
(74).
26
This continues to be a strong ideology prevalent today: just look at how the Outdoor
industry commodifies wilderness spaces as refuge from alienated life of a (late) capitalist
modernity.
27
See, for example, the reform or muckraking journalism of Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair,
or articles published in McClures Magazine around this time.
28
See O’Brien’s analysis of “Lasting Narratives” in her Firsting and Lasting.
29
A present-day example of is this can be found in forms of white environmentalism like
the social entrepreneurship of a company like Patagonia which recently ran an ad
protesting the shrinking of the Bear Ears National Monument with the title, “The
President Stole Your Land.” This slogan was quickly challenged for how it erased
Indigenous claims to the same lands. Patagonia’s brand of activism which tries to
preserve public lands as (white) sites of romantic anticapitalism loses its integrity when
Indigenous people demand that same land be repatriated.
30
From the point of view of white labor, George finds the resolution to capitalism’s
attack on settler sovereignty in the settler state socializing land, that is, abolishing private
ownership of land, or the creation of a settler commons that, George imagines, would
maintain capitalism, while ensuring equality of opportunity and the end to exploitation.
Commoning the land puts the United States back on track toward achieving higher forms
of civilization and progress. It avoids the fall into barbarism that inequality spells for
settler democracy. For George, equality is the mark of civilization, arguing that what
makes US settlers modern and civilized is precisely the cultivating of equality through
conquest and elimination: “The truth is that progress goes on just as society tends towards
closer association and greater equality. Civilization is co-operation. Union and liberty are
its factors. The great extension of association—not alone in the growth of larger and
denser communities, but in the increase of commerce and the manifold exchanges which
knit each community together and link them with other though widely separated the
recognition of the equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—it is these
that make our modern civilization so much greater, so much higher, than any that has
gone before” (457-8). Achieving this equality and the progress it entails requires that
capital’s power over white labor must be curbed, but not that capital itself be abolished.
31
See Susan Scheckel’s study in which she compares Love and Booker T. Washington’s
understandings of upward mobility. Scheckel argues that “when Nat Love suggests that
he is Deadwood Dick, he implies that whiteness is not essential to the role, which an
African American can assume as well as a white man. Whereas Washington relied upon
the melodramatic plots originating in slavery to contain the potentially frightening
changes ushered in by the Civil War, Love enlists the stereotypical characters and
formulaic plot structures of the dime western to highlight the social and economic fluidity
that his autobiography exemplifies.” (233). For other studies on Love, see Blake
Allmendinger’s early reading, Georgina Dodge’s more recent study of Love’s
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representation of Black masculinity, and Daniel Wordens’ “Between Anarchy and
Hierarchy: Nat Love’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s Manly Feelings.”
32
Carnegie had argued that white labor should support the concentration of capital
precisely because concentrated wealth advances white racial superiority, a benefit, he
implies, that improves the lives all white settlers, regardless of class position. “While the
law may be sometimes hard for the individual,” Carnegie contends, “it is best for the
race, because it insures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and
welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great
inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in
the hands of a few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only
beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race” (16-17). Capitalism as social
Darwinism, Carnegie believes, facilitates the formation and maintenance of “natural”
racial hierarchies, with white people at the top and nonwhites at the bottom. Even if
some white settlers are made to live in poverty, their inclusion in this brotherhood of
whiteness is an absolute gain outweighing the relative poverty between white owners and
white labor. This is Carnegie’s strategy for gaining the consent of his workers despite
intensifying conflicts of exploitation and worker repression at the time.
Chapter 4
1

In his essay “Commitment,” Adorno criticizes the political aesthetic of artists Sartre and
Brecht. Adorno argues that politics lies in the form of the work of art and not its political
content: “The content of works of art is never the amount of intellect pumped into them;
if anything, it is the opposite” (194).
2
For more on how literary naturalism is an art form of the polemic, see Ira Wells’
Fighting words: Polemics and Social Change in Literary Naturalism. For a reading of
naturalism that sees it reproducing the logic of the very industrial capitalism it claims to
critique, see Walter Benn Michael’s The Gold Standard.
3
Pizer continues, saying, “the chaos and turmoil of the social collapse of the 1930s did
not cause despair among writers and intellectuals but rather the vitalizing expectation that
out of the rubble of the old system and its values would emerge a society more capable of
fulfilling the American dream” (Twentieth-Century 16).
4
It is in this way that I am also suggesting that naturalism protests against the ways
industrial capitalism disrupts settler unity holding together the capitalist relation. It
demands that settler democracy ensure that those with the right to have rights through the
liberal social contract retain such rights that it appears industrial capitalism has violated.
It emerges in response to this class antagonism between settlers at the turn-of-the century
and is revived after 1929 because this is an historical moment when the potential for
catastrophic rebellion seems possible and eminent and the liberal contract as racial
contract, settler democracy, needs mending immediately. Like Progressive era reforms,
the welfare state at a much larger scale answers this call to repair the liberal social
contract. The state saves capital from the rebellion of labor by providing workers security
from unemployment and the threat of surplus life. Naturalist protest fiction thus becomes
the mode of representation at this time most closely embodying the logic of welfare state
reform in which it appears that garnering recognition of worker suffering leads to state
action and the reinforcement of civil society.
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5

These novels dramatize Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, a critique
demonstrating how there is no recognition for the nonhuman, those in the zones of
“nonbeing,” These positions of the elimination and social death are constitutive of the
very zones of recognition in the first place. See Black Skin White Masks.
6
As theorist George Caffentzis notes, the creation of the welfare state in the 1930s would
lead to what some call the golden-era of capitalism in years that followed: “between 1947
and 1967 we see that in this period wages and profits intimated the fulfillment of an
American Capitalist Dream: the class struggle can be bypassed, wages and profits can
grow together, perhaps not at the same rate, but in a long-term growth equilibrium path.
The Keynesian strategy of matching real wage increases with productivity increments
seemed to succeed” (20). It rescues capitalism from revolution by holding intact settler
unity, its pillars of sovereignty and whiteness, an investment in producing a more reliable
and stable working class, the result of which prevents revolution and saves capitalism
from further disruptions. As Caffentzis explains: “not only had unemployment to be
‘conquered,’ but the real wage, which the working class ‘defended’ in the starkest years
of the Depression and later forced up, could be capitalized upon. If wage increases could
be used to capitalize the home, this would eventually increase the productivity of labor,
and thus increase profit. Here we have the basis of a class deal: happy workers, happy
capital, and a compromise! The Keynesian system is delicately balanced upon the
symbiosis of home and factory and the use of the wage not only for working-class
subsistence but as a form of investment for capital” (25).
7
For a foundational study of the welfare state and literary production see, Szalay,
Michael Szalay’s New Deal Modernism: American Literature and the Invention of the
Welfare State.
8
For more on McNickle as a modernist, see Alicia Kent’s study in which she argues,
“unlike the modernist expatriates, Archilde is never able to go abroad and live the life of
an artist, suggesting that the modernist notion of flight to Europe to pursue an artistic
calling is not applicable to most Native Americans. And unlike the modernists, Native
Americans in modernity did not have to go abroad to be homeless; as Native Americans
they already are homeless in their own home” (37). Kent also contends that, “because
dissolution of tribal lands and the attempted eradication of Indian cultures were central
historical conditions of modernity for Native Americans, modernity looks different from
the vantage point of many Native Americans, for whom the modern effort to break with
the past was not chosen but imposed. In drawing upon modernist themes but also in
revising the narrative of the modernist expatriate life in his novel, McNickle
simultaneously engages in and challenges the modernist project in order to suggest that it
does not apply neatly to the situation of most Native Americans in the modern era” (38).
9
Louis Owens shows how McNickle had initially written The Surrounded as a romance.
Owen writes, “The Surrounded didn’t always end in fatalistic despair, however: In the
earlier draft of the novel entitled “The Hungry Generations” a version almost twice as
long as the published manuscript, and very different in its implications, McNickle
allowed Archilde to live happily ever after. In this draft, Archilde is allowed to travel to
Paris and to experience the heady atmosphere of the Lost Generation’s milieu” (244).
Comparing the two versions, Owens comes to the conclusion that “the distinction
between the two versions might well be compared to that between a conventional
romance and a naturalistic novel. In the former much confusion of identity and potential
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disaster lead to marriage and the promise of a fruitful future; chaos is ordered a
controlled. In the latter, the protagonist simply cannot understand much less order and
control the world he inhabits. The question who he is remains unanswered. The romantic
and the naturalistic might also define American attitudes toward the Indian from the fi
encounters: the choice for the Indian in the American imagination has always been a
choice between marriage with the white cult or inexorable death. It is at that point that the
road divides” (247).
10
See Hemingway’s “Big Two Hearted River.”
11
Owens reads the novel’s pessimistic ending as follows: “Archilde stands where not just
the road but the maps divide. One fork would seem to lead toward a past that is
irretrievable, the other toward a world in which Indian values have no meaning. Across
this divided terrain communication would seem impossible. That the Indian road is no
longer viable seems indisputable in The Surrounded” (242)
12
An example of this sentimentalism legitimizing the “Vanishing Indian” is Helen Hunt
Jackson’s Ramona.
13
Patrick Wolfe further elucidates IRA policy as ongoing assimilation as elimination: “in
seeking to dismantle that opposition, the Indian Reorganization Act sought to raise the
scope of assimilation from the level of the individual to that of the tribe itself. Where
Dawes-style assimilation had reconstituted individual Indians as property-owners, and
thus sought to eliminate them as Indians, the Indian Reorganization Act reconstituted
tribes into structural conformity with White institutions – which is to say, it sought to
eliminate them as Indian institutions” (36).
14
While Coulthard’s critique of liberal recognition applies to contemporary contexts,
particularly the Canadian settler state, the logic of liberal recognition in which it is
assumed both the colonizer and colonized meet reciprocally is the logic in the IRA.
15
Here I differ from Robert Dale Parker who argues, “The Surrounded can finally stand,
therefore, as a critique of narrow reaction and a call for more imaginative, more
organized responses, a call that McNickle and others increasingly heeded in political
activism and in the ongoing history of Native American writing that carries a wider
vision of political and imaginative possibility than such early and founding works and
titles as Cogewea, Sundown, and The Surrounded” (927).
16
Coulthard goes on to say, “today this process will and must continue to involve some
form of critical individual and collective self-recognition on the part of Indigenous
societies, not only in an instrumental sense like Fanon seemed to have envisioned it, but
with the understanding that our cultural practices have much to offer regarding the
establishment of relationships within and between peoples and the natural world built on
principles of reciprocity and respectful co-existence” (48).
17
For foundational studies of Petry’s novel see, Lindon Barrett’s “(Further) Figures of
Violence: The Street in the American Landscape; Keith Clark’s The Radical Fiction of
Ann Petry; Don. Dingledine’s “‘It could have been any street’: Ann Petry, Stephen
Crane, and the Fate of Naturalism”; Kimberly Drake’s “Women on the Go: Blues,
Conjure, and Other Alternatives to Domesticity in Ann Petry’s The Street and The
Narrows; and Heather Hicks’ “‘This Strange Communion’: Surveillance and
Spectatorship in Ann Petry’s The Street.”
18
For more on this, see: Marx’s Capital, Chapter 25: The General Law of Accumulation.
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19

Justin Akers Chacon and Mike Davis in No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State
Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border summarize nicely the history of proletarianization of
Mexican Americans in the land the US encloses after 1849: “Mexicans residing in the
newly acquired portions of the United States were reduced to second-class citizenship.
While the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo contained a set of guarantees protecting the land
and voting rights of Mexicans, “American local, state, and national courts later ruled that
the provisions of the treaty could be superseded by local laws.”’ Anglo economic
interests used the federal government, in the form of the Federal Land Act of 1851, to
deprive Mexicans of their land, and state and local governments to implement a Jim
Crow-like social structure across the Southwest.’ Most Mexican land-holdings were
nullified in the decades following the war, reducing the majority to the ranks of the
working class” (Locations 1004-1009).
20
For more on this history of counterinsurgency see Kelly Lytle Hernández’ Migra!: A
History of the US Border Patrol.
21
This category of the less than human colonial laborer is best captured in the scene
where Guálinto’s friend Orestes does the math to figure out how many Mexican
Americans the life of a horse is worth. Orestes is reading in the paper the sentences
handed down to local criminals and sees that “A Mexican steals a horse and gets ten
years” (178). He then suggests that, “you would think that before the law in this town a
horse is worth five Mexicans” and furthermore “that in murder cases Mexicans and
Negroes get double the sentence a white man would get. So what if the Mexican had been
killed by a Gringo? The Gringo would have got off with a year. One divided into twenty:
a Mexican then is worth one-twentieth the value of the horse. But that isn’t all of it. . .
Chances are the Gringo’s sentence would be suspended. Then how much would a
Mexican be worth? What’s one-twentieth of zero?” (179). Here Orestes’ comments
highlight how Mexican American lives are treated as objects before US law, that they are
valued as equivalent to livestock, interchangeable and disposable, mere objects
commodified for profit and ownership of others. Theorist María Saldaña-Portillo says of
this passage, “Mexicans are less than zero within the racial imaginary of the United
States, unable to find a place in the United States binary logic, because of the racial di
erence of their mestizaje, which they are unable to shed. . . Orestes provides an ironic
undoing of the law as the site of emancipation. Anglo-American jurisprudence can
recognize Mexicans only obliquely, through that which they are not: Mexicans are
neither white nor black but can be read through only these two categories of being. If
Mexicans are visible legally only by passing through a U.S. racial ideology of white and
black, this passage is nonetheless subtended by the language of Mexican racial
governmentality, inherited as it is from Spanish colonialism.” (827)
22
Leif Sorenson argues that George Washington Gómez is a hybrid form combining the
bildungsroman and the corrido form. As such Sorenson contends, “The corrido of border
conflict ends tragically, with the hero either imprisoned or killed. These two narrative
trajectories seem incompatible, but Paredes’s novel satisfies the conventions of both. The
novel achieves this conjunction by forcing the reader to process the same set of events
through two different narrative codes. George finds his place in the national body of the
United States but the casualty of this success story is the corrido ethos itself, which dies
out of the world of direct action and social significance to become a psychological
symptom, a recurring dream” (134).
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23

My argument compares to Tim Libretti’s reading of the novel who writes, “I will argue
that the novel reconceives the relation between race, class, culture, and nation, effectively
rewriting the master narrative of class struggle to include the specific conditions of
Chicanos and to highlight the agency of Chicanos in those struggles. Paredes
accomplishes this political and cultural transformation through a synthesis or
hybridization of the traditional corrido form with the then emergent form of literary class
struggle, the proletarian novel” (119).
24
For example, Guálinto learns from his experience in school to internalize the status of
inferiority he is ascribed. In one scene, when Guálinto’s wealthy girlfriend passes by his
house, he runs inside to hide, fearing she will see his poverty as a sign of this ascribed
inferiority (157). His uncle Feliciano, who has not attended school, confronts this
internalization he sees in his nephew as a defamiliarizing experience “On the porch
Feliciano sat for a long time in his rocker, thinking. He inspected his large, bony hands as
if he had never seen them before. Then he looked around him, studying his surroundings.
After that he sat in the rocker for a long while, unmoving, his eyes fixed in the distance.”
(157).
25
This unity presented as class unity was really a unity among white workers coded as
the identity of the universal workers. As the Endnotes collective writes, “within the
labour movement, workers claimed that the class identity they promoted and affirmed
really was universal in character. It supposedly subsumed all workers, regardless of their
specific qualities: as mothers, as recent immigrants, as oppressed nationalities. . . That is
to say, it included workers not as they were in themselves, but only to the extent that they
conformed to a certain image of respectability, dignity, hard work, family, organisation,
sobriety, atheism, and so on” (Web). I maintain that this very image is an identity of
whiteness.
26
Of this section, Libretti argues that “representing typical literary depression scenes
effected by the stock market crash of 1929—really the beginning of the 1930s proletarian
literary tradition—and contrasting them with very different experience of the Mexican
laborer in the Southwest, Paredes at once invokes his text’s relation to the proletarian
novel form but also marks its difference from that form. Working within the proletarian
form, Paredes identifies the work as a narrative of class struggle; but by bringing to bear
the specificity of the Mexican working class and national experience on the proletarian
literary form, Paredes complicates and expands the parameters of the form and rewrites
traditional narratives of class struggle to incorporate the national struggle of the internally
colonized Texas Mexicans. This strategy allows Paredes to identify the Mexican laborer
as part of and in solidarity with the working class” (123). I differ from this reading by
suggesting that Paredes makes explicit how the wages of whiteness, the way white
workers share a settler status with owners, places them in a different position of power
than a Mexican colonial proletariat, and as such, unity is only possible by attacking these
very institutions creating this asymmetry in the first place.
27
Libretti shows how the proletarian bildungsroman, if following its conventions, should
end in Paredes’ novel: “Just as early in the novel Feliciano’s partners in the campaign for
a Spanish-speaking Southwest Republic eventually betray the revolution in one way or
another, so George Washington Gómez also betrays the revolution by rising individually
within an American free market economy that racially and economically oppresses most
Mexicans. The typical narrative of 1930s proletarian liberation would have called instead
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for his assent with his class and nation” (126).
28
In this way, we can see how Paredes offers a critique of the proletarian bildungsroman
in a similar way that Foley contends it is a form opposed to proletarian politics. Using
bourgeois forms to represent the identity and struggle seeking to abolish bourgeois
relations becomes a paradox in which the form legitimates what the content suggests
should be destroyed. Referring to the proletarian bildungsroman Foley says: “These texts
are not, in my view, “leftist”—either in the sense of espousing ultrarevolutionary doctrine
or in the sense of being excessively didactic. Rather, the difficulty encountered by writers
of “conversion” tales stems in part from the authors’ choice of a medium for telling these
tales. The form of the bildungsroman with its tendency to focus on the individual and to
foreclose contradiction in the movement toward closure, significantly inhibits the
expression of a politics advocating collective consciousness and revolutionary change.
Indeed, the genre loses some of the very qualities that make it an effective (if politically
loaded) medium for exploring bourgeois consciousness and destiny. Transposed to the
task of articulating an antibourgeois politics, the genre’s cognitivist premise conflicts
with its hortatory function” (353-4).
29
The bond and harmony between white owners and white workers the novel mentions
also requires, as we saw in Chapter 2, that white workers support or participate in the
policing of colonial populations and their potential rebellion or acts of resistance. To
receive redress, or to achieve a unity that could lead to a settler socialism, white workers
must defend US sovereignty and thus border violence, the policing of colonial
rebellion/resistance, acts of survival.
30
While Libretti argues that “Paredes’ national struggle takes place within the cultural
arena but not with the goal of reclaiming lost territory. Instead he advocates the
formulation of a political program in cultural terms, one that comprehends the distinct
history and unique conditions of oppression and exploitation endured by Chicanos in the
U.S. yet also allows for an alliance with the working class struggle” (128), I contend that
Paredes and his novel are interested in land and revolutionary struggles to reclaim stolen
land and that such politics lies in first acknowledging what categories and movements are
opposed to such a politics, such as, the workerist movement that the proletarian novel
coheres in its aim of winning welfare state reforms and building a settler socialism
without a view of decolonization.
31
This is where I add to Ramon Saldivar’s point who argues, “the rest of Guálinto’s story
is concerned with what it would take, materially and psychologically, to imagine a new
identity, how one could conceptualize what one can by definition not yet imagine since it
has no equivalent in current experience. The novel attempts meticulously to imagine, in
other words, the affirmation that is contained in every negation, in short, the future in the
present” (283).
32
Libretti here suggests that “Paredes intervenes in and rethinks the Marxist sociocultural approach being developed in the Thirties and by synthesizing the corrido and the
proletarian novel forms, he offers a version of a Chicano Marxism, so to speak (in the
spirit of Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism) and provides models for the rethinking of
class struggle today in the context of the multiracial, indeed, multinational U.S. working
class” (129).
Conclusion
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1

See David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
For more on how New Deal reforms were designed to elevate white workers above
colonial laborers, and how such reforms were weaponized to reinforce colonial and racial
hierarchies see, Mary Poole’s Segregated Origins of Social Security: African Americans
and the Welfare State and Deborah E. Ward’s The White Welfare State: The Racialization
of U.S. Welfare Policy.

2

270
Works Cited
Adéè̳ kó̳ , Adéléke. The Slave's Rebellion: Literature, History, Orature. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 2005.
Adorno, Theodore. “Committed Art.” Aesthetics and Politics. London: NLB, 1977.
Agamben, Giorgio. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford
UP, 1999.
Alemán, Jesse. “Assimilation and the Decapitated Body Politics in The Life and
Adventures of Joaquín Murieta.” Arizona Quarterly 59. 1 (2004): 71–98.
- - - . “Historical Amnesia and the Vanishing Mestiza: The Problem of Race in The
Squatter and the Don and Ramona.” Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies 27.1
(2002): 59-93.
Allmendinger, Blake. “Deadwood Dick: The Black Cowboy as Cultural Timber.” The
Journal of American Culture 16.4 (1993): 79-89.
Anderson, Kevin. Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western
Societies. Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2010.
Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our
Times. London: Verso, 1994.
- - - . “Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis.” New Left Review 111 (1978): 3-24.
Aranda, José. “Contradictory Impulses: María Amparo Ruiz De Burton, Resistance
Theory, and the Politics of Chicano/a Studies.” American Literature 70.3 (1998):
551-79.

271
- - - . “Returning California to the People: Vigilantism in The Squatter and the Don.”
María Amparo Ruiz de Burton: Critical and Pedagogical Perspectives. Lincoln,
U of Nebraska P, (2004). 11-26.
Arsic, Branka. Passive Constitutions or 7 1/2 Times Bartleby. Stanford: Stanford UP,
2007.
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. “The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” 2 Feb
1848. Accessed 20 Jan 2016. Web.
Barker, Joanne. Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity. Durham: Duke
UP, 2011.
Barnett, Louise K. “Bartleby as Alienated Worker.” Studies in Short Fiction 11.4 (1974):
379-385.
Barrett, Lindon. “(Further) Figures of Violence: The Street in the American
Landscape.” Cultural Critique 25 (1993): 205-237.
Benjamin, Walter. “Thesis on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations. Trans. Harry
Zohn. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.
Berlant, Lauren. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in
American Culture. Durham: Duke UP, 2008.
Berliner, Jonathan. “Written in the Birch Bark: The Linguistic-Material Worldmaking of
Simon Pokagon.” PMLA (2010): 73-91.
Bernardin, Susan. “On the Meeting Grounds of Sentiment: S. Alice Callahan’s Wynema:
A Child of the Forest.” American Transcendental Quarterly 15.3 (2001): 209-224.
Bhandar, Brenna and Davina Bhander. “Cultures of Dispossession: Critical Reflections
on Rights, Status and Identities.” Darkmatter Journal 14 (2016). Web.

272
Bhandar, Brenna. “Property, Law, and Race: Modes of Abstraction.” UC Irvine Law
Review 4. 1 (2014): 203-218.
Biggio, Rebecca Skidmore. “The Specter of Conspiracy in Martin Delany’s Blake.”
African American Review 42. 3-4 (2008): 439-454.
Bronstein, Jamie L. Land Reform and Working-Class Experience in Britain and the
United States, 1800-1862. Stanford UP, 1999.
Brooks, Peter. The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and
the Mode of Excess. Yale UP, 1995.
Broussard, Albert S. Black Cowboys in the American West: On the Range, on the Stage,
Behind the Badge. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2016.
Brownson, Orestes. “The Laboring Classes.” Boston Quarterly Review, 1840.
Bruyneel, Kevin. The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of USIndigenous Relations. U of Minnesota P, 2007.
Butler, Judith. Frames of war: When is Life Grievable?. New York: Verso, 2016.
- - - . Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2006.
Byrd, Jodi A., Alyosha Goldstein, Jodi Melamed, and Chandan Reddy. “Predatory Value:
Economies of Dispossession and Disturbed Relationalities.” Social Text 36.2
(2018): 1-18.
Byrd, Jodi. The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism. Minneapolis: U
of Minnesota P, 2011.
- - - . “Follow the Typical Signs: Settler Sovereignty and its Discontents.” Settler
Colonial Studies 4.2 (2014): 151-154.

273
- - - . “‘Do they not have rational souls?’: Consolidation and Sovereignty in Digital New
Worlds.” Settler Colonial Studies 6.4 (2016): 423-437.
- - - . “Introduction.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists 2. 1 (2014):
131-148.
Chacon, Justin and Mike Davis. No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence
on the U.S.-Mexico Border, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017.
Caffentzis, George. ‘In Letters of Blood and Fire.’ Work, Machines, and the Crisis of
Capitalism. Oakland: Midnight Notes Collective, 2013.
Chaffin, Tom. Fatal Glory: Narciso López and the First Clandestine U.S. War against
Cuba. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1996.
Callahan, S Alice. Wynema: A Child of the Forest. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, (1891)
1997.
Castillo, Pedro G. and Albert Camarillo. Furia Y Muerte: Los Bandidos Chicanos. Los
Angeles: Aztlán Publications, 1973.
Carnegie, Andrew. The Gospel of Wealth, and Other Timely Essays. Ed. Edward C.
Kirkland. Cambridge: Harvard UP, (1889) 1962.
- - - . Triumphant Democracy. New York: J. J. Little and Co., 1886.
Castronovo, Russ. “Occupy Bartleby.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century
Americanists 2.2 (2014): 253-272.
Chakravartty, Paula, and Denise Ferreira da Silva. “Accumulation, Dispossession, and
Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism—an Introduction.” American
Quarterly 64.3 (2012): 361-385.

274
Chen, Chris. “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality.” Endnotes 1.3 (September 2013)
https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-capitalistequality
Chestnutt, Charles W. The Marrow of Tradition. New York: Norton, (1901) 2012.
Chiles, Katy. “Within and Without Raced Nations: Intratextuality, Martin Delany, and
Blake; or the Huts of America.” American Literature 80.2 (2008): 323-352.
Christensen, Peter G. “Minority Interaction in John Rollin Ridge’s The Life and
Adventures of Joaquín Murieta.” Melus 17.2 (1992): 61-72.
Clark, Keith. The Radical Fiction of Ann Petry. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP,
2013.
Ciccariello-Maher, George. Decolonizing Dialectics. Durham: Duke UP, 2017.
Clover, Joshua “Subsumption and Crisis” The SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt School
Critical Theory. Eds. Beverley Best, Werner Bonefeld, and Chris O'Kane.
Forthcoming.
Clymer, Jeffory A. “Martin Delany’s Blake and the Transnational Politics of Property.”
American Literary History 15.4 (2003): 709-31.
Commons, John Rogers, et al., eds. A Documentary History of American Industrial
Society: Labor conspiracy cases, 1806-1842. Vol. 3. New York, Arthur H. Clark
Company, 1910.
Cox, James H. Muting White Noise: Native American and European American Novel
Traditions. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2006.
Coulthard, Glen S. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of
Recognition. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2014.

275
Crane, Gregg D. The Cambridge Introduction to the Nineteenth-Century American Novel.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.
- - - . “The Lexicon of Rights, Power, and Community in Blake: Martin R. Delany's
Dissent from Dred Scott.” American Literature 68.3 (1996): 527-553.
Dale, Edward E. and Gaston Litton. Cherokee Cavaliers: Forty Years of Cherokee
History As Told in the Correspondence of the Ridge-Watie-Boudinot Family. Norman: U
of Oklahoma P, 1939.
Dawson, Melanie V. “Ruiz De Burton’s Emotional Landscape: Property and Feeling in
The Squatter and the Don.” Nineteenth-Century Literature 63.1 (2008): 41-72.
Davies, Jude. “Naturalism and Class.” The Oxford Handbook of American Literary
Naturalism. Ed. Keith Newlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Davidson, Adenike M. The Black Nation Novel: Imagining Homeplaces in Early African
American Literature. Chicago: Third World Press, 2008.
Davis, Angela. Women, Race and Class. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.
Day, Iyko. Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial
Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- - - . “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Anti-Blackness, and Settler Colonial Critique.”
Critical Ethnic Studies 1.2 (2015): 102-121.
Deleuze, Gilles. “Bartleby; or, the Formula.” Essays Critical and Clinical (1997): 68-90.
Dingledine, Don. “’It could have been any street’: Ann Petry, Stephen Crane, and the
Fate of Naturalism.” Studies in American Fiction 34.1 (2006): 87-106.
Delany, Martin. Blake: Or, the Huts of America. Boston: Beacon Press, (1859) 1970.
Deloria, Philip J. Playing Indian. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998.

276
Denning, Michael. “Wageless Life.” New Left Review 66 (2010): 79-97.
Dodge, Georgina. “Claiming Narrative, Disclaiming Race: Negotiating Black
Masculinity in The Life and Adventures of Nat Love.” a/b: Auto/Biography
Studies 16.1 (2001): 109-126.
Doolen, Andy. “Be Cautious of the Word ‘Rebel’: Race, Revolution, and Transnational
History in Martin Delany’s Blake; or, The Huts of America.” American Literature
81.1 (2009): 153-79.
Drake, Kimberly. “Women on the Go: Blues, Conjure, and Other Alternatives to
Domesticity in Ann Petry's The Street and The Narrows.” Arizona Quarterly 54.1
(1998): 65-95.
- - - . Subjectivity in the American Protest Novel. New York: Springer, 2011.
Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962.
- - - . John Brown. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
Douglass, Frederick. The Heroic Slave. Boston: John P. Jewett and Company, 1853.
- - - . Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. Harvard UP, (1845) 2009.
Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Eby, Clare Virginia. ‘Beyond Protest:’ The Street as Humanitarian
Narrative.” Melus 33.1 (2008): 33-53.
Endnotes Collective. “A History of Separation.” Endnotes. 4.1 (October 2015).
https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/4/en/endnotes-preface
- - - . “Misery and Debt.” Endnotes. 1.2 (April 2010).
https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/2/en/endnotes-misery-and-debt

277
Estes, Nick. Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock Versus the Dakota Access
Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance. London, Verso. 2019.
- - - . “Wounded Knee: Settler Colonial Property Regimes and Indigenous
Liberation.” Capitalism Nature Socialism 24.3 (2013): 190-202.
Evans, George. “A Rejoinder to Garrit Smith.” Working Man's Advocate, July 1844. A
Documentary History of American Industrial Society: Labor movement, 18201840. Vol. 5. Eds. Eugene A. Gilmore, Helen L. Sumner, and John B. Andrews.
Cleveland: Arthur Clark Company, 1910.
- - - . “To Garrit Smith.” Working Man's Advocate, August 17, 1844. A Documentary
History of American Industrial Society: Labor movement, 1820-1840. Vol. 5. Eds.
Eugene A. Gilmore, Helen L. Sumner, and John B. Andrews. Cleveland: Arthur
Clark Company, 1910.
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
- - - . The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1965.
Federici, Silvia. Caliban and the Witch. New York, Autonomedia. 2004.
Fluck, Winfried. “The Nineteenth-Century Historical Novel.” The Cambridge History of
the American Novel. Ed. Leonard Cassuto. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.
Foner, Eric. Free soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
Before the Civil War. Oxford UP, 1995.
Foner, Philip S. The Great Labor Uprising of 1877. New York: Monad Press, 1977.
Foley, Barbara. “From Wall Street to Astor Place: Historicizing Melville’s ‘Bartleby’.”
American Literature 72.1 (2000): 87-116.

278
- - - . Radical Representations: Politics and Form in US Proletarian Fiction, 1929-1941.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1993.
Fox, Cybelle. Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare
State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal. Princeton UP, 2012.
Genovese, Eugene D. From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the
Making of the Modern World. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1979.
George, Henry. Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial
Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth, The Remedy. New
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1886.
Gillman, Susan K. “The Epistemology of Slave Conspiracy.” Modern Fiction Studies
49.1 (2003): 101-123.
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1993.
Goeke, Joe. “Yellow Bird and the Bandit: Minority Authorship, Class, and Audience in
John Rollin Ridge’s The Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murieta.” Western
American Literature 37.4 (2003): 453-78.
Gold, Michael. Jews without Money. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1930.
Goldstein, Alyosha. “Colonialism, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty.” J19:
The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists 2.1 (2014): 148-153.
- - - . “By Force of Expectation: Colonization, Public Lands, and the Property Relation.”
UCLA Law Review 65 (2018): 124-137.
- - - . “Where the Nation Takes Place: Proprietary Regimes, Antistatism, and US Settler
Colonialism.” South Atlantic Quarterly 107.4 (2008): 833-861.

279
González, John M. “The Whiteness of the Blush: The Cultural Politics of Racial
Formation in The Squatter and the Don.” María Amparo Ruiz de Burton: Critical
and Pedagogical Perspectives. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, (2004). 153-68.
González, Marcial. Chicano Novels and the Politics of Form: Race, Class, and
Reification. U of Michigan P, 2009.
Grande, Sandy. “Accumulation of the Primitive: The Limits of Liberalism and the
Politics of Occupy Wall Street.” Settler Colonial Studies 3.3-4 (2013): 369-380.
Griggs, Sutton. The Hindered Hand: Or, The Reign of the Repressionist. Nashville: Orion
Publishing Company, 1905.
Harney, Stefano and Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black
Study. New York: Minor Compositions. 2013.
Harootunian, Harry. Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism.
New York: Columbia UP, 2015.
Hartman, Saidiya V. Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in
Nineteenth-Century America. New York: Oxford UP, 1997.
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
Havard John C. “John Rollin Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta: Sensation, Hispanicism, and
Cosmopolitanism.” Western American Literature 49.4 (2015): 321-349.
Hemingway, Ernest. Big Two-Hearted River. Contre Coup Press, 2011.
Hernández, Kelly Lytle. Migra!: A History of the US Border Patrol. U of California
Press, 2010.
Hicks, Heather. “’This Strange Communion’: Surveillance and Spectatorship in Ann
Petry’s The Street.” African American Review 37.1 (2003): 21-37.

280
Horwitz, Tony. Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War.
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2011.
Horne, Gerald. The Counterrevolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the
United States of America. New York: NYU P, 2014.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits. New York: New Press, 2000.
Howells, William Dean. “A Call for Realism.” The Rise of Silas Lapham: An
Authoritative Text, Composition and Backgrounds, Contemporary Responses.”
Ed. Don Lewis Cook. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.
Howard, June. Form and History in American Literary Naturalism. Chapel Hill: U of
North Carolina P, 1985.
Ignatiev, Noel. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Irwin, Robert McKee. Bandits, Captives, Heroines, and Saints: Cultural Icons of
Mexico’s Northwest Borderlands. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2007.
James, C.L.R.. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo
Revolution. New York: Penguin, 2001.
Jameson, Fredric. Antinomies of Realism. New York: Verso, 2014.
- - - . The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1981.
- - - . Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One. London, Verso. 2013.
- - - . Valences of the Dialect. London: Verso, 2010.
Johnson, Walter. River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013.

281
Kaplan, Amy. The Social Construction of American Realism. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1992.
Kent, Alicia A. African, Native, and Jewish American Literature and the Reshaping of
Modernism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- - - . “’You can't run away nowadays’: Redefining Modernity in D'Arcy McNickle's The
Surrounded.” Studies in American Indian Literatures 20.2 (2008): 22-46.
King, Tiffany Lethabo. “Black ‘Feminisms’ and Pessimism: Abolishing Moynihan’s
Negro Family. Theory & Event 21.1 (2018): 68-87.
- - - . “Labor’s Aphasia: Toward Antiblackness as Constitutive to Settler Colonialism”
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society. (June 2014).
https://decolonization.wordpress.com/2014/06/10/labors-aphasia-towardantiblackness- as-constitutive-to-settler-colonialism/
Krauthamer, Barbara. Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and
Citizenship in the Native American South. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P,
2013.
Lazo, Rodrigo. Writing to Cuba: Filibustering and Cuban Exiles in the United States.
Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2005.
Leroy, Justin. “Black History in Occupied Territory: On the Entanglements of Slavery
and Settler Colonialism.” Theory & Event 19.4 (2016). Web.
Levine, Robert S. Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative
Identity. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1997.
- - - . Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P,
2003.

282
Libretti, Tim. “’We can starve too’: Américo Paredes' George Washington Gómez and
the Proletarian Corrido.” Recovering the US Hispanic Literary Heritage 2 (1993):
118-30.
Love, Nat. The Life and Adventures of Nat Love. New York: Arno Press, (1907) 1968.
Lowe, Lisa. The Intimacies of Four Continents. Durham: Duke UP, 2015.
Lowe, John. “Joaquín Murieta, Mexican History, and Popular Myths of Freedom.”
Journal of Popular Culture 35.2 (2001). 25-39.
Lukács, György. The Historical Novel. U of Nebraska P, 1983.
- - - . “Realism in Balance.” Aesthetics and Politics. New York: Verso, 1980.
Luis-Brown, David. “‘White Slaves’ and the ‘Arrogrant Mestiza’: Reconfiguring
Whiteness in The Squatter and the Don and Ramona.” American Literature 69.4
(1997): 813-39.
Madley, Benjamin. An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian
Catastrophe, 1846-1873. New Haven: Yale UP, 2017.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Penguin, 2002.
- - - . “German Ideology.” The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton, 1978.
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume 1. New York: Vintage
Books, 1977.
- - - . The Civil War in the United States. Ed. Andrew Zimmerman. New York:
International Publishers, 1961. Print.
- - - . Grundisse. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. New York, Penguin. 1973.
May, Robert. Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America.
Chapel Hill: U o North Carolina P, 2002.

283
McCall, Dan. The Silence of Bartleby. Cornell UP, 1989.
McNickle, D'Arcy. The Surrounded. Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 1978.
Menchaca, Martha. Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and
White Roots of Mexican Americans. Austin: U of Texas P, 2001.
Merish, Lori. “Print, Cultural Memory, and John Rollin Ridge’s the Life and Adventures
of Joaquín Murieta, the Celebrated California Bandit.” Arizona Quarterly 59.4
(2003): 31-70.
Michaels, Walter Benn. The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism: American
Literature at the Turn of the Century. Oakland: U of California P, 1987.
Miles, Tiya. The House on Diamond Hill: A Cherokee Plantation Story. Chapel Hill: U
of North Carolina P, 2010.
Mollis, Kara. “Teaching ‘Dear Mihia’: Sentimentalism and Cross-Cultural Education in
S. Alice Callahan’s Wynema: A Child of the Forest.” MELUS 33.3 (2008): 111129.
Mondragon, Maria. “‘The (Safe) White Side of the Line’: History and Disguise in John
Rollin Ridge’s the Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murieta, the Celebrated
California Bandit.” American Transcendental Quarterly 8.3 (1994): 173-187.
Monroy, Douglas. Thrown Among Strangers: The Making of Mexican California in
Frontier California. Berkeley: U of California P, 1990.
Moreton-Robinson, Aileen. Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous Sovereignty Matters. Sidney,
Allen & Unwin, 2007.
- - - . The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous Sovereignty. U of
Minnesota P, 2015.

284
Newlin, Keith. “Introduction.” The Oxford Handbook of American Literary Naturalism.
Ed. Keith Newlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- - - . “The Documentary Dtrategies of Naturalism.” The Oxford Handbook of American
Literary Naturalism. Ed. Keith Newlin. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.
Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Harvard UP, 2009.
Nichols, Robert. “Disaggregating Primitive Accumulation.” Radical Philosophy 194
(Nov- Dec, 2015): 18-28.
- - - . “Theft is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession.” Political Theory (April
2017):1-26.
Nwankwo, Ifeoma C. K. “The Promises and Perils of US African-American
Hemispherism: Latin America in Martin Delany's Blake and Gayl Jones's
Mosquito.” American Literary History 18.3 (2006): 579-599.
O’Brien, Jean M. Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians Out of Existence in New
England. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010.
Olson, Joel. The Abolition of White Democracy. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2004.
Orihuela, Sharad B. “The Black Market: Property, Freedom, and Martin Delany’s Blake;
or, the Huts of America.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists
2.2 (2014): 273-300.
Owens, Louis. “The Red Road to Nowhere: D'Arcy McNickle's” The Surrounded and
The Hungry Generations.” American Indian Quarterly (1989): 239-248.
Parker, Robert Dale. “Who Shot the Sheriff: Storytelling, Indian Identity, and the
Marketplace of Masculinity in D'Arcy McNickle's The Surrounded.” Modern
Fiction Studies 43.4 (1997): 898-932.

285
Paredes, Américo. George Washington Gómez: A Mexicotexan Novel. Houston: Arte
Público Press, 1990.
Parins, James W. John Rollin Ridge: His Life & Works. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1991.
Patterson, Orlando. Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study. Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1982.
Perez, Hector. “Voicing Resistance on the Border: A Reading of Américo Paredes's
George Washington Gómez.” Melus (1998): 27-48.
Petry, Ann. The Street. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, (1946) 2013.
Pierrot, Gregory. “Writing over Haiti: Black Avengers in Martin Delany’s Blake.”
Studies in American Fiction. 41.2 (2014): 175-199.
Pizer, Donald. Twentieth-Century American Literary Naturalism: An Interpretation. SIU
Press, 1982.
- - - . “Late Nineteenth-Century American Literary Naturalism: A Re-Introduction.”
American Literary Realism. 38.1 (Spring, 2006): 189-202.
Pokagon, Simon. Ogimawkwe Mitigwaki: Queen of the Woods. East Lansing: Michigan
State UP, (1899) 2011.
Poole, Mary. Segregated Origins of Social Security: African Americans and the Welfare
State. Durham: The U of North Carolina P, 2006.
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the
Making of Australian Multiculturalism. Durham: Duke UP, 2002.
Rancière, Jacques. “Deleuze, Bartleby, and the Literary Formula.” The Flesh of Words:
The Politics of Writing (2004): 146-164.

286
Rawls, James. Indians of California: The Changing Image. Norman: U of Oklahoma P,
1984.
Reynolds, David. John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the
Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights. New York: Random House, 2005.
Rifkin, Mark. “‘For the wrongs of our poor bleeding country’: Sensation, Class, and
Empire in Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta.” Arizona Quarterly 65. 2 (2009): 27-56.
- - - . Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American
Renaissance. U of Minnesota P, 2014.
- - - . When did Indians become Straight?: Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native
Sovereignty. New York: Oxford UP, 2011.
Ridge, John R. The Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murieta, the Celebrated California
Bandit. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, (1854) 1955.
- - - . A Trumpet of Our Own: Yellow Bird’s Essays on the North American Indian. Eds.
David R. Farmer and Rennard Strickland. San Francisco: The Book Club of
California, 1981.
Roediger, David. Class, Race and Marxism. London: Verso, 2017.
- - - . The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class.
London: Verso, 1999.
Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel
Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2000.
Rosenberg, Jordana and Amy Villarejo. “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia.” GLQ:
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies. 18.1 (2012): 1-18.

287
Rosenberg, Jordana and Chi-ming Yang. “Introduction: The Dispossessed Eighteenth
Century.” The Eighteenth Century 55. 2 (2014): 137-152.
Rosenberg, Jordana. “Monstrously Unpositable: Primitive Accumulation and the
Aesthetic Arc of Capital.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists
3.1 (2015): 197-204.
Rowe, John Carlos. “Highway Robbery: ‘Indian Removal,’ The Mexican-American War,
and American Identity in The Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murieta.” Novel: A
Forum on Fiction 31. 2 (1998): 149-173.
Ruiz de Burton, María Amparo. The Squatter and the Don. Houston: Arte Público Press,
(1885) 1992.
- - - . Who Would Have Thought It? Houston: Arte Público Press, (1872) 1995.
Rusert, Britt. “Delany’s Comet: Fugitive Science and the Speculative Imaginary of
Emancipation.” American Quarterly 65.4 (2013): 799-829.
Ryan, Melissa. “The Indian problem as a Woman’s Question: S. Alice Callahan’s
Wynema: A Child of the Forest.” American Transcendental Quarterly 21.1
(2007): 23-45.
Sakai, J. Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat from Mayflower to Modern.
Chicago: PM Press, (1983) 2014.
Saldaña-Portillo, María Josefina. “’How many Mexicans [is] a horse worth?’ The League
of United Latin American Citizens, Desegregation Cases, and Chicano
Historiography.” South Atlantic Quarterly 107.4 (2008): 809-831.

288
- - - . “’Wavering on the Horizon of Social Being’: The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and
the Legacy of Its Racial Character in Américo Paredes's George Washington
Gómez.” Radical History Review 89.1 (2004): 135-164.
Saldívar, Ramón. “The Borderlands of Culture: Américo Paredes's George Washington
Gómez and Chicano Literature at the End of the Twentieth Century.” American
Literary History (1993): 272-293.
Sale, Maggie Montesinos. The Slumbering Volcano: American Slave Ship Revolts and the
Production of Rebellious Masculinity. Durham: Duke UP, 1997.
Sánchez, Rosaura and Beatrice Pita. “Rethinking Settler Colonialism.” American
Quarterly 66.4 (2014): 1039-1055.
- - - . “Introduction.” The Squatter and the Don. Arte Público Press, 1992.
Scheckel, Susan. “Home on the Train: Race and Mobility in The Life and Adventures of
Nat Love.” American Literature 74.2 (2002): 219-250.
Schedler, Christopher. “Inscribing Mexican-American Modernism in Américo Paredes'
George Washington Gómez.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 42.2
(2000): 154-176.
Scott, William. “Material Resistance and the Agency of the Body in Ann Petry's The
Street.” American Literature. 78.1 (2006): 89-116.
Senier, Siobhan. “Allotment Protest and Tribal Discourse: Reading Wynema’s Successes
and Shortcomings.” American Indian Quarterly 24.3 (2000): 420-440.
Shockley, Evie. “Buried Alive: Gothic Homelessness, Black Women's Sexuality, and
(Living) Death in Ann Petry's The Street.” African American Review 40.3 (2006):
439-460.

289
Simpson, Audra. “Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and Juridics
of Failed Consent.” Law and Contemporary Problems 71.3 (2008): 191-215.
Simpson, Leanne. Dancing on our Turtle's Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-creation,
Resurgence and a New Emergence. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2011.
Singh, Nikhil Pal. “The Whiteness of Police.” American Quarterly 66.4 (2014): 10911099.
Sorensen, Leif. “The Anti-corrido of George Washington Gómez: A Narrative of
Emergent Subject Formation.” American Literature 80.1 (2008): 111-140.
Speirs, Kenneth. “Writing Self (Effacingly): E-Race-D Presences in The Life and
Adventures of Nat Love.” Western American Literature 40.3 (2005): 301-320.
Stowell, David O. Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1999.
Sundquist, Eric J. To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993.
Szalay, Michael. New Deal Modernism: American Literature and the Invention of the
Welfare State. Durham: Duke UP, 2000.
Szeghi, Tereza M. “The Vanishing Mexicana/o: (Dis)Locating the Native in Ruiz De
Burton’s Who Would Have Thought It? and The Squatter and the Don.” Aztlán: A
Journal of Chicano Studies 36.2 (2011): 89-120.
Tatonetti, Lisa. “Behind the Shadows of Wounded Knee: The Slippage of Imagination in
Wynema: A Child of the Forest.” Studies in American Indian Literatures 16.1
(2004): 1-31.

290
Thompson, Graham. “’Through consumptive pallors of this blank, raggy life’: Melville’s
Not Quite White Working Bodies.” Leviathan 14.2 (2012): 25-43.
Thornton, Bruce S. Searching for Joaquín: Myth, Murieta, and History in California. San
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.
Thornton, Russell. “Cherokee Population Losses During the Trail of Tears: a New
Perspective and a New Estimate.” Ethnohistory (1984): 289-300.
Trachtenberg, Alan. The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded
Age. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
Trafzer, Clifford E. and Joel R Hyer. ‘Exterminate Them’: Written Accounts of the
Murder, Rape and Enslavement of Native Americans During the California Gold
Rush, 1848-1868. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1999.
Teuton, Sean K. “The Indigenous Novel.” The Oxford Handbook of Indigenous American
Literature. Eds. James H. Cox and Daniel Heath Justice. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2014. 318- 331.
- - - . “The Settler Complex: An Introduction.” American Indian Culture and Research
Journal 37:2 (2013) 1-22.
Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.” Decolonization:
Indigeneity, Education & Society 1.1 (2012).
Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Frontier in American History. Ed. Allan G. Bogue. New
York: Courier Corporation, (1920) 2010.
Van Dyke, Annette. “An Introduction to Wynema, A Child of the Forest, by Sophia Alice
Callahan.” Studies in American Indian Literatures (1992): 123-128.

291
Vimalassery, Manu. “Counter-sovereignty.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century
Americanists 2.1 (2014): 142-148.
Vimalassery, Manu, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein “Introduction: On
Colonial Unknowing.” Theory & Event 19.4 (2016). Web.
Walker, Cheryl. Indian Nation: Native American Literature and Nineteenth-Century
Nationalisms. Durham, Duke University Press. 1997.
Ward, Deborah E. The White Welfare State: The Racialization of U.S. Welfare Policy.
Ann Harbor: U of Michigan P, 2005.
Wells, Ira. Fighting words: Polemics and Social Change in Literary Naturalism.
Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2013.
Whiting, Frederick. “The Citizen's Progress: Irony, Agency, and the Evolution of the
Bildungsroman in Américo Paredes's George Washington Gómez.” Studies in the
Novel 46.2 (2014): 178-196.
Whitman, Walt. “American Working Man Versus Slavery (1847).” The Gathering of the
Forces. Vol. 1 New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 1920.
Williams, Kristian. Our Enemies in Blue: Police and power in America. Chicago, AK
Press, 2015
Wilderson, Frank B. Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms.
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010.
- - - . “Gramsci's Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” Social Identities 9.2
(June 2003) 225-241.

292
Windell, Maria A. “‘Sanctify Our Suffering World with Tears’: Transamerican
Sentimentalism in Joaquín Murieta.” Nineteenth-Century Literature 63.2 (2008):
170-196.
- - - . “The Sentimental Realisms of S. Alice Callahan’s Wynema: A Child of the
Forest.” American Literary Realism 49.3 (2017): 246-262.
Winter, Molly Crumpton. “Culture-Tectonics: California Statehood and John Rollin
Ridge’s Joaquín Murieta.” Western American Literature 43.3 (2008): 259-276.
Wolfe, Patrick. “After the Frontier: Separation and Absorption in US Indian Policy.”
Settler Colonial Studies 1:1 (2013): 13-51.
- - - . “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal of Genocide
Research 8.4 (2006): 387–409.
Womack, Craig S. Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism. U of Minnesota
P, 1999.
Worden, Daniel. “Between Anarchy and Hierarchy: Nat Love’s and Theodore
Roosevelt’s Manly Feelings.” Masculine Style. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011. 35-55.
Wynter, Sylvia. “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the
Human, after Man, Its overrepresentation—an Argument.” CR: The New
Centennial Review 3.3 (2003): 257-337.
Žižek, Slavoj. “Notes Towards a Politics of Bartleby: The Ignorance of Chicken.”
Comparative American Studies 4. 4 (Dec. 2006): 375-394.

